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This dissertation takes the relationship between agricultural plants and power as its primary lens 
on the history of Chinese state-building in the Kham region of eastern Tibet during the early 
twentieth century. Farming was central to the way nationalist discourse constructed the imagined 
community of the Chinese nation, and it was simultaneously a material practice by which settlers 
reconfigured the biotic community of soils, plants, animals, and human beings along the frontier. 
This dissertation shows that Kham’s turbulent absorption into the Chinese nation-state was 
shaped by a perpetual feedback loop between the Han political imagination and the grounded 
experiences of soldiers and settlers with the ecology of eastern Tibet. Neither expressions of state 
power nor of indigenous resistance to the state operated neatly within the human landscape. 
Instead, the rongku—or “flourishing and withering”—of the state was the product of an 
ecosystem. 
This study chronicles Chinese state-building in Kham from Zhao Erfeng’s conquest of the 
region that began in 1905 until the arrival of the People’s Liberation Army in 1950. Qing officials 
hatched a plan to convert Kham into a new “Xikang Province” in the last years of the empire, and 
officials in the Republic of China finally realized that goal in 1939. The borders of Xikang Province 
enveloped a vast territory of 3.2 million square kilometers and some two million people. But as I 
show, Chinese authority there was also vertically bounded by a “grain line” at approximately 
3,600 meters above sea level, beyond which agriculture gave way to relatively ungovernable yak 
and sheep pastoralism. As it became clear that mass migration of Han Chinese farmers into 
eastern Tibet was an unlikely outcome under present conditions, local Han officials adapted 
through innovations in three areas: tax policy, agricultural science, and the redrawing of 
provincial borders. Beginning with Qing Frontier Commissioner Zhao Erfeng, administrators 
implemented a land tax in kind that strategically accommodated the needs of farmers to 
maximize the grain supply of Chinese armies and reduce the “friction of terrain.” Breakthroughs 
in wheat, barley, and yak production at high altitude agricultural experiment stations helped to 
renew Han Chinese confidence in the project of agricultural colonization during the 1940s. And 
the provincial government absorbed fertile rice-growing counties from western Sichuan to 
supply life-giving grain to civil organs in Kham, such as the schools that aimed to educate the 
children of Han settlers and assimilate indigenous Khampas. These adaptations were crucial to 






I wrote this dissertation all over the place: in my Champaign bedroom, at the Flying Machine 
coffee shop in Urbana (hopped up on macchiatos), at the Parasol café in Chengdu (where the 
owner would sometimes strut out his two pet alpacas), at an apartment on Arbat Street in 
Moscow, at my parents’ house in the woods of North Carolina. First of all, I want to thank 
everyone around me who tolerated my obsession with a Chinese province that no longer exists. 
Professionally speaking, my first and fiercest supporter has been my PhD adviser, Shao 
Dan, and it was our first phone call in 2010 that convinced me to study at UIUC. Professor 
Shao’s mentoring style was just what I needed: she put me in touch with exciting ideas and 
scholars but gave me tremendous leeway in crafting a research topic. Hers has always been the 
voice of reason, from pressing me to include more Chinese-language texts on my prelim 
reading list to reminding me that this is “just a dissertation” as I dragged my feet on filing it five 
years later. 
I will never forget the thrill of (finally) defending my dissertation to Shao and three 
other historians I deeply admire: Laura Hostetler, Rod Wilson, and Robert (Bob) Morrissey. 
Laura’s work has inspired my pursuit of borderlands history since my first year of grad school, 
and I was over the moon when she agreed to join my defense committee from Chicago. She has 
often been the first to return feedback on queries and drafts—and it is always good feedback. 
Rod is beyond generous with his time and energies, even with his own deadlines looming, and I 
can only hope to pay it forward. He and Bob ignited my interest in environmental history and 
coached me through much of the literature that frames this study.  
My research in China was supported by a Henry Luce/ACLS China Studies Pre-
Dissertation Summer Travel Grant and then a Fulbright Research Fellowship. The year and a 
half of archival research in China was one of happiest times in my life, and I have never leaned 
so heavily on the mercies of others. I am truly grateful to Yudru Tsomu for offering to mentor 
me at Sichuan University and thus salvaging my research plans after an earlier affiliation fell 
through. It is difficult to imagine my time in the Sichuan Archives without running into Li 
Songsong, who happens to be one of the few people as interested in Xikang Province as I am. It 
was Songsong who gifted me the copy of the Draft Gazetteer of Xikang (Xikang tongzhi gao) that I 
cite in every chapter. In the very early stages of document analysis, I bounced ideas off of my 




and out of my Chengdu apartment or over dinner at Tai Koo Li. Numerous others made our 
lives in Chengdu a pleasure, including Yuqin, Anne and Josh, Pat and Michelle, Camilla, Miles, 
and Ke’er. 
I had the privilege of workshopping every chapter of this dissertation at intimate 
meetings away from my home institution, and my chapters were much improved after incisive 
commentary from the following discussants: Deborah Fitzgerald at the graduate workshop of 
the Agricultural History Society, and Mariko Tamanoi at the Joint Consortia National 
Dissertation Workshop on Contemporary East Asia in 2017; Kenneth Pomeranz at the East Asia: 
Transregional Histories seminar in 2018; Ling Zhang, Benny Shafer and Alexander (Sasha) Day 
at a pair of workshops on Chinese Food in Boston in 2018 and 2019; and Kalyanakrishnan 
(Shivi) Sivaramakrishnan and James C. Scott at the Agrarian Studies Colloquium at Yale 
University in 2019. I would also like to thank the many workshop and colloquium participants 
who read my very rough drafts and weighed in. Happily, the feedback from these workshops 
was so rich that I couldn’t hope to integrate all of it into the dissertation, and I must continue to 
grapple with it as I move from the dissertation stage to the book. Then there are the mentors, 
colleagues, and friends who read and commented on large excerpts of my work purely out of 
the kindness of their hearts, including Scott Relyea, Sakura Christmas, Josh Levy, and Spencer 
Stewart. 
My parents David and Lynn Frank, who also suffered through grad school, were ever 
sympathetic and supportive. I owe my greatest debt of gratitude to my life partner Maria: for 
moving to China and adapting, for living below the poverty line, for working to support us, for 
listening to my half-baked ideas, and for giving me the opportunity to spend five years devoted 
to a passion project with no clear financial benefit. I would like to dedicate this dissertation to 
Maria and our daughter Katya, who will eventually figure out what I was doing on my 
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A Note on the Transliteration of Chinese and Tibetan Terms 
 
Chinese terms in this dissertation are transcribed using the Hanyu Pinyin Romanization system. 
Exceptions are made for names, such as Chiang Kai-shek, that are commonly transcribed in 
ways other than Pinyin. Chinese characters are also included the first time a Chinese term 
appears in the text. 
 
Tibetan terms are transcribed using the THL Simplified Phonemic system as described here: 
http://www.thlib.org/reference/transliteration/#!essay=/thl/phonetics/. The names of most 
Chinese counties in eastern Tibet were historically derived from their Tibetan names, and this 
dissertation uses those Chinese names where I am referring to a Chinese unit of administration 
(such as Daofu county). A Chinese-Tibetan conversion table for counties in Xikang province can 






Out of this soil has grown a glorious history, but it is a 
history that was naturally limited by what could be taken 
from the soil. Now it appears that these very limitations 
imposed by agriculture will hold China back, will prevent 
the nation from moving forward. 
—Fei Xiaotong, From the Soil (1948) 
 
When in 1912 the Republic of China supplanted the Qing empire, it was far from clear which 
parts of the former empire were Chinese. Many peoples along the northern and western frontiers 
of the empire felt that they were not terribly Chinese. Representatives of Mongolia and Tibet, two 
former dependencies of the Qing, declared independence from China shortly after the 
revolution.1 Two decades later the East Turkestan independence movement threatened to take 
China’s Xinjiang Province off the map. Mongolia retains its independence today, while Chinese 
(PRC) rule in Tibet and Xinjiang still faces calls for greater autonomy or even independence, 
which are often met with brutal crackdowns. 
Scholars have explained these contests over the borderlands primarily in terms of 
ethnopolitics. Typically, historians of Chinese borderlands focus on political and cultural 
relations between the Han ethnic majority and various other peoples who are now officially 
designated “ethnic minorities” (shaoshu minzu 少数民族) by the PRC state.2 It is widely recognized 
that the Chinese nation-state has subsumed its multi-ethnic frontiers into a republic dominated 
by the Han, while many Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, and members of other ethnic groups in 
Inner Asia have resisted political and cultural domination by the Han. But borderlands historians 
 
1 Mongolia twice declared independence from China, first in 1911, then in 1921, with support from 
Russia. It existed as the Soviet-backed Mongolian People’s Republic from 1924-1992, and as simply 
“Mongolia” from 1992 to the present. In 1913, a Buryat Mongol monk named Aguan Dorjieff claiming to 
represent the 13th Dalai Lama signed a treaty in Urga, Mongolia with the revolutionary Mongolian 
government, according to which Mongolia and Tibet each henceforth recognized the independence of the 
other. However, the legitimacy of that treaty, and Dorjieff’s claim to represent the Dalai Lama in 
particular, have been the subject of much controversy. For an erudite discussion of this treaty, see Mehra 
(1969). 
2 Works in this vein are numerous, but here I would point to two influential edited volumes as 
representative of the field overall: Cultural Encounters on China’s Ethnic Frontiers (Harrel 1995), and 
Governing China’s Multi-ethnic Frontiers (Rossabi 2004). By my read, historians of Chinese borderlands 
have shown markedly less interest in environment and ecology than their counterparts in American 




increasingly recognize that ethnic relations were (and are) guided by ecological factors that require 
us to look beyond the anthropocentric rubrics of politics and culture.3 
The ethnic diversity of the Qing was closely related to its ecological diversity. In the 17th 
and 18th centuries, as the imperial court consolidated ever more Inner Asian territory, it 
deliberately stemmed the migration of Han farmers from the empire’s arable core (often called 
“China proper”) to the forests, steppes, and mountains of the Inner Asian frontier, where mostly 
non-Han communities engaged in hunting, foraging, pastoralism, and other lifeways.4 Depletion 
of frontier quarry and a burgeoning Han population eventually made these controls impractical, 
and the court reluctantly endorsed agricultural encroachment on formerly protected Inner Asian 
lands. By the late 19th century, notes David Bello, Qing frontier policy had given way to a “‘vulgar’ 
arablism” that “sought to turn everyone into (Han) farmers and everywhere into (Han) 
cropland.”5 Policies to increase farm area, typically through migrant land reclamation, became a 
pervasive pattern across the transition from Qing to Republic. 
By the 1920s, print discourse presented agriculture as essential to Chinese identity and 
agricultural colonization as a patriotic enterprise. The revolutionary statesman and writer Zhang 
Shizhao 章士釗 promoted the notion that China, unlike Japan and western Europe, was and 
should remain an “agrarian country” (nong guo 農國) after his experiences as a student in Tokyo 
and Edinburgh left him with a distaste for industrialization.6  Numerous writers echoed that 
sentiment, including one Que Peizhen 闕培珍, who wrote in 1922 that “our country is founded 
on agriculture,” and that “the two enterprises of industry and commerce are of no fundamental 
importance.”7 Other essayists asserted that “the material for the four great needs of clothing, food, 
shelter, and travel all grow from the earth. […] As such, farmers are those who utilize the earth 
to produce and multiply in order to give the people their needs,” and that “agriculture is the root 
 
3 Exemplary recent environmental histories of Chinese borderlands include Bello (2016), Schlesinger 
(2017), Kinzley (2018). 
4 Bello (2016), p. 269. On interdictions against Han migration to Manchuria during the Qing, see also 
Elliot (2000). Qing rulers were particularly attentive to the dangers of Han migration to Manchuria and 
Mongolia, which threatened the livelihoods of the Manchu and Mongol bannermen that formed the 
mainstay of the Qing military. 
5 Bello (2016), p. 239. 
6 Boorman (1967), pp. 105-106 




of the Chinese state (nongye shi zhongguo zhi guo ben 農業是中國之國本), and farmers are the 
nucleus of Chinese society.”8 
Frontier policy wonks in the Republic of China were quick to adapt this sort of agricultural 
fundamentalism in support of kaiken and tunken, terms that denoted Han migration from the 
Chinese interior (neidi 内地) to the frontier for land reclamation. A 1923 essay in Enterprise 
Magazine (Shiye zazhi 实业杂志) lamented (not quite accurately) that the former Qing empire and 
the fledgling Republic had allowed Sichuanese farmers to settle the Tibetan frontier but did little 
to promote or encourage migration. Not only would frontier land reclamation (bianwai kaiken邊
外開墾) greatly influence economic development, contended the author, but it was also “one of 
the most important affairs in relation to governance, society, and the nation (minzu 民族).”9 A 
1931 manifesto called for Han soldiers to settle the Kham region of eastern Tibet, farm its land, 
and marry its women. It opened with what was by then a familiar refrain: “our country is a 
country founded on agriculture.”10 
While other historians have considered agriculture as one component of China’s state-
building toolkit on the frontier, this dissertation takes the relationship between plants and power 
as its primary lens on the history of Chinese state-building in the Kham region of eastern Tibet 
during the early twentieth century. The framing of agriculture as the guoben國本, or “root of the 
state,” in historical discourse invites us to collapse the common distinction between the nation-
state as a semiotic construct and as a material formation. On one hand agriculture was central to 
the way nationalist discourse constructed the imagined community of the Chinese nation, and it 
was simultaneously a material practice by which settlers reconfigured the biotic community of 
soils, plants, animals, and human beings along the frontier.11 As I show in the following chapters, 
Kham’s turbulent absorption into the Chinese nation-state was shaped by a perpetual feedback 
loop between the Han political imagination and the grounded experiences of Han soldiers and 
settlers with the agricultural ecology of eastern Tibet. Neither expressions of state power nor of 
resistance to the state operated neatly within the human landscape. This might best be expressed 
 
8 These two quotes are taken from Chen Baolin (1935) and Cheng Baoyuan (1924), p. 18. 
9 Zhi Fei (1922), p. 16. 
10 Zhang Yunping (1931), p. 39. 
11 Here I invoke Benedict Anderson’s formulation of the nation as a form of “imagined community,” 
constructed through discourse (Anderson 2006) and Aldo Leopold’s notion of soild, plants, animals, and 
humans as belonging to a “biotic community” (Leopold 1989, p. 204). I further explore the interplay of 




in terms of the Chinese metaphor rongku榮枯, which literally denotes “flourishing and withering” 
but is often used to describe the “rise and fall” of human endeavors. It may be said that the rongku 
of Chinese rule in Kham was the product of an ecosystem.12 
Tibet, situated on the world’s highest plateau, was exceptionally resistant to agrarian 
colonization. Just a century ago, its superlative heights restricted Chinese encroachment in ways 
that are difficult to imagine in our age of planes, automobiles, and hydroponic farming. 
Governance was not so difficult at lower altitudes, where the Qing/Chinese state could establish 
military colonies and levy a grain tax to feed its soldiers and administrators, administrators could 
entice Han migrants to settle farming villages and form counties, and grain surpluses freed civil 
servants to run institutions like schools and prisons that molded a modern citizenry. But as low 
valleys ascended into high grasslands and alpine forests, the situation in Tibet resembled the 
highlands of Zomia in Southeast Asia, where, according to James C. Scott, “the friction of terrain 
set up sharp, relatively inflexible limits to the effective reach of the traditional agrarian state.”13 
While Zomia, by Scott’s famous definition, runs from about two hundred to four thousand meters 
above sea level, most of ethnographic Tibet (the region populated by Tibetan-speaking peoples) 
sits at the higher end of this scale. By the time the People’s Liberation Army occupied Lhasa in 
the 1950s, it had the use of automobiles that substantially alleviated the friction of terrain. But for 
decades before that, China (first the ROC, then the early PRC) was essentially limited on Sino-
Tibetan frontier to what J.R. McNeill calls “the somatic energy regime,” in which the state “had 
no viable options for concentrating energy other than amassing human bodies.”14 Those bodies 
were fueled mainly by plants endemic to lower altitudes. Thus, to understand the pace and 
direction of China’s interventions in ethnographic Tibet during the early twentieth century, we 
must look closely at the relationship between governance, agriculture, and the environment. 
The geographical focus of this study is on the Kham region, situated on the southeastern 
corner of the Tibetan plateau and sharing a large border with southwest China’s Sichuan 
province. Qing officials hatched a plan to convert Kham into “Xikang Province” in the last years 
of the empire, and officials in the Republic of China finally realized that goal in 1939. The borders 
of Xikang province enveloped a vast territory of 3.2 million square kilometers and some two 
 
12 For example, “The Flourishing and Withering of Migration to Kham” was the topic of a 1935 essay in 
Northwest Commentary. See “Xikang Yimin.” 
13 Scott (2010), p. 43. 




million people.15 But as I will show, Chinese authority there was also vertically bounded by a 
“grain line” at approximately 3,600 meters above sea level, beyond which agriculture gave way 
to relatively ungovernable yak and sheep pastoralism. As it became clear that mass migration of 
Han Chinese farmers into eastern Tibet was unlikely to succeed, local officials adapted through 
innovations in three areas: tax policy, agricultural science, and the redrawing of provincial 
borders. These adaptations were essential to the integration of Kham into China’s provincial 
system, where it remains to this day. 
 
 
Figure 1. Map of Kham showing the major trading route from Chengdu to Lhasa and the 1727 stele that demarcated the divide 





15 “Xikang yiban jingji,” p. 52. These figures exclude the large area west of the Yangtze/Jinsha river that 






Until recently, the historiography of modern Sino-Tibetan relations focused on the metropoles: it 
was essentially the study of how Beijing occupied (or “liberated”) Lhasa.16 In that literature, the 
borderlands between China proper and central Tibet figured in a peripheral role, if at all. In the 
past two decades, historians and anthropologists have added nuance to the metropolitan 
narrative by training their lenses on less elite communities in the borderlands. Their insights 
include the observation that state power in the borderlands operated within syncretic, inter-
ethnic networks, disturbing the illusions of a pure Tibetan resistance to a pure Chinese oppression. 
In his pioneering study of Buddhist interactions between Han and Tibetans, Gray Tuttle writes 
that China’s Sichuan Province served as “a middle ground between the centralized 
administrations of China and Tibet” that “proved more capable of flexible innovation than the 
cultural centers of either nation” during the early twentieth century.17 The same is true of the 
Kham region, which in fact overlapped in space with Sichuan. Kham studies has only emerged 
as a field in its own right over the past several years.18 
The emergent field of Kham studies might be roughly divided into two bodies of work. 
One of these, loosely aligned with the American school of borderland studies, re-narrates the 
history of the Qing empire from the perspective of Kham. Patrick Giersch, summarizing some of 
this work, notes that Kham figured as a borderland between the Chinese provinces and the Lhasa-
based government of the Dalai Lama, the Ganden Phodrang. Even though the Ganden Phodrang 
was nominally subordinate to the Qing, it vied with the Qing provinces (especially Sichuan) for 
control over parts of Kham from the mid-19th century through the mid-20th century.19 Kham itself 
was a polycentric order in which kings, governors, and lamas competed with one another for 
power and challenged the authority of outside players, including Sichuan and Lhasa. These 
historians have identified two events that dramatically reconfigured the balance of power in 
Kham, and lent credence to the notion of “Kham” as a political unit: the first was an attempt by 
 
16 Examples of histories in this vein include Goldstein and Gelek Rimpoche (1989), Goldstein (2005), 
Shakya (2000). 
17 Tuttle (2007), p. 127. 
18 In addition to the many individual books and chapter that I shall cite throughout his dissertation, three 
edited volumes suggest the emergence of Kham studies as a significant field of scholarship: the edited 
volumes Khams Pa Histories: Visions of People, Place, and Authority (Epstein 2002) and Frontier Tibet: Patterns 
of Change in the Sino-Tibetan Borderlands (Gros 2019), as well as a special issue of Cross-Currents E-Journal 
on the theme of “Frontier Tibet: Trade and Boundaries of Authority in Kham” (Gros 2016). 




Gompo Namgyel, an indigenous strongman from the Kham polity of Nyarong, to overthrow 
competing chieftains and unify much of the region under his authority in the 19th century. 
Sichuan and the Ganden Phodrang eventually united against Gompo Namgyel to protect their 
interests, resulting in his swift demise. The second event was a more successful effort by a Sichuan 
official named Zhao Erfeng to overthrow local chieftains and convert their polities into a series of 
bureaucratic counties in the fashion of the Qing provinces, beginning in 1905 and lasting until the 
fall of the Qing dynasty in 1911. Chapter 1 will open with a brief overview of this latter saga, and 
other chapters will revisit it. 
Another body of work looks at Chinese governance of eastern Tibet (Kham and Amdo) 
under the People’s Republic of China after 1950. These I will not summarize except to note that 
they are somewhat less cohesive with one another because such is the nature of contemporary 
Kham, which has ceased to exist as an official political entity under the PRC and is now divided 
among several Chinese provinces, including Sichuan, Yunnan, and the Tibet Autonomous 
Region. They tend to be local in scope, probing in ethnographic detail how communities, 
households, and individuals have adapted to the changing political, cultural, and economic 
landscape of the PRC.20 
The Rooted State addresses the relatively unexamined history of Chinese state-building in 
Kham from the end of the Qing empire through the beginning of the PRC. The core of this 
dissertation is a study of Chinese governance under the Republic of China, culminating in the 
establishment of Xikang Province. It is motivated in part by the present controversies 
surrounding Tibet, and by a recognition that “it is impossible to understand these hotly-debated 
issues without first analyzing how the Sino-Tibetan relationship was shaped in the pre-
Communist era.”21 Writing a history of Xikang is about more than “filling a gap” in the literature: 
it disrupts prevailing ideas about the broader history of Sino-Tibetan relations. The current 
literature suggests, implicitly or explicitly, that Republican China claimed symbolic sovereignty 
over the Tibetan plateau but made little effort to actually govern it. In one influential account, 
Tibet and Nationalist China’s Frontier, Hsiao-Ting Lin describes the Guomindang’s Tibet policy as 
a series of “ethnopolitical games” through which China asserted an “imagined sovereignty” over 
greater Tibet to boost its prestige in the domestic and international arenas.22 Lin and others are 
 
20 Examples of scholarship in this vein include Tan (2016), Turek (2019), Cho (2019). 
21 Lin (2006), p. 14. 




particularly dismissive of Xikang Province. He describes it as “an imaginary Xikang Province,” 
while Warren Smith’s Tibetan Nation similarly claims that Xikang was “of an almost entirely 
imaginary nature.”23 A corollary of that statement is that in reality, the years from 1912-1949, 
(corresponding to China’s Republican era) saw a long hiatus in Chinese state-building activities 
in Kham. 
Conversely, in the building of Xikang province I perceive a great deal of continuity from 
the Qing empire to the early PRC. Chapter 1 will show that Qing officials first proposed building 
Xikang in the last years of the dynasty, and while the Revolution of 1912 undermined those plans, 
the goal of building Xikang resonated in frontier politics until warlord-turned-governor Liu 
Wenhui劉文輝 formally established it in 1939. Admittedly, Liu and his warlord predecessors 
could not extend uniform control throughout the space marked as Xikang. But nor was the 
province “imaginary.” 
Rather, it was incomplete. By way of an illustration, consider the situation in Degé: the 
kingdom of Degé in northern Kham was ruled by a line of indigenous kings and survived in some 
form from the 15th century until 1950, when it was dismantled by the People’s Liberation Army. 
From 1913 onward, however, it coincided in space with the Chinese county of Dege (Dege xian 德
格縣), which was governed by a Han Chinese magistrate and hosted an assortment of modern 
Chinese institutions.24 Intuitively, these two polities seem incompatible. So which was fictitious: 
Dege county or the concurrent kingdom of Degé?  
Certainly, the Chinese county of Dege must have seemed illusory to many Khampas. 
Growing up in the kingdom of Degé, one Juchen Thupten Namgyal remembers hearing about 
the Chinese, but never seeing them. He read in books that there was a land named Gyakar (India) 
to the west where most people wore white, and a land named Gyanak (China) to the east where 
most people wore black. He saw girls wearing Chinese copper coins and Qing silver Zangyang 
in their hair. Sometimes, when he fussed, his parents would scare him into silence by saying that 
“the Chinese are coming!” Stories lingered about Zhao Erfeng’s bloody campaigns in the late 
Qing, and several Chinese predations since then. Even so, Juchen Thupten Namgyal recalls that 
after some brief and violent encounters with the Red Army in 1936, “there was no Chinese 
 
23 See Lin (2006), p. 202; Warren Smith (1996), p. 226. 
24 However, the Tibetan army gained control over Degé from 1918-1932. During this time there was no 




influence here, but Chinese people came to see Dege as their territory.” However, it is difficult to 
reconcile that viewpoint with archival records that reveal a real and politically complex Chinese 
presence in Degé by the late 1940s. Xikang’s Dege county oversaw tax collection, schools, a police 
force, local militias, cooperative associations, and a Chinese-style system of household 
registration that appears to list both Chinese and Tibetan names.25 In Degé and elsewhere, the 
Chinese state apparatus co-existed with Khampa power structures. To be sure, Chinese 
institutions in Kham operated under the political fiction that the Chinese state exercised 
sovereign control over the lands within Xikang, when in reality, it had no monopoly on power 
across much of that territory. But to dismiss Xikang and its counties as “imaginary” is to ignore 
the very real history of Chinese institutional growth in eastern Tibet that the PRC still cites in 
support of its rule on the Tibetan plateau today. Instead of asking whether Xikang was a real or 
imaginary province, we might ask why there was such a big discrepancy between its real and 
imagined properties. What were the processes that brought Xikang into China’s provincial fold, 
and who or what set their pace? 
 
Making Kham Chinese 
While the government of the PRC claims that its Tibetan regions have always been an 
“inseparable” part of the “unified, multi-ethnic country” that is China, the consensus among 
international historians is that China’s current control over these regions stems from the 
expansionist frontier policies of the Qing empire, and from the efforts of the ROC and PRC to 
translate that imperium into a sovereign nation-state under a unified administration. The 
question of how peripheral Qing territories like Kham came to be seen as integral territories of 
the Chinese nation-state has no simple answer. It deserves a complex explanation from multiple, 
complementary perspectives that each inform this study. 
One explanatory framework focuses on political changes specific to Qing/China. In the 
17th and 18th centuries the Manchu rulers of the Qing subjugated the former Ming empire as well 
as Mongolia, Dzungaria, and Tibet, but they did not attempt to place all of these territories under 
a single administrative system. Instead, the former Ming provinces remained under the Six 
Ministries, while frontier territories outside of the provincial system were administered 
 
25 These details are gleaned from a detailed survey of institutions in Dege county compiled by the county 




separately under a Court of Colonial Affairs (Chinese: Lifan yuan理藩院; Manchu: tulergi golo be 
dasara jurgan). From the 17th century the Lifan Yuan mediated relations between the Qing court 
and the Ganden Phodrang, which the court recognized it as the legitimate administration in 
central Tibet. But Kham was beyond the immediate control of either the Ganden Phodrang or the 
junxian system, and here the Lifan yuan followed the precedent of earlier dynasties in authorizing 
a large number of tusi土司, or “local chieftains,” to rule their own minor polities on behalf of the 
empire, maintaining what some have called a “tusi system” of indirect rule.26 Four tusi dominated 
Kham during the late Qing, corresponding to the polities of Degé, Chakla, Batang, and Litang.27 
In the long view, the tusi system facilitated the transition of frontier regions from proxy 
rule by local chieftains to direct rule by Qing (later Chinese) bureaucrats. Scott Relyea observes 
that Yuan, Ming, and Qing rulers were known to replace local chieftaincies with bureaucratic 
administrations on an ad hoc basis, but the Yongzheng emperor decreed in 1726 that the tusi 
should be eliminated entirely through systematic bureaucratization—a policy he referred to as 
gaitu guiliu 改土歸流.28 Officials began to implement gaitu guiliu, in Yunnan as early as the 1720s. 
Kham, however, did not experience extensive regularization until the first decade of the twentieth 
century, when it was provoked by an indigenous uprising (chapter 1). The late Qing push to 
bureaucratize Kham was easily enough to translate into nationalist policy after 1911, when the 
Administrative Yuan was eager to implement a uniform administrative system across the 
Republic of China. For many administrators, the 1939 creation of Xikang province was the logical 
outcome of a decades-long process of bureaucratization. 
 Another explanatory framework considers Qing/Chinese territorial expansion in the 
broader context of the cultural history of imperialism and colonialism. One of the more 
revolutionary insights of the “New Qing History” movement that emerged in the 1990s is that 
the Qing acted in a similar way to early modern European empires by inducting frontier peoples 
 
26 Crossley (2006), pp. 68. Although contemporary historians (including this author) commonly refer to a 
“tusi system” (tusi zhidu 土司制度), C. Patrick Giersch notes accurately that there was no mention of the 
tusi as a coherent or centrally coordinated “system” in late imperial China. Giersch writes that the 
relationship between the Qing government and the tusi “did not revolve around an intangible ‘system,’ 
but around individuals who assessed each other, evaluated the costs of coercion and resistance, and then 
made decisions within the social and political norms of their respective societies” (2006, p. 11). As such, I 
would note, the conferral of tusi titles on local rulers is a good indication of where the bureaucratic Qing 
state had difficulty establishing direct rule.  
27 Gros (2019), p. 52. 




as colonial subjects within a politically and ethnically heterogeneous imperium. Much of this 
work focuses on issues of representation. Inspired by earlier studies of how Europeans 
represented African and New World peoples in word and image, Qing scholars like Laura 
Hostetler and Emma Teng have shown that ethnography, cartography, and travel writings 
galvanized Qing officials’ interest in frontier regions like Guizhou and Taiwan that were 
populated by ethnic “others,” and supported the project of colonizing those regions.29  Some 
historians have extended that analysis to Chinese representations of Kham during the early 
twentieth century: Yudru Tsomu argues that the maps and ethnographic writings of Ren 
Naiqiang helped Chinese readers to perceive Kham as “a core territory of the new China” during 
the 1930s, while Yajun Mo contends that the photography of Zhang Xueben performed a similar 
role during the 1940s.30 The explanatory force of these studies derives from a strategy of—in the 
words of Emma Teng—“shifting the focus to the cultural and ideological dimensions of 
imperialism/colonialism.”31 
But some newer borderland histories argue convincingly that we cannot understand the 
particular course of territorial expansion without attention to material processes. Judd Kinzley 
argues that the study of frontier territorial issues is “about more than symbolic representations of 
space through maps, the crafting of historical narratives, or the performance of identities,” while 
David Bello complains that both the New Qing historians and their opponents “ignore the 
influence of ecological factors on issues of Han ethnic superiority.”32 These interventions are 
consistent with the broader material turn in the humanities, which rejects “an anthropocentric 
purview and nature-culture dualism,” and I would situate my study within that development.33 
Bello’s account of Qing ecology identifies rapid agricultural expansion as a feature of the 
Qing-Republic transition. Earlier historians perceived a fairly continuous spread of Chinese 
agriculture from its origins in the central plain (zhong yuan 中原) along the Yellow river to the 
lower Yangtze region in the south, and finally the forests, steppes, and mountains on the northern 
and western frontiers of the empire.34 By contrast, Bello views the Qing dynasty as a significant 
 
29 Hostetler (2001); Teng (2004). 
30 Tsomu (2012), pp. 5-6; Mo (2013). 
31 Teng (2004), p. 8. 
32 Kinzley (2018), p. 9; Bello (2016), p. 7. 
33 For an overview of the New Materialism, see “New Materialism - Literary and Critical Theory.” 
34 For example, Mark Elvin (1993) claims that the agrarian Chinese state oversaw “three thousand years of 
unsustainable growth” culminating with the Chinese cultivation of portions of Inner Asia. He further 




departure from its late imperial predecessors in that it made “a concerted, if often conflicted, 
effort to protect and even nurture networks of environmental relations other than those 
constituting Han agrarianism.”35 Pastoralism and hunting helped to distinguish the Manchu and 
Mongol bannermen who comprised the mainstay of the Qing military from the Han and other 
commoner subjects of the empire. This ecological balance collapsed only during the 19th century 
as hunters depleted frontier game, pastoral bannermen became increasingly dependent on grain 
and silver supplements from China proper, and a ballooning Han population spilled out of 
bounds. The triumph of agriculture over non-agrarian lifeways produced “a comparatively 
monolithic form of empire-wide environmental relations” (namely, agrarianism), and augured 
the rise of a new Han-dominated state.36 In a sense, this dissertation picks up where Bello leaves 
off by examining how resurgent Han agrarianism produced a new kind of Chinese frontier 
during the early twentieth century. 
  
The Frontier through Agrarian Eyes 
If all you have is a plow, everything looks like a farm. In the last decades of the Qing, officials 
grew increasingly concerned that there was so much “wasteland” on the frontier. Some four 
hundred million Chinese appeared to be crowded into less than half the area of the territory 
claimed by the empire. Why not “open it up to cultivation” (kaiken開墾)?37 
An association between ethnic minorities and under-exploited land and resources, often 
couched in terms of population density, has been a persistent feature of Chinese state discourse 
ever since. In 1956 Chairman Mao declared that “it is the Han nationality whose population is 
large and the minority nationalities whose territory is vast and whose resources are rich.”38 In 
 
45). Bello (2016), by contrast, emphasizes a shift in human-environment relations during the 19th century 
that I discuss below. 
35 Bello (2016), p. 13. 
36 Bello (2016), p. 225. 
37 For example, Sakura Christmas, writing on Inner Mongolia under the late Qing, notes that “by the late 
nineteenth century, officials came to believe hunters and herders under-utilized what territory the empire 
had granted them. These perceptions helped justify requisitioning the land in the name of the state. What 
had changed in the nineteenth century, then, was not the way indigenes had used banner property as 
much as the way the state had interpreted that notion of usefulness” (2016, p. 158). Judd Kinzley similarly 
observes that in Xinjiang during the late 19th century, Qing officials invited Han settlers to “constitute a 
stable civilian population that could lower the high cost of labor in the region, help ease the burden of 
empire by both reducing the need to import grain and increasing land tax revenues, and help facilitate 
the settlement of vulnerable, underpopulated border regions” (2018, p. 26). 




2009 a PRC white paper similarly claimed that “in places where ethnic minorities live in compact 
communities, the minority populations are usually small, whereas the areas they live in are often 
large and rich in resources.”39 Today industrial China’s most prized frontier resources include oil, 
coal, and precious minerals. But at the dawn of the twentieth century, as the Qing empire and 
subsequent republic faced a Malthusian population crisis, it was abundant unfarmed dirt that 
most tantalized state planners. 
In some places, the state struggled to persuade the average Zhou that soil “beyond the 
pass,” long thought to be forbidden or undesirable, was in fact neglected and desirable. The 
Tibetan plateau was one such place. In 1910, the Qing Frontier Commissioner (Bianwu Shi邊務使
) delivered a speech in the Chinese vernacular (baihua白話) advertising for Han farmers to settle 
parts of Kham. After three years of mostly fruitless recruiting, he now insisted that central Kham 
was “a really, really good place”—by which he meant a good place to farm: 
Seeing that Batang and Litang beyond the pass have undergone gaitu guiliu in the 
past several years, and since I saw that their land was fertile and that no one was 
cultivating it, I, the Frontier Commissioner, issued a notice to recruit people to 
open it up to cultivation. […] No more than one percent of the land is under 
cultivation, and there are ten million mu that could be turned into farms. Irrigation 
is also easy. This is a really, really good place (zhen shi ge hao difang真是個好地
方).40 
  
In colonial fashion, the late Qing and subsequent Republic construed frontier lands as 
“unoccupied” so as to legitimize settling them with outsiders. In Kham this meant discrediting 
indigenous uses of the land, namely, mobile pastoralism and the cultivation of indigenous crops 
that were unfamiliar to the Han. The reason that Khampas did not grow rice, claimed the Frontier 
Commissioner, was not that rice was poorly suited to the environment—but rather, that “the 
barbarians (manzi蠻子) are all lazy.” 
To fully appreciate the problems with that view, we must confront the agrarian prejudices 
that we ourselves have inherited. American statesmen and scholars also long equated agriculture 
with civilization and agricultural expansion with progress. Liberty Hyde Bailey, a founding 
figure in rural sociology, prefaced a 1911 volume on East Asian agriculture (F.H. King’s Farmers 
of Forty Centuries) by describing farming as “the bottom condition of civilization” and the spread 
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of agriculture as “the final conquest of the planet.”41 In 1939 the conventional wisdom was still 
that (to quote Ezra Parmalee Prentice) “agriculture arose, bringing increased food and a degree 
of leisure sufficient to permit man to turn his mind to the study of the possibilities before him.”42 
From that perspective, the replacement of nomadism with agriculture seemed both desirable and 
inevitable. 
By the 1970s, however, social scientists armed with new data had begun to invert the 
agriculturalist narrative by arguing that our ancestors who transitioned from hunter-gatherer to 
sedentary lifeways abandoned a diverse diet for one that was far less nutritious. The farmer could 
produce a larger volume of food than the hunter-gatherer but expended more time and energy 
to secure a given number of calories. And dry grain was amenable to taxation, a crucial factor in 
the rise of the earliest states but also in the rise of social inequality.43 Calling the adoption of 
agriculture “the worst mistake in the history of the human race,” already in 1987 Jared Diamond 
noted that “recent discoveries suggest that the adoption of agriculture, supposedly our most 
decisive step toward a better life, was in many ways a catastrophe from which we have never 
recovered.”44 More recently, a Yuval Noah Harari’s pop-history book Sapiens echoed Diamond in 
labeling the agricultural revolution “history’s biggest fraud.” 45  The anarchist historian and 
anthropologist James C. Scott contends that the shift from mobile subsistence to settled 
agriculture was a largely coercive process in which predatory, grain-powered states pressed non-
state peoples into settled agriculture against “determined resistance” in order to reap their taxes 
and labor.46 From that perspective, modern agriculture’s “final conquest of the planet” seems 
markedly less benign. 
Highlands are sites where civilization’s discontents have notoriously flouted the control 
of agricultural states until modern times. In The Art of Not Being Governed, Scott attributes this 
phenomenon to the “friction of terrain,” in that upland topography inhibited both intensive 
agriculture and the transportation of bulk foodstuffs, and thus created “sharp, relatively 
inflexible limits to the effective reach of the traditional, agrarian state.”47 Scott gleans his major 
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insights from a historical survey of hill tribes in Zomia, an upland region of Asia roughly 
corresponding to what Jean Michaud had previously termed the “Southeast Asian massif.” 
Zomia/the Southeast Asian massif was (and is) not a polity, but rather, a cluster of upland 
societies that long evaded assimilation by neighboring lowland states—most notably China. 
Although this highland region runs directly into the Tibetan plateau to the north, both Scott and 
Michaud exclude Tibet from their analyses on what I believe to be a faulty premise: that Tibet, 
including Kham, “has a long history as a centralized and religiously harmonized kingdom with 
a very ancient, sophisticated political structure.”48 This statement may be fairly accurate of central 
Tibet (known as U-Tsang to Tibetans), but it hardly describes what Michaud calls “the ancient 
Kham polity”— nor has such a polity ever existed. 
When considering the historical, fractious, state-resistant Kham, I find Scott’s Zomia 
model very good to think with. His description of the “friction of terrain” neatly captures the 
conundrum facing one Yin Changheng 尹昌衡 who led a Chinese army from the Sichuan basin 
to re-take Kham after the Revolution of 1911. Between short skirmishes with the central Tibetan 
army, Yin’s men faced long marches over difficult terrain on mostly empty stomachs. Sensing the 
threat of a mutiny, Yin resorted to desperate rhetoric: “you gentlemen say that hunger and 
exhaustion kill people, I say hunger and exhaustion in fact give us life.” Chapter 1 introduces 
what I call Yin’s “war on hunger” to raise questions about how the Chinese 
state grappled with Kham’s friction of terrain during and after the late-Qing 
conquests, which chapter 2 then addresses more systematically. As we might 
expect in a Zomia-esque setting, Chinese efforts to directly appropriate 
foodstuffs from local farms to feed its military were plagued by brazen 
indigenous non-compliance, which was in turn facilitated by a high degree of 
indigenous mobility. But the Chinese state was responsive to such challenges, 
and I observe that China’s conversion of much of Kham into Xikang Province 
during the late 1930s corresponded with a general lightening of local tax 
burdens. Why? 
I argue that Xikang’s race toward province-hood was in some ways, 
ironically, a humbling experience for the Chinese state. It spurred 
increasingly detailed survey reports on eastern Tibet, which in turn made 
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state actors more acutely aware of the environmental limits of their power. Chapter 3 explores 
this experience through the eyes of “Kham watchers,” or Chinese and international observers of 
Kham, during a period of heightened interest in the region from 1928 to the establishment of 
Xikang Province in 1939. Kham watchers’ attitudes toward ethnic assimilation, based largely on 
hearsay and travel writing, adapted with the production of new ecological knowledge—
including the sobering discovery that settled agriculture appeared to be impossible above some 
3,600 meters. Since kaiken land reclamation was primarily a Han male enterprise, Chinese 
observers often couched their concerns about the environment in ethnic and gendered terms that 
I unpack in this chapter. 
Not coincidentally, Xikang Province was established in the midst of China’s “war of 
resistance” to Japan during World War II. Chinese and international observers sometimes drew 
direct comparisons between the Chinese colonization of eastern Tibet and the Japanese 
colonization of Manchuria. In 1938 the Christian Science Monitor reported that:  
Government heads at Chungking have decided that with the New Year, Sikang—
formerly known as “Inner Tibet”—will be a new province and given full 
recognition for its role as site of vast land-reclamation projects which are to be 
pushed by both Government and semiofficial circles… Sikang will become to 
China what the Japanese used to say Manchuria was to them—a “life line.”49 
 
Growing a Chinese province on the Tibetan plateau was a sort of high-stakes experiment. 
While China’s Kham administration had hitherto existed as a sort of scalable martial order, the 
creation of Xikang Province established new civil organs that tested the environmental limits of 
the state. The latter half of the dissertation explores these bureaucratic entanglements with the 
landscape in ethnographic detail from 1939 to the Communist takeover of 1950. Only after 1939 
did the Chinese state collect systematic weather data in the Kham region as an aid in agricultural 
development. Through a richly documented study of the Kangding weather bureau, chapter four 
details how conditions on the frontier forestalled meteorological observations, and how the 
bureau ultimately succeeded in producing enough data to change Chinese perceptions of Kham’s 
climate. By the mid-1940s, Kham watchers were alerting the public that upland Xikang suffered 
from a “food grain problem” (liangshi wenti 糧食問題), not because it wanted for settlers, but 
because of climate and soil problems deriving from its extraordinary elevations. 
 




To tackle the food grain problem, Liu Wenhui turned to technical solutions. Chapter five 
reveals that the provincial Bureau of Agricultural Improvement (Nongye gaijin suo 農業改進所) 
drew on international science as well as national networks of personnel and seed stock to expand 
agricultural production in Kham beyond its prior limits. The rhetoric surrounding “improvement 
agriculture” tended to denigrate Khampa subsistence practices, and yet, as I show, the Bureau 
borrowed heavily from indigenous practice, most obviously in its experimentation with yak 
husbandry. Scientific agriculture made modest gains in Kham, but it hardly resolved the food 
grain problem. The civil institutions that constitute the hallmarks of the modern state still 
struggled with nourishment at high altitudes. 
Arguably, no institution was more directly concerned with Sinicizing Kham than the 
Xikang Province Department of Education (Jiaoyu ting 教育廳). Chapter six investigates public 
schools to understand how their considerable dietary needs constrained the project of 
assimilation through education. Ambitious schemes to procure local grain for schools and to 
import rice from the neighboring piedmont regions saw little success in the short term as China’s 
disastrous wartime economy compounded the local food grain problem. Still, neither this nor the 
preceding chapters are intended as chronicles of failure. They focus not on how environmental 
challenges and indigenous resistance foiled the Chinese state, but on how China’s adaptations to 
those challenges sustained its rule on the Tibetan plateau. Revisions to the land tax, agricultural 
experimentation, and the redrawing of borders each had long-term effects that outlasted Xikang 
Province itself. 
 
Finding Xikang (and Other Ignoble Pursuits) 
The Chinese Communist Party seized (or in its own terms, “liberated”) Xikang from the 
Guomindang in 1950 and dissolved it into neighboring provinces in 1955. Xikang province has 
since more or less disappeared from public memory even in China. Much as some academic 
historians have dismissed Xikang as an “imaginary” province, public historians and journalists 
have shown little interest in the province beyond a morbid fascination with its ephemeral nature. 
The cover of Zhang Yongjiu’s Xiaoshi de Xikang (Xikang Lost), for example, sells it as “a province 
that existed for only sixteen years and then disappeared from the map.”50 Similarly, a 2005 short 
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documentary titled “A Vanished Province” (Yige xiaoshi de shengfen) asks, “why was Xikang 
Province established, and why was it dissolved? Why did this province only exist for 16 years?”51 
Such writers typically tie Xikang’s fate to the singular personality of Liu Wenhui, giving little 
attention to either long-term processes or the complexities of the settler state. Even less—virtually 
nothing—has been published about Xikang in English. When I recently published a journalistic 
article about Xikang anticipating its 80th anniversary, some readers had unexpectedly visceral 
reactions, including one who called my short but carefully-researched story “a poor attempt at 
revisionist history that would delight the current Chinese authorities.”52 Clearly there is room for 
a more substantial history of the “lost” province of Xikang—but first I needed to find it. 
This took me to several archives and libraries in the PRC, Taiwan, and the United States, 
but most importantly to the Sichuan Provincial Archives in Chengdu, which now houses the 
archives of Xikang Province. As that institution barrels towards a digital future, I was likely 
among the last batch of researchers to have the privilege of working extensively with the original 
Xikang records in the form of brush ink on brittle paper. These pages were the material residues 
of something from the past—of a province and a nation-state, but more immediately, of a 
bureaucracy. The bureaucracies of Xikang Province and its pre-1939 antecedents thus serve as my 
primary vantage point. Borrowing the language of ethnography: if the nation-state constitutes 
my frame of analysis, the bureaucratic state serves as my field site. 
 
 
Figure 3. Xikang officials exmine documents at a meeting of the provincial 
General Affairs Department (shuwu ke 庶务科) (Sun and Zhang 2003, p. 70). 
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To an extent, my research practices are isometric with the workings of the bureaucracy I 
study. Petitioners frequently signaled that the evidence of their claims was zai’an 在案, “on the 
record.” For an event to be zai’an was both the condition of its availability to bureaucratic 
decision-making and the condition of its availability to me as a historian. Like me, historical actors 
dealing with the bureaucracy consulted documents while describing their world. They often 
indicated this by prefacing sentences with the character cha 查, “verified.” In 1916 when the 
incoming magistrate of Shiqu (Tibetan: Sershül) county, Zhu Ronghan 朱榮漢, intended to blame 
his predecessor for the county’s sorry finances, he invoked the ledgers: cha, the previous 
magistrate had claimed to transfer 3,778 Tibetan rupees in livestock tax to Zhu, and cha, he had 
transferred only 3,670 in actuality.53 An effective bureaucrat was by necessity a local historian. 
Similarities between the work of the bureaucrat and the historian extend to the act of 
synthesis. A governor was able to oversee many counties while a magistrate oversaw but one 
precisely because the governor benefited from the work of magistrates, among others, in 
synthesizing local information for the consumption of the governor. The genre of the gazetteer 
(zhi 志) historically marks the apex of information synthesis in Chinese provincial bureaucracies, 
and gazetteers have been the starting point for many a historian. Sometimes there is almost 
perfect continuity between the work of bureaucrats and historians. The sole gazetteer 
commissioned by the Xikang Provincial Government, the Draft General Gazetteer of Xikang  (Xikang 
tongzhi gao 西康通志稿), existed only as a hand-written manuscript in the Sichuan archives for 
half a century until a team of PRC scholars published an edited version of it in 2017.54 Another 
major Chinese source on Xikang, Wang Chuan’s Research on Modern Society in the Xikang Region 
(Xikang diqu jindai shehui yanjiu 西康地区近代社会研究) is not so much an analytical study as a 
synthesis of major sources on Xikang.55 These PRC projects were important reference points for 
my study, but I approach them with caution: this way of writing history essentially provides the 
reading public with a view from the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Can we historians ask tough questions about state bureaucracy if we are acting as 
extensions of it? Synthesis is especially problematic when we wish to interrogate material facets 
of the state. Everyday objects sometimes metamorphose under the pen as they ascend the 
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bureaucratic ladder. In tax ledgers, for instance, diverse collections of grain were sometimes 
recorded as “wheat” on paper, and wheat was sometimes converted into cash. I mean not that 
these things were exchanged for each other (though they often were), but that a transaction listed 
in currency may actually have been paid in kind, a fact sometimes relegated to the marginalia of 
ledgers.  
My approach is to alternate between top-down and bottom-up perspectives. Chapter 1 
attends to the wars and political machinations that made Xikang a political reality, while chapter 
3 draws on published books and periodicals to show how prominent figures across China 
constructed a certain image of Xikang in the national imaginary. In other chapters, however, I am 
guilty of the folly of Duke Yin of Lu (Lu Yingong 鲁隐公); according to the ancient Zuo zhuan 左
傳, when once the duke wandered off to watch fishermen near a ceremonial hall, his official Zang 
Xibo臧僖伯 remonstrated that “insofar as objects can neither be implemented in great affairs nor 
their materials used for noble instruments, the nobleman (jun 君) ought not to engage them.”56 I, 
too, am given to ignoble pursuits: throughout much of this study I wander from the exploits of 
powerful women and men to observe taxmen, weathermen, yak herders, and teachers. Chapters 
4 through 6 draw inspiration from the German school of alltagsgeschichte, or history of everyday 
life.57 The actors who figure most prominently in these chapters are neither elites nor voiceless 
“subalterns” but rather laborers, professionals, and low-level officials whose voices are just 
audible—and whose quietness means that they may have something to say that we haven’t 
already heard. 
Their voices and faces survive in personnel files and work reports, but especially in cheng 
呈 or official memos, which often took the form of petitions from personnel to their superiors. 
Cheng interest me not because they are repositories of facts about the state, but because they are 
so full of uncertainty and anxiety. They exemplify what Ann Laura Stoler calls “the ethnographic 
space of the archive,” which “resides in the disjuncture between prescription and practice, 
between state mandates and the maneuvers people made in response to them, between normative 
rules and how people actually lived their lives.”58 The authors of memos were often trying to 
reconcile received orders with material reality, or were reckoning with the impossibility of doing 
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so. They might be working out the appropriate relationship of duty to suffering, the concrete 
distinctions between public and private property, or the question of which plants were food and 
which were not. 
But if history of everyday life tends to emphasize “history as a human product,” as some 
scholars have claimed, I also employ it to emphasize that the human is never purely human.59 
Here I take cues from the environmental humanities, one of whose major contributions has been 
to challenge our conventional distinction between humanity and the environment and the 
concomitant distinction between mind and matter—distinctions Frank Trentmann collectively 
terms “the paradigm of disconnection.”60 To recount human history as a product of humans is as 
much a tautology as would be recounting agricultural history as a product of agriculture, because, 
as Eduardo Kohn puts it, “the analytical object becomes isomorphic with the analytics.” 61 
Timothy Mitchell similarly argues that “no explanation grounded in the universalizing force of 
human projects and intentions can explore whether the very possibility of the human, of 
intentionality, of abstraction depends on, at the same time as it overlooks, nonhuman elements.”62  
As environmental histories of everyday life, then, these chapters blur the lines between 
the human and the inhuman in everyday experience. The particular, documented sensory 
phenomena at the heart of human encounters with the “outside” world were the nexus of Kham’s 
environment with the bureaucratic state. This is why I dally for so long at Xikang’s weather 
stations and experimental farms, where personnel mediated between bureaucratic imperatives 
and ecological reality. The bitter taste of mountain buckwheat relative to barley, the bodily 
suffering of a high-altitude winter, the horseback magistrate’s emotional witness to the 
destruction wrought by hailstones upon a wheat field—these experiences were all socio-
politically consequential. 
 
A Note on Ethnic Terms 
The arguments in this dissertation operate on several identities, including “Chinese,” “Han,” 
“Tibetan,” and “Khampa,” that bear unclear relationships to one another. Today the CCP 
maintains that China is “a unified, multi-ethnic country” (tongyi de duo minzu guojia 统一的多民
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族国家) made up of 56 recognized ethnic groups, or minzu, of which the Han is the largest, 
comprising approximately 91% of the population.63 By that logic, the terms “Han” and “Tibetan” 
are fraternal ethnic groups within the greater Chinese nation. But in the landmark volume Critical 
Han Studies, Tom Mullaney points out that the immense size of the Han population and its 
internal diversity set it apart from China’s other recognized ethnic groups.64 
In the chapters to follow I have made the conscious and contentious decision not to draw 
a clear categorical distinction between the terms “Han” and “Chinese,” particularly during the 
Republican era, but rather, to alternate these terms based on context. For example, where I discuss 
“Chinese settlers” in Kham, the implication is that these were Han Chinese settlers. To readers 
accustomed to current usage of these terms in the PRC, this may seem wrong-headed: were not 
all of the peoples within China’s national borders Chinese?65 My approach reflects that the Han 
enjoyed a unique relationship with the Chinese state. For starters, Han ethno-nationalism fueled 
the Chinese revolution and dominated ethnic policy in the Republic of China.66 Although the 
Guomindang theoretically advocated “unity of the five races” (wuzu lianhe 五族聯合), Mullaney 
notes that this concept of unity generally emphasized “the possibility of and necessity for 
assimilating such groups into the Han majority,” particularly under Chiang Kai-shek.67  It is 
telling that Republican Chinese rhetoric made little distinction between the processes of 
“assimilation” (tonghua同化) into the Chinese nation and “becoming Han” (Hanhua), and nor did 
international discourse.68 Put differently, to be non-Han was to be in need of assimilation, as 
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exemplified by one Chinese writer’s 1931 commentary that “among the various frontier peoples, 
the Tibetans are the easiest race to assimilate.”69 
Before the CCP’s ethnic classification project of the 1950s and 60s, ethnicity was not a well-
defined category of identity in China.70 Terms like “Han” and “Tibetan” were unstandardized, 
and the borders between ethnic groups within China remained relatively fluid. I treat “Han” 
before the PRC as an open-ended and inductive category. Chinese-language sources typically 
identified a given household as “Han” in reference to various traits that might include its 
language, sartorial customs, and religious or philosophical views, but also, significantly, its 
subsistence practices. One might be a Han merchant or a Han farmer, but a Han nomad was 
virtually unheard of. David Bello notes that Qing literati linked Han identity to a particular kind 
of space (Bello terms this “Hanspace”), that, while variously defined, was generally arable and 
either situated in or environmentally similar to China proper. 71  This remained true in the 
Republican era, though urbanization complicated the relationship between Han and the 
landscape. 
Similarly, the meanings of “Tibetan” and “Khampa” are difficult to pin down. Today 
Chinese, Tibetan, and international writers typically take “Tibetans” (Tib. Böpa; Chin. Zangzu ren 
藏族人) to include people from across “greater” or “ethnographic” Tibet, and Khampas to be a 
subset of Tibetans. But this was not uniformly true before 1950. In Republican-era Chinese sources, 
the term Zangren藏人 typically denoted people from central Tibet not including Khampas. The 
terms Kangba 康巴, Kangren 康人, and Kangmin 康民 implied Khampas, though as I note in chapter 
one, figures like Liu Wenhui used the latter two terms in an ethnically ambiguous way such that 
they could in any instance refer to both Han and Khampa residents of Kham. Finally, many 
Chinese writers simply referred to all Tibetan-speaking peoples as yi夷 or man 蠻, generalized 
and often pejorative terms for non-Han peoples. In all cases I use the term “Khampa” to refer to 
Tibetan-speaking people who were, to the best of my knowledge, native to the Kham region, and 
 
69 Han Dezhang (1941), p. 11. 
70 Mullaney (2010) notes that the Republic of China’s first county-by-county census of 1912 “contained 
seventeen questions, none of which pertained to linguistic or ethnic diversity” (p. 25). Conversely, the 
PRC’s first census in 1953-1954 included questions on ethnic and linguistic identity, and its results 
motivated the CCP to initiate an ethnic classification project that resulted in the ethnic classifications that 
are in effect there today (Mullaney 2010, p. 20). Citizens of the PRC today have state-designated ethnic 
identities that are indicated on their ID cards. No such system existed in the Republican era. 




“Tibetan” to refer to the government, armies, and people of central Tibet (U-Tsang). I do so not 
to imply that Khampas are not Tibetan (as they are generally considered today), but to preserve 
an ethnic and political distinction between the peoples of central and eastern Tibet that was 













1. A Land “Without History”: The Rise (and Fall and Rise) of Xikang Province 
 
Since [central] Tibet has not been established as a province, 
the borderlands reach to Kham. There has long been a 
division between Tibet and Kham. We should fix the 
boundary according to the old design, build Kham into a 
province, confer a name upon it, and occupy its soil. 
—Fu Songmu, Record of Building Xikang Province1 
 
Fu Songmu 傅嵩木 had a proposal for the Qing imperial court. His six years as an official in the 
frontier region of Kham led him to believe that it was feasible—no, essential—to convert that 
region into a Chinese province as a matter of border defense. Local officials had already laid the 
groundwork by deposing indigenous rulers and dividing their land into a system of Chinese 
counties. “Yet the establishment of a province is a weighty matter,” Fu acknowledged, “and I 
dare not take it lightly.” He also proffered a Chinese name for the new province: “the land of 
old Kham (Chin. kang 康) is in the west (xi 西),” he explained, “so its name is called Xikang 
Province.”2 
The memorial containing Fu’s proposal made its way east in the sixth month of 1911, and 
by the following month Fu was notified by telegram that it had reached the city of Chengdu and 
would be relayed onward to the capital. Then China had a revolution. Fu was captured by 
revolutionaries and interned in Chengdu under the authority of the new military governor of 
Sichuan Province. Zhao Erfeng led his army against the revolutionaries and lost his head. The 
proposal never arrived. Xikang Province was dead. 
But at the behest of his captor, Fu spent the next several months penning a history of his 
province that never was. He chronicled the destruction of indigenous power structures and the 
establishment of direct Chinese rule in the name of gailiu改流 or “regularization,” appending 
these chronicles with a copy of his original memorial to the Qing court. The resultant Record of 
Establishing Xikang Province (Xikang jian sheng ji西康建省記) went to press in serialized form in 
1912, igniting a national conversation on the prospect of building a Xikang Province; it was, as 
people say, a “sticky” idea.3 Chinese writers floated all manner of fantastical ideas about Xikang 
 
1 Fu (1962), p. 117. 
2 Fu (1962), p. 116. 
3 Writers Chip and Dan Heath coined the term “sticky idea” to describe ideas that are readily understood, 




over the next few decades—that it was a vast virgin waste whose development would “benefit 
the country and enrich the people”; that it could be a springboard for the liberation of India from 
British rule, or a last bastion against Japanese invasion. 
A decade after Fu’s untimely death in 1929, his vision became reality. On January first, 
1939, Xikang officially became the 28th province of the Republic of China under the governorship 
of a Sichuanese warlord named Liu Wenhui 劉文輝 (1895-1976). Then China had a revolution. 
The Communists entered Xikang in 1950, and officially dissolved it into neighboring provinces 
(chiefly Sichuan) in 1955. Today few people know that it ever existed, even in China. 
It has been said that history is “what you can remember.”4 But it depends on what you 
can forget.5 The history of Chinese state-building in eastern Tibet has been propelled by a series 
of forgettings. In 1909, the earliest proposals to provincialize the Tibetan plateau spoke of sending 
settlers to “empty lands” on the frontier, in disregard of the indigenous peoples that had long 
interacted with the imperial state. In another bout of forgetfulness, Liu Wenhui announced his 
new province in 1939 as theretofore “a land without a name, and moreover, without history to 
speak of.” Today, Kham figures in the historiography of the People’s Republic of China not as a 
series of annexed polities, but rather, as a set of “Tibetan areas” (Zangqu 藏区 ) that were 
“liberated” by the Communists in 1950, with the greater part of the region subsequently 
established as the PRC’s first “ethnic autonomous prefecture” (the Garzê Tibetan Autonomous 
Prefecture) in 1955.6 Each of these narratives employs a degree of historical erasure in the service 
of the nation-state. 
This chapter recovers the largely forgotten history of Kham’s integration into the Chinese 
nation-state by way of Xikang Province and demonstrates that agriculture was central to that 
endeavor. The sections to follow synthesize a substantial body of historical scholarship on the 
history of Qing state-building in Kham and carry that narrative forward to the eventual creation 
 
4 Walter Carruther Sellar and Robert Julian Yeatman famously wrote, in jest, that “history is not what you 
think. It is what you can remember” (1943, p. vii). 
5 Here I am inspired by Ernest Renan, who wrote that “forgetting (l’oubli), and I would say even historical 
error, is an essential factor in the creation of a nation” (1882, p. 7). 
6 For example, in the shi hua or “simple history” genre in the PRC, the history of Kham falls mainly under 
the Ganzi shihua 甘孜史话 (simple history of Garzê), which is published in the series of Sichuan shihua 
congshu (Collection of Simple Histories of Sichuan). It refers to the historical area subsumed that that 
prefecture as “the Garzê area” (Ganzi diqu 甘孜地区) regardless of time period, although Garzê prefecture 




of Xikang Province in 1939.7 Subsequent chapters will then explore particular arenas of Chinese 
agrarian policy in the Kham borderlands against the narrative backdrop that I provide here. 
Superficially, the creation of Xikang province realized the vision that Fu Songmu 
articulated in 1911. However, I demonstrate that Xikang was less the outcome of an enduring 
vision than of a convoluted series of historical accidents. It represented a marriage of convenience 
between the wartime desires of the Nationalist government and those of the embattled warlord 
Liu Wenhui. Ideas about what Xikang should look like and what it meant for China varied greatly 
over time, but this chapter reveals two consistent leitmotifs in the way that Chinese envisioned 
it: Xikang as key to national defense, and Xikang as site for agricultural colonization. The latter of 
these was of paramount importance, because as administrators well understood, the 
consolidation of Chinese power over the region for national defense depended on agricultural 
colonization by Han migrants. 
 
Kham, a Province? 
The late Qing was an age of rapid province-building. When the Manchu banner armies conquered 
the Ming Empire and established the Great Qing empire in 1644, they inherited 15 provinces 
(sheng 省) as well as vast regions in the borderlands that were indirectly ruled under the so-called 
tusi (native chieftaincy) system. Dzungaria, conquered by the Qing during the reign of the 
Qianlong Emperor (r. 1735-1796), achieved recognition as a province by the name of Xinjiang 
(‘New Territory’) in 1884, and Taiwan followed suit in 1885, only to be ceded to the Japanese after 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95. The Manchus kept their ancestral homeland of Manchuria 
administratively separate from the provinces until 1907, when the Guangxu Emperor (r. 1875-
1908) regularized Manchuria into Fengtian (today’s Liaoning), Jilin, and Heilongjiang, known to 
this day as ‘the three northeast provinces.’8 Between the incorporation of new territories into the 
provincial system and the division of existing provinces, the sum of provinces in the empire had 
increased from 15 to 22 by 1911. Superficially, Fu Songmu’s aspiration of creating a province in 
eastern Tibet conforms to a long-term political trend. 
 
 
7 Major works on the Qing-era history of Kham include Xiuyu Wang (2011), Relyea (2011), Tsomu (2015). 





Figure 4. Map of Kham (Chaix 2019). 
But it was not at all obvious that the Kham region was a particularly good site for 
province-building. Until the twentieth century, Kham was not so much a polity as a hodgepodge 
of borderland polities with very disparate political systems. Instead of thinking of Kham as a 
polygon on a map the way we picture most territories today, it is arguably more appropriate to 
think of Kham as a series of nodes along the two major routes from Sichuan Province in the east 
to central Tibet in the west. 
Where the Sichuan basin ascended into the eastern foothills of the Hengduan Mountains 
there sat Yazhou Fu 雅州府, Sichuan’s westernmost prefecture and the gateway to the Kham 
region. A sandal-clad tea porter traveling northwest from the tea warehouses of Ya’an, the 




strapped to his back, have crossed the wooden planks of the Chazamkha bridge (Luding qiao 瀘
定橋) and then climbed a further 50 kilometers to the frontier town of Dartsendo (Chinese: 
Dajianlu打箭爐). This section of the journey was often known as the Lu Pass (Lu guan爐關), and 
upon passing through the southern and then northern gates of Dartsedo, one left the Interior 
(neidi 内地)—referring to the lands under the authority of the junxian郡縣 system of provinces, 
prefecture and counties—and crossed into guanwai 關外, the realm “beyond the pass.” No longer 
under the aegis of the Great Qing Legal Code, travelers beyond the pass were in the dominion of 
governors, kings, and living Buddhas with only tenuous connections to either Beijing or Lhasa. 
Dartsedo, gateway to guanwai, had been a Qing trading post since 1696 and a 
subprefecture of Yazhoufu since 1729. Here Chinese merchants from Sichuan and Yunnan 
offloaded their wares, chiefly tea and silk, at the kortso trading houses that were under the 
management of Tibetan nobles. A trade commissioner represented the interests of the Qing in 
Dartsedo, but these were also the stomping grounds of the Chakla King (Chakla gyalpo), heir to an 
indigenous line that established the original thirteen kortso in the seventeenth century.9 Like many 
an imperial entrepot, the administration of Dartsedo was complex, and it enjoyed what juridical 
scholars call ‘legal pluralism’, in that Chinese subjects fell under the jurisdiction of the Qing legal 
code while Tibetan subjects of the Chakla king were instead under that ruler’s legal jurisdiction. 
In recognition of the Chakla King’s local authority, the Qing court invested him with the title of 
Right and Luminous Chieftain (Mingzheng tusi 明正土司), the name by which he appeared in 
Chinese documents after the 17th century. 
At the trading houses of Dartsedo, our tea will have passed hands to a series of Khampa 
Tibetan porters who relayed it north and west as a form of corvée service to their liege lords. 
Rarely did a single person travel the entire distance from the Lu Pass to the Ningjing mountains, 
but an emissary or a campaigning soldier might. The first stage of the route ascended from 
Dartsedo’s comparatively mild valley climate (approximately 2,800 meters above sea level) to the 
high grasslands of the Litang plain (over 3,900 meters), seat of a hereditary line of laymen 
governors (depa) with roots in the local aristocracy. Then the grasslands dipped into the mild 
climes of the Batang valley (approximately 2,700 meters), the first large stretch of good farmland 
west of Dartsedo, where another line of depa shared power with monasteries belonging to the 
Gelukpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism. At Batang’s western flank were the Ningjing Mountains 
 




(Ningjing shan 寧靜山) with peaks above 4,000 meters, also marking the eastern limit of central 
Tibetan authority. Power structures along the northern route were even more chaotic; one 
thousand li (500 kilometers) from Dartsedo one passed through the fractious Hor states and 
arrived at the kingdom of Degé, whose royal line maintained close ties to the Sakya sect of Tibetan 
Buddhism.10 The powerful king of Degé benefited from the tax and corvee labor that he exacted 
from hundreds of retainers, including farm households along the valleys of the Nya and Dri rivers 
and nomadic clans in the grasslands between those rivers.11 About 225 kilometers west of Degé 
one ascended a pass in the Ningjing range, beyond which lay Chamdo. 
Just as the Lu Pass at Dartsedo marked the western limit of the Qing bureaucratic 
administration, a stone stele at a pass in the Ningjing mountains, erected in 1727, marked the 
eastern limit of Tibetan authority.12 Kham was the spaces in between. That is, the Kham of the 
Qing dynasty was characterized by a specious unity first imposed from the outside, its identity 
rooted in its liminal status as a place between the Central Tibetan and Chinese states. Perhaps the 
strongest case for considering Qing-era Kham as a regional unit is that proffered by William 
Coleman, who argues that Kham’s “unique sense of socio-economic order” lay in its distinct 
interactions between “indigenous leaders, monasteries and their representatives, representatives 
of the Qing empire, and merchants.”13 Kham was not in any sense an administrative unit prior to 
the twentieth century. It was more akin to a landscape, known in Tibetan as the land of “four 
rivers and six mountain ranges” (chushi gangdruk), and although Chinese and Tibetan sources 
sometimes referred to a “Khampa” identity, there is little evidence until well into the twentieth 
century that being Khampa was a salient source of identity for those to whom it was assigned.14  
Not until the 1930s would a true Khampa nativist movement emerge. 15 
During the nineteenth century, the Nyarong strongman Gönpo Namgyel in fact came 
close to unifying much of the Kham region by force, incurring the wrath of both Lhasa and the 
 
10 The distances given in this paragraph are taken from a detailed route length chart in Sichuan Provincial 
Archives (henceforth SA), Min 213-1-7. This chart dates to 1940 and may not perfectly reflect earlier route 
distances; they are intended as estimates only. 
11 Rinzin Thargyal (2007), pp. 45-56. 
12 For more background on the stele, see Relyea (2015), p. 182; Chen Guangxu (1986), p. 125. 
13 Coleman (2002), p. 53. 
14 On chushi gangdruk, see Gros (2019), p. 36; Relyea (2011), p. 19. 





Qing court when he challenged their proxy rulers in Kham.16 Gönpo Namgyel was ultimately cut 
down by Qing forces, ending any prospect of indigenous unification, and Beijing granted control 
over Nyarong to Lhasa. But the rebellion provoked a more interventionist approach to the Kham 
region on the part of Sichuan officials, beginning with Governor-general Lu Chuanlin. Lu 
attempted to annex Nyarong and Degé to Sichuan without the authorization of the Qing court, 
which censured Lu and forced him to reverse these actions.17 
In 1904 Lu was succeeded as Sichuan governor-general by a Mongol bannerman named 
Xiliang 錫良, whose appointees to the Kham region coordinated more closely with the imperial 
court. They included Fengquan 鳳全, a Manchu bannerman who approached the imperially-
sanctioned strategy of agricultural colonization in Kham with especial vigor. Although Xiliang 
avoided the sort of unprovoked military violence that had ended Lu’s career, he was 
apprehensive of Khampas and hardly attendant to indigenous interests in Kham. 18  Further 
conflict was set on a hair trigger. 
  
The Case for Xikang Province 
Then an incident in 1905 prompted such violence as to upend the system of indirect rule in Kham. 
On April 5, an indigenous uprising killed Fengquan while he was serving as an assistant amban 
(representative) of the Qing court to Lhasa, as he attempted to flee from an outpost in Batang to 
the haven of Dartsedo. By one credible account the crowd slayed Fengquan in a preemptive strike 
after he threatened to kill every man, woman, child, and animal in Batang, though by later Qing 
accounts he was ambushed blind at a narrow pass known as the Parrot’s Beak (Yingge zui 鹦哥
嘴), and this is how the event is remembered in most Chinese sources today.19 
All accounts concur that the incident began when a small number of Khampas clashed 
with Fengquan’s retinue at an agricultural colony in Batang at the end of March. Historian Xiuyu 
Wang notes that Fengquan overreached his mandate from Beijing to represent the court in 
Kham’s westernmost outpost at Chamdo, instead spending an extended time in the Batang valley 
 
16 For a history of Gönpo Namgyel, see Tsomu (2015). 
17 The Guangxu emperor in fact briefly approved of Lu Chuanlin’s plan to annex Nyarong in 1907, but 
this permission was quickly revoked after the Dalai Lama objected. See Xiuyu Wang (2011), pp. 69-84. 
18 Xiuyu Wang (2011), p. 89-91, Relyea 2010, pp. 105-106. 
19 For a wonderfully rich discussion of the conflicting recollections of the Parrot’s Beak incident, see 




of his own initiative to expand land reclamation efforts there.20 In 1912 Fu Songmu recalled that 
Fengquan 
saw the soil there was rich and fertile, and immediately he recruited Han people 
to open up the land. But according to the barbarian peoples’ superstition, they 
thought the mountain god should not be disturbed, so they went out and 
obstructed them. Feng Quan would not listen, and at Cililong he tilled a field… 
Thereupon the people of Qicungou plundered the field, killed the field manager, 
and then rose up and chased after Feng Quan.21 
 
Because land reclamation, more than any other enterprise, was at the heart of both Qing imperial 
policy and Fengquan’s personal agenda for Kham, this was a highly symbolic act of sabotage. 
The clash escalated quickly. Within days over 3,000 Khampas rose up against Fengquan, burning 
the Catholic mission and forcing him to flee. 
The death of Fengquan became the casus belli for a bloody Qing reprisal. First, Xiliang 
commissioned his lieutenant Zhao Erfeng to lead a punitive assault on Batang, resistance to which 
prompted an ad hoc alliance between Ba Chodeling monastery and the Batang tusi. Zhao 
overcame the monastery and executed the tusi within days, but the conflict merely expanded as 
Qing officials feared the prospect of further indigenous alliances. Zhao next trained his army on 
Sampeling monastery in nearby Chetring and defeated it after a seven-month standoff, during 
which time his grain supply was cut off and his soldiers suffered severe hunger.22 After this hard-
won victory Xiliang appointed Zhao as the inaugural Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner 
(Chuan-Ddian bianwu dachen 川滇邊務大臣), and he continued his conquest with the intent of 
“regularizing” all of the Kham polities. In 1910 Zhao was promoted to governor-general of 
Sichuan and he appointed Fu Songmu to the post of acting Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier 
Commissioner. By the eighth month of that year, the last of the living tusi submitted. As far as 
Qing officials were concerned, Kham was now “pacified.”23 
Meanwhile, Fu and Zhao worked to replace the old decentralized order with a new, 
bureaucratic administrative system. In 1908 Zhao converted a portion of eastern Kham into a new 
“Pacified Kham” Circuit (Kang’an dao 康安道 ) of Sichuan Province, retaining it under his 
 
20 Xiuyu Wang writes that Fengquan “argued that Chamdo, being poor and infested with banditry, was 
unsuitable as the locus operandi, whereas Batang, being centrally located and possessing gold mining and 
reclamation potential, could better facilitate communication and control” (2011, p. 92). 
21 Fu Songmu (1912), p. 5, as quoted in Coleman (2002), p. 31. 
22 ZECZ p. 25, 26. See also Xiuyu Wang 2011, pp. 120-129 




jurisdiction as Frontier Commissioner. This imperial circuit subsumed Dartsedo (now elevated 
to the status of full prefecture) as well as the formerly insurgent polities of Batang and Litang, 
which received new names to suit their conquered status: Ba’an 巴安 (“Batang pacified”) and 
Lihua 理化 (“Litang transformed”). In 1910 he converted the kingdom of Degé and its north Kham 
environs into a “Northern Borderlands Circuit” (Bian bei dao 边北道). By 1911 these two circuits 
subsumed approximately 30 administrative units, including prefectures, sub-prefectures, 
departments, and counties.24 Fu envisioned far more still: in his undelivered memorial to the Qing 
court he projected that Xikang Province would eventually subsume “80 or 90” such units.25 
In this memorial Fu offered five “reasons for establishing a province” that articulated why 
he considered it essential to create Xikang as a Chinese province and why it must be distinct from 
Sichuan. First, the Kham region bordered Tibet, which had been infiltrated by the British during 
the Younghusband expedition of 1904. Because “foreigners are crafty” it was important to 
establish Xikang as a province so as to safeguard it against territorial claims by imperialist powers. 
Secondly, Kham could not be left to indigenous rule because Tibetans (including Khampas) 
harbored an ethnic hatred towards the Chinese and had long tried to “cleanse the Han” (xi Han
洗汉), such that a sustained Chinese military presence was essential. Thirdly, he argued that 
Kham’s absorption into Sichuan province was impractical because it stretched three thousand li 
from Dartsedo in the east to the Danda mountains in the west, and four thousand li from Gansu 
in the north to Yunnan in the south, and it was thus beyond the capacity of the Sichuan Governor-
General to monitor sufficiently. Fourthly, and pertinent to our later discussion, he claimed that 
the land under the prefectures, subprefectures, and counties was sufficient to “nourish officials” 
(yang guan 养官) and that local grain taxes would support a viable bureaucracy. Finally, he 
assured the court that Kham’s conversion into Xikang province was largely a matter of translation: 
the Frontier Commissioner (Fu himself) would be renamed the “Governor of Xikang,” the 
Frontier Revenue Bureau would become the provincial Department of Revenue, the Guanwai 
Education Bureau would become the provincial Department of Education (tixue si提學司), and 
so on.26 
 
24 Relyea (2011), p. 281. 
25 XJSJ p. 118. 




But Fu was just too late. Beginning with the Wuchang uprising in October 1911, 
revolutionaries overthrew China’s last imperial dynasty, and his memorial made its way across 
Sichuan as the uprising known as the Railroad Protection Movement toppled the Sichuanese 
imperial bureaucracy. Zhao Erfeng, now serving as governor-general of Sichuan, commanded his 
New Army forces against the rebels, culminating in a battle in the heart of Chengdu. On 
December 22 he was captured and executed by one Yin Changheng 尹昌衡 who had recently 
maneuvered his way to the top of the new Great Han Sichuan Military Government. Meanwhile 
general Hu Jingyi胡景翼 summoned Fu and placed him under arrest, and it was during this time 
that Hu commissioned the latter to write a chronicle of his activities in Kham. Fu’s finished work, 
completed within months and entitled the Record of Building Xikang Province (Xikang jian sheng ji
西康建省記), included not only his original memorial to the Xuantong Emperor, but also a preface 
and a lengthy chronicle of his and Zhao’s gailiu efforts from siege of Batang to the fall of the Qing 
empire.27 
And what of the reception? Would the republican readers of the Record of Building Xikang 
Province condemn its imperial roots or applaud its overture to frontier defense? Between 
factionalism in the Chinese heartland and the foment of World War I, the Kham issue was hardly 
front page news, but among the first and lengthiest responses to the book was a very gracious 
eleven-page book review in Oriental Miscellany (Dongfang zazhi東方雜誌) by one Gao Lao高勞 in 
1913. Gao noted that: 
Mr. Fu Songmu resided in Kham for six years in the frontier service. He is the most 
intimately familiar with the situation in Xikang […] His reasons for establishing a 
province hold up to scrutiny and his language exhibits mature reasoning. Presently the 
stormy situation on the Tibetan frontier is dire. Those who speak of national defense must 
needs take heed of this.28 
 
 
27 The standard translation of this title, used by William Coleman, Scott Relyea and others, is “Record of 
Province-Building in Xikang” but I prefer the translation “Record of Establishing Xikang Province,” both 
because of the awkwardness of the former translation and because I believe it slightly misjudges Chinese 
syntax: the object of the verb jian (to build, to establish) is not merely sheng (province) but rather Xikang 
sheng (Xikang Province). The placement of the verb between Xikang and sheng does not preclude Xikang 
as the modifier of sheng, much in the same way that its placement between Zhongguo (China) and guo in 
the phrase Zhongguo jian guo (the establishment of China) does not preclude Zhongguo as the modifier of 
guo.  




Ten thousand fires! The central Tibetan army seized on the vacuum created by Zhao’s removal by 
marching on Kham in 1912, and Yin Changheng rode with a force of four thousand Sichuanese 
soldiers to meet it on the battlefield. After Yin executed Zhao Erfeng, Yuan Shikai 袁世凱 had 
appointed him to the position of “Commander in Chief for the Subjugation of Tibet” (Zheng Zang 
Zong Siling 征藏總司令). By the time Yin’s army arrived in Dartsedo, still removed from the front, 
he was concerned about maintaining a food supply, since his strategy relied on porting dry rice 
uphill from Yazhou prefecture. On June fourth he cabled Yuan Shikai in Beijing to impress upon 
him the gravity of the situation, invoking shiwan huoji 十萬火急—“the urgency of ten thousand 
fires”—as he requested funds from other provinces that never came. During a nine-month 
campaign Yin’s forces nevertheless managed to beat back the Tibetan army and retake the frontier 
town of Chamdo, which he established as a Chinese sub-prefecture under officer Peng Risheng 
彭日昇 , though by the end of the campaign Peng’s “food was exhausted and his soldiers 
destitute.”29 
 
The War on Hunger 
Hunger was a more intractable problem for the Chinese state than Khampa rebels or Tibetan 
soldiers in this period. Reliant on long-distance movements of grain to feed his army, Zhao 
eventually had his food supply cut off by Khampa forces during his campaign against Sampeling 
Monastery. The shortage was severe by April 1906, and though ultimately victorious, he would 
recall “hauling grain along narrow paths over long distances in biting cold, of suffering night 
attacks and ambushes on the vital grain supply, of eating tree bark, and grass roots.”30 The next 
chapter takes a closer look at this episode. 
Yin Changheng fared little better in 1912. His communications with Beijing periodically 
related that “the food is exhausted and the soldiers are destitute” (shi jin bing qiong食盡兵窮). The 
prospect of purchasing all the necessary food and supplies in Kham was out of the question, 
because “everything is expensive beyond the (Lu) pass.” His initial strategy was to select rice in 
Yazhou and hire porters to carry it as far as Chamdo, but the cost of sending a single dan of rice 
to Chamdo was an exorbitant twenty-five taels of silver; Yin estimated that once reinforcements 
 
29 Yin recalled that “Peng Risheng held Chamdo for eight months. The food was exhausted and the 
soldiers were destitute. There was only death and they could no longer hold it” (1931, p. 188). 




arrived the monthly cost of feeding his army in Kham would be over three hundred taels of silver. 
Two days after his first petition he again cabled Yuan to reiterate the problem: transferring rations 
to soldiers was uncommonly difficult in Kham because “the land is vast and the people are few.”31 
Especially telling is the way Yin narrates the episode in his memoir of 1918. He devotes 
more attention to his tactics for coping with hunger than to his combat tactics. For instance, at 
the outset of the campaign: 
We covered a hundred li and then rested, and the next day we surpassed that, 
and the next day we surpassed it by even more. The soldiers were blistered, and 
in Yajiang when they had not had food in two days, one among the army spoke 
up to say: “hunger and exhaustion kill people.” I commanded them to rest and 
fed them wine, and I raised my voice to tell them: “You gentlemen say that 
hunger and exhaustion kill people, I say hunger and exhaustion in fact give us 
life. Without hunger and without exhaustion, you will die by the hands of the 
brigands, and what then?”32  
 
Yin proceeded to strip his clothing, revealing a deep gash in his thigh to the astonishment of the 
soldiers, who “shivered like aspens” and fell back into rank.33 
The hunger from which Sichuanese armies suffered was merely an acute symptom of a 
chronic problem facing the Chinese state in Kham, akin to what James C. Scott calls the “friction 
of terrain.” Scott notes that agrarian states rely on intensive grain agriculture to feed their armies, 
and that upland settings tend to confound those armies because of “the difficulty of transporting 
bulk foodstuffs.”34 But Chinese strategists understood the problem largely in terms of population 
density: the sparse population of the Tibetan plateau meant that local grain stores were few and 
far between, and that rice porters had to travel inordinately long distances between relay stations. 
Yin complained to President Yuan that “the Tibetan frontier stretches thousands of li, the land is 
vast and the people are few, and transferring rations to the soldiers is fundamentally difficult.”35 
In the long term, Yin seems to have recognized that his best strategy was to avoid 
unnecessary disruptions of Khampa villages, because his soldiers relied on local farmers for 
nourishment. Nine months after embarking from Chengdu a victorious Yin marched into Litang 
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with an army of three hundred men but found it abandoned by all except for a few old monks in 
the temple. Yin was arriving just six years after Zhao’s brutal suppression of Litang and he 
empathized with the terrified Khampas who had suffered under Zhao’s policy of, as Yin put it, 
“weeding out the non-Han and forcing the masses.” Late in the night he took a translator to the 
door of the temple and notified the monks that he hoped to accept their submission in the 
morning. In the morning he again summoned them and entreated that “my war is not with you” 
(wu fei yu ru zhan 吾非與汝戰), and they submitted to him before the image of the Buddha. There 
he expressed his admiration toward the Buddhist interdiction on greed and assured the monks 
of his good will, admonishing them that “to console the exiled is the true love and compassion of 
the Buddhist.” By Yin’s account, the monks were moved to tears, and the next day more than a 
thousand Khampas returned to Litang, at which time Yin was able to procure grain for his 
soldiers, and hay for the horses. 
This passage of Yin’s memoir models the classical notion of “conquering people with 
virtue” (yi de furen 以德服人), but it also underscores his vigilance toward the enemy that was 
hunger. Here the conventional notion of “war” as combat with enemy troops does poor service 
to the struggles that Yin ostensibly faced in his war for Kham. Some bloodshed was essential, but 
too much bloodshed could be disastrous. As Yin reasoned with mutinous troops and courted 
monks (“my war is not with you”), he was fighting to maintain command over a living system. 
He was warding off entropy, the deterioration of the system to an inert state. With its exceedingly 
low population density, the Tibetan plateau tended towards entropy. 
Diguang renxi—the land is vast and the people are few. Across decades those words 
figured as a sort of talking point, an apologia for China’s difficulty in consolidating power over 
the Tibetan borderlands. A concentrated agrarian population is conducive to state formation, as 
Scott has articulated, and by correlation, the dispersed populations typical of highland settings 
make them difficult to govern. 36  Population growth is associated with agriculture, but the 
virtually stagnant population of the Tibetan plateau over many centuries has boggled social 
scientists, since cereal agriculture does exist in Tibet.37 The missionary Robert Ekvall wrote of a 
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“population hunger” on the plateau, while Charles Bell commented that “Tibet does not lack for 
cultivation, but lacks the men to till it.”38 
Similar thoughts occurred to not a few of Ekvall’s Chinese contemporaries. Officials from 
Lu Chuanlin onward developed programs for relocating Han farmers from the interior to 
agricultural colonies in Kham for land reclamation. Unlike mining and other industries that 
brought Han migrants to Kham, agricultural development figured in Chinese discourse as a sort 
of panacea, promising not only the production of food but the production of a Han-centric social 
order reminiscent of the central plain, which is why, as Xiuyu Wang notes, the policies that 
received “the broadest support” from officials outside of Kham during the last decade of the Qing 
dynasty were land reclamation policies.39 From 1906 on, China’s approach to land reclamation 
Kham evolved from an early reliance on soldiers establishing military colonies (tuntian 屯田) to 
the recruitment of civilian peasants from Sichuan and elsewhere. 
The first attempts at colonizing Kham were ill-fated. Fengquan’s agricultural colony in 
Batang courted the wrath of local Khampas, who made several attempts to sabotage it before 
ultimately killing him.40 Rather than deter Sichuan officials from further land reclamation efforts, 
this incident merely galvanized their resolve. Relyea reveals that after regularizing Batang, Zhao 
Erfeng commissioned “50,000 blank title deeds printed in Chengdu and shipped to Batang in 
anticipation of an avalanche of settlers.” Zhao also promulgated a notice promising plentiful land 
and available women to farmers in land-choked Sichuan and distributed it to government 
buildings across that province in 1906, inviting migrants to colonize sites in Batang and later 
Dzayül to the west. His written communications make it clear that he was modeling this program 
on both international colonial precedent and the recent conversion of Chinese borderlands into 
provinces. Yet only a few thousand Sichuanese settlers materialized, and most of these absconded 
after realizing that the Batang and Dzayül valleys were poorly suited for cultivating rice and 
millet.41 
This desperate first period of Chinese land reclamation programs in Kham took its last 
gasp when Yin Changheng, in command of twenty thousand soldiers after his Western 
Expedition, sent three thousand of his men to colonize (tun) the northern route and two thousand 
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to colonize the southern route.42 When Yuan Shikai relieved him of his post, Yin prognosticated 
that the effort in Kham would languish without him, because “the food has been exhausted, the 
soldiers are destitute, power has been ceded, and there can only be defeat.”43 The incarcerated 
Yin may have felt vindicated when Lhasa indeed reconquered Chamdo just five years later in 
1917 and held it until the Communist “liberation” of Tibet in the 1950s. The next decade saw 
sporadic violence between sides, and in 1929 the Chinese remnant in eastern Kham sent a 
delegation to the capital to warn President Chiang Kai-shek that their administration lacked the 
material resources to hold it in case of an attack. Though a few camps of Sichuanese soldiers 
remained, they related, these were in poor condition and “it is no secret that when they encounter 
the Tibetans, they will be destroyed as easily as dry weeds and rotten wood.” The delegation’s 
proposal was to reprise an old plan: If China wished to retain Kham, then Kham must become 
Xikang Province.44 
 
The Xikang Problem 
As a nation-state succeeding a vast and variegated empire, the new Republic of China needed to 
come to terms with the several former Qing imperial territories along the northern and western 
borders that were external to the provincial system, most of which had been administered 
separately under the Qing Court of Territorial Affairs. In 1911 one of these, Outer Mongolia, 
seized on the demise of the Qing to declare independence under the authority of the Bogd Khaan, 
illustrating the tenuous nature of Chinese authority beyond the provinces. Partly in response to 
this, newly installed president Yuan Shikai issued a “Presidential Order” in 1912 to establish 
administrations in the Inner Asian territories consistent with those of the interior provinces:  
Now that the five ethnic groups are joined in a republic, the lands of Mongolia, 
Tibet, and the Muslim regions together are the territory of the Republic of China, 
each of the peoples inhabiting these lands are citizens of the Republic of China, 
and the term ‘Dependencies’ once used under the imperial government may no 
longer be used. Henceforth, as regards Mongolia, Tibet, and the Muslim regions, 
a thorough plan should be made to form a unified system of administration and 
promote unity among the races.45 
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Even as the president decreed ethnic conciliation, Yin Changheng’s Chinese army ranged 
westward across the plateau. The British and Tibetans suspected that Yuan intended to convert 
Tibet into two provinces, which concerned them enough to call a convention at which the three 
parties—China, Tibet, and Britain—could negotiate China’s territorial rights on the Tibetan 
plateau. After the three parties presented documentary evidence for their respective claims at the 
third meeting in March 1914, the chief negotiator, Andrew McMahon of British India, arrived at 
his final decision: Tibet would be divided into an “Inner” and “Outer” Tibet along the Ningjing 
mountain range, which had similarly marked the eastern limit of Lhasa’s direct authority during 
the Qing era; among the evidence McMahon weighed was Fu Songmu’s Record of Building Xikang 
Province, which stated as much. China could exercise sovereign authority in “Inner Tibet,” which 
included most of the Kham and Amdo regions. But it could enjoy only suzerain authority over 
“Outer Tibet,” meaning that Lhasa would autonomously govern the internal affairs of that 
territory while China had some say over its foreign affairs.46 
After McMahon refused four proposals by the Chinese negotiator, Ivan Chen, to modify 
this arrangement in favor of the ROC, Yuan Shikai instructed Chen not to sign the Simla Accord, 
which to this day is not recognized by China. Instead, while negotiations were still underway, 
Yuan’s Beiyang Government declared the establishment of a “Chuanbian Special Administrative 
Region” (Chuanbian tebie xingzheng qu 川邊特別行政區 ) of China encompassing Kham and 
extending west of the Ningjing mountains in deliberate contradiction of the Simla Accord. The 
term Chuanbian referred to the “Sichuan Borderlands,” evoking its longtime status as a 
dependency of Sichuan’s provincial administration. Portions of Inner Mongolia were also 
rearranged into the Rehe 熱河, Chahar察哈爾, and Suiyuan 綏遠 Special Administrative Districts. 
All five of these special administrative regions eventually acceded to provincial status 
during the Republican era. But Chuanbian’s evolution into Xikang Province was anything but 
inevitable. Unlike Rehe, Chahar, and Suiyuan, Chinese development in Kham stagnated for 
decades with little support or recognition from the outside. The eventual push to provincialize 
Kham was contingent on two dramas that were initially extraneous to the situation in Kham—








“Empty Words,” 1914-1933 
After China failed to ratify the Simla accord, notes Scott Relyea, India “presented the Tibetan 
plenipotentiary with a gift of 5,000 rifles and 500,000 rounds of .303 calibre ammunition meant to 
aid in repelling Chinese aggression along Tibet’s eastern border.”47  Yuan Shikai meanwhile 
reshuffled the Chinese leadership in Kham, replacing the wayward Yin with his rival in Sichuan, 
Hu Jingyi. Yin, in a cable to Beijing, protested that every Tibetan soldier would be heartened by 
his departure.48 
The inconstancy of Chinese affairs indeed compromised China’s position on the Tibetan 
plateau. Yuan proclaimed himself emperor of a new dynasty in 1915 only to recant under 
domestic pressure and die shortly thereafter; meanwhile a Yunnanese army occupied much of 
Sichuan, including the capital of Chengdu. The Yunnanese general Yin Chenghuan殷承瓛arrived 
in Dartsedo in 1916 to fill the office of Frontier Commissioner but was forced to flee south across 
the mountains to his native province when his army was routed by resurgent Sichuanese. He was 
succeeded as Frontier Commissioner by the Hunanese general Chen Xialing 陳遐齡, who was 
newly installed in Dartsedo as relations with Tibet deteriorated in 1917. 
Chinese authority in Kham was now deeply fractured, with Frontier Commissioner Chen 
occupying Dartsedo while rival generals occupied positions in Batang and Chamdo. As usual, 
the Chinese forces in Kham were poorly provisioned. Eric Teichman, who was posted in 
Chongqing as a British consular officer at the time, wrote that 
the unfortunate Chinese garrisons on the frontier were completely neglected and 
left, without supplies of rice, silver, clothing, or ammunition, to shift for 
themselves and to live on the country as best they could. As a result, they had 
Degénerated into little better than brigands, helping themselves to food and 
money by plundering the natives of the localities where they chanced to be 
stationed.49 
 
The Tibetan army was comparatively well supplied and united under the command of 
the Kalong Lama, a reincarnate lineage that originated in Chamdo. General Peng Risheng, 
entrusted with command of Chamdo during Yin’s campaign of 1912, was openly hostile 
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towards the Kalon Lama and considered his activities near the Ningjing mountains to be in 
violation of Chinese territorial rights. In the fall of 1917 Peng’s men seized two Tibetan soldiers 
they found wandering near Riwoche to the west, igniting a series of skirmishes that developed 
into a war lasting the better part of a year. The forces of the Kalon Lama retook Chamdo and 
conquered as far east as Degé in the north and Markham in the south before reaching the village 
of Rongpatsa, where a desperate Frontier Commissioner Chen called on Teichman to negotiate 
a truce just as the Tibetans threatened to invade Batang. This Rongpatsa agreement ceded 
considerable territory to Tibet, including Degé, Markham and Chamdo. But it was negotiated 
only as a temporary truce—with a term of seven years according to one source—and like the 
Simla Accord, it was never recognized by the national government of China.50  
 
Figure 5. A photograph of Liu Wenhui as the governor of 
Sichuan Province in 1920. ("Liu Wenhui in 1920"). 
 
 





Yet more reshuffling in Sichuan and Beijing prompted more reshuffling in Kham. With 
little actual authority in the borderlands, Chiang Kai-shek conferred various “commissioner” 
titles on Han and indigenous strongmen, a strategy that Lin Hsiao-ting calls “commissioner 
politics.”51 In spring 1925 under Duan Qirui 段祺瑞, the new Chief Executive of the Beiyang 
Government, the Chuanbian Special Administrative Region was renamed the “Xikang Special 
Administrative Region” and the office of the Chuanbian Garrison Commissioner was replaced 
with that of the “Xikang Tunken Commissioner.” These re-brandings were mainly cosmetic but 
not without significance: the name Xikang evoked the late Qing scheme to convert Kham into a 
province by that name, while the term tunken referred to a strategy of agricultural colonization 
under army supervision. The inaugural Tunken Commissioner Liu Chengxun 劉成勳 was barely 
in office for a year when Sichuanese warlord Liu Wenhui forcibly appropriated the counties 
under his command. Meanwhile in the east, General Chiang Kai-shek seized power from the 
Beiyang Government in his famous “Northern Expedition” (beifa 北伐). Liu Wenhui traveled to 
the capital for an audience with Chiang, who invested him with the new title of “Sichuan-Xikang 
Border Defense Commander.”52  
Chiang seized on his success in the Northern Expedition to regularize Chinese 
administration in the borderlands. On September 17, 1928 the Administrative Yuan in Nanjing 
issued an order that the five regions of Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, Qinghai and Xikang “shall all 
convert into provinces and establish provincial governments in accordance with legal protocol.”53 
Within a year, all of these SARs were indeed reorganized into provinces—except for Xikang. 
In August of the following year, a delegation from Xikang delivered a petition to Chiang 
in Nanjing relating the direness of their situation. The truce that Teichman negotiated in 1918 had 
long since lapsed, and there was a perpetual threat of renewed warfare with the Tibetans 
stationed across the Jinsha River. The remaining Chinese soldiers in Xikang were “old, weak, and 
crippled,” claimed the petition, and since even “in normal times they can barely eradicate the 
local bandits” (perhaps they sometimes were the bandits!), an invasion by the Tibetans would 
inevitably result in the loss of the 13 counties in Kham remaining under Chinese control. The 
delegation reminded the president that “the Kham territory is national territory of our Republic 
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of China, and the people of Kham are citizens (guomin 國民) of our Republic of China,” and 
requested financial and military assistance in preparation for the formation of a provincial 
government. 54  The Xikang administration delivered a second petition in February of 1932, 
prompting the Legislative Yuan to issue an order for the formation of a Xikang provincial 
government. But this was not backed by material support from the center, and it accomplished 
virtually nothing.55 
Not only did the Xikang administration exert little actual control over Kham, but it in fact 
had little understanding of the region’s geography and population. To borrow a term from James 
Scott, Kham was an “illegible” place, in that much about it seemed inscrutable to the modern 
state. Scott notes that the typical premodern state “knew precious little about its subjects, their 
wealth, their landholdings and yields, their location, their very identity.” The modern state, by 
contrast, attempts to make its territories “legible” by producing information about them formats 
that are readily digestible to even external administrators.56 
Accordingly, the period after 1928 saw the production of a large corpus of Chinese 
knowledge on Kham, including maps, survey reports, travel writings, and photographs. Much of 
this was orchestrated by Liu Wenhui. Most notably, from May of 1929 to February of 1930, a team 
commissioned by Liu and led by the Sichuanese scholar Ren Naiqiang surveyed eleven counties 
and produced a plethora of visual and textual materials including the Kham Region Inspection 
Report (Kang qu shicha baogao shu康區視察報告書), which was serialized in the journal Bian Zheng. 
This survey tour launched Ren’s career as the preeminent scholarly authority on Kham, which 
was firmly established by the time he published his Illustrated History of Kham (Xikang Tujing西
康圖經) in 1933. Meanwhile, other Chinese representations of Kham were not orchestrated by the 
Xikang administration and even contended with its version of things. These include Liu 
Manqing’s 1932 Mission through Kham and Tibet (Kang Zang yaozheng), which at times questioned 
the benevolence of Chinese rule in the region.57 
The sudden outpouring of print publications on Xikang transformed the Chinese 
discussion about what to do with Kham. Until about 1930 that discussion was for the most part 
conducted privately between officials at the local, provincial, and central levels. Now it became a 
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matter of public concern as tracts and travelogues helped ordinary citizens to visualize Kham and 
its people as a part of their national community that was under threat from foreign imperialists. 
Often the agent of change in these discourses—the protagonist, so to speak—was not a 
particularly frontier commissioner, but rather, the Chinese nation. Exemplary is Chen Zhongwei’s 
The Xikang Problem (Xikang wenti西康問題), issued by a Shanghai press in May 1930. According 
to the author’s foreword, 
In striking out against Great Britain’s imperialism, only my nation is sufficient to 
the task. And in establishing this base there is nothing more important than 
solving the Tibet problem. In solving the Tibet problem there is nothing more 
important than opening up Xikang.58 
 
If only Tibet were secured as a base for Chinese soldiers, claimed the author’s foreword, the 
Republic of China could liberate India from the British within twenty-four hours(!).59 The map of 
Tibet prefacing the volume reveals only a tiny portion of Arunachal Pradesh, cropping out more 
than 99% of colonial India’s roughly four million square kilometers, and readers glancing at this 
map may have been tempted to believe his grandiose liberation prophesy. 
Like much of the popular literature on Kham, The Xikang Problem alternates between 
narrative and encyclopedic formats. Much of the book lists uncited facts of dubious veracity: that 
Han people comprised 50% of the Batang population but only 10% of Sershül’s, that the wheat 
grown by Han people put forth 90-140 grains per ear while that grown by indigenous people (tu 
ren) produced only 40-70 kernels; that the air pressure was 1500 PSI in Dartsedo but only 3,000 
PSI on top of the Ningjing Mountains. It is the messianic overtones that make The Xikang Problem 
an engaging read and lend coherence to its otherwise banal statistics about climate, vegetation, 
topography and demographics. In Chen’s vision, the first step toward establishing Xikang was 
“to obtain the faith of the masses” (de qunzhong zhi xinyang) and then to “guide the masses for the 
struggle over New Xikang.”60 The material hardships that for decades characterized the Chinese 
experience on the plateau were for Chen an evangelical opportunity: 
It is said that the meaning of life is simply to satisfy the needs of clothing, food, 
and shelter. With food we feed people, with clothing we clothe people, with shelter 
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we house people. Where there is a need, we ought to meet it, and where there is 
suffering, we ought to alleviate it. Where they ask help of us and ask love of us, 
they believe us, love us, and thereupon receive it.61 
 
For the first time, Chinese readers as far east as Shanghai may have felt a personal affinity 
with their compatriots in Xikang. But if altruism made for compelling literature, it was a weak 
force in politics. Even while politicians agreed that developing Kham was important to border 
defense, investing resources in Kham was of little personal benefit to anyone until 1933, when a 
series of misfortunes drove Liu Wenhui into the mountains. Before Liu’s fateful flight to Ya’an, 
writes Wang Chuan, “social discussion and government decisions were still stopped between 
deliberation and the government’s empty words.”62 
 
A Province of Convenience, 1933-39 
The Han Chinese migrations that prefigured the eventual founding of Xikang Province were 
prompted by a series of retreats from violence in the lowland interior. First, Sichuan warlord 
politics drove the army of Liu Wenhui into exile at Ya’an with nowhere to go but west. Four years 
later, the Japanese invasion of China Proper drove the nationalist government into exile in the 
Sichuanese city of Chongqing. Without moving an inch, the Xikang of 1937 was in a more central 
location than the Xikang of a few years prior—insofar as the “Center” (Zhongyang 中央) referred 
to Guomindang headquarters. 
Liu Wenhui, the eventual Xikang helmsman, originated just west of Chengdu in Sichuan’s 
Dayi County and attended army schools at all levels before graduating from China’s premier 
military training institute, the Baoding Military Academy, in 1916.63 He cut his war teeth fighting 
the warlord Yang Sen 杨森 as a division commander in the service of his nephew Liu Xiang 劉翔, 
who was vying for control of Sichuan. This put him in an awkward spot when Yang and Liu 
Xiang reconciled in 1926. That year he resigned from his nephew’s service, joined the 
Guomindang Party, and took over command of the ROC’s Twenty-Fourth Army. After he 
appropriated the Xikang counties from the Xikang Tunken Commissioner, Chiang Kai-shek 
named him “Commander of Sichuan-Xikang Border Defense” in 1927, then governor of Sichuan 
in 1928. Yang Sen took up arms in resistance to this latter appointment, but Liu Wenhui and Liu 
 
61 Chen Zhongwei (1930), p. 252. 
62 Wang Chuan (2009), p. 60. 




Xiang allied to defeat him.64 Much like Yin Changheng in the previous decade, Liu Wenhui now 
enjoyed control over an enormous territory encompassing both traditional Sichuan and the 
Xikang Special Administrative Region, 70 counties in all. And much like Yin, he would begin to 
lose his grip on Sichuan while campaigning against central Tibetan forces in the mountains of 
Kham. 
The incident that first drew Liu Wenhui deep into Kham began with a dispute between 
two Tibetan Buddhist monasteries near Gardze. In 1930 the monks of Targye Monastery attacked 
Pehru village in an attempt to appropriate the assets of its local monastery. After soldiers from 
Liu Wenhui’s Twenty-Fourth Army intervened on behalf of Pehru, the abbot of Targye 
Monastery requested military assistance from the Thirteenth Dalai Lama, who was eager to 
maintain Lhasa’s influence over Gardze and its vicinity. At the end of 1931 the Nanjing 
government negotiated a truce that would have ceded Gardze and Nyarong to Tibet, but Liu 
rejected this arrangement. He sustained hostilities with the Tibetans and succeeded in driving 
them out of Gardze in 1932 during an attack in alliance with the Qinghai warlord Ma Bufang 馬
步芳. The Dri River was once again the de facto boundary between Chinese and Tibetan Kham.65 
Just two months after the cessation of hostilities in Kham, in October 1932, Liu Xiang 
moved on his uncle’s headquarters in Chengdu with the Twenty-First Army, initiating what is 
known today as “the War of the Two Lius.” Though Liu Wenhui initially commanded more 
soldiers and more territory, Liu Xiang enlisted the help of warlords Deng Xihou 鄧錫侯 and Tian 
Songyao田頌堯 to defeat him in the deadliest clash of Sichuan’s warlord era, involving hundreds 
of thousands of soldiers on each side and 60,000 casualties. In the fall of 1933 Liu Wenhui 
retreated from Chengdu to Ya’an with the last twelve companies of his Twenty-Fourth Army, 
and he never regained control of Sichuan.66 
At this point Liu Wenhui turned his attention to Xikang, but he faced opposition there as 
well. To many Khampas the Twenty-Fourth Army was an occupying force, and Liu’s increased 
presence after 1930 provoked a series of nativist movements. The first of these was led by a 
Khampa named Kalsang Tsering (Chin. Gesangzeren 格桑澤仁) who happened to be the first 
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ethnically Tibetan member of the Guomindang Party as of 1924.67  Friction between Kalsang 
Tsering and Liu Wenhui ensued after the nationalist government appointed the former “Xikang 
Party Affairs Special Commissioner” (Xikang dangwu tepai yuan西康黨務特派員) in an apparent 
effort to curtail Wenhui’s autonomy in Xikang, and in 1932 he seized the armory of Liu’s troops 
in Ba’an and established his own “Headquarters for Xikang Provincial Defense,” declaring 
“Khampa rule for Kham” (Kangren zhi kang康人治康).68 As Peng Bin notes, however, this was not 
an anti-Chinese uprising per se, but rather a revolt against the occupying forces of Liu Wenhui by 
a fellow member of the Guomindang. Not only did Kalsang Tsering fight battles against the 
Tibetan army in the name of Xikang, he appealed to the nationalist government for aid in his 
power struggle against Liu.69 
The latter managed to expel Kalsang Tsering from Xikang in 1932, but not without further 
alienating Khampa nativists. Liu Manqing, an emissary of the nationalist government with 
Khampa heritage and one of Liu Wenhui’s most prominent critics, issued a statement to the 
Guomindang leadership at the National Crisis Conference affirming that “Xikang must undergo 
provincialization” (Xikang fei shixing jian sheng bu ke 西康非實行建省不可) but denouncing his 
Han-centric leadership. “The Sichuanese governor Liu Wenhui from more than 3000 li away 
waves around his title of ‘Sichuan-Xikang Border Defense Commissioner’ for control [of Kham],” 
she lamented, “such that the Center has no way to command him and the Khampas cannot but 
suffer.” She claimed that the soldiers of the Twenty-Fourth Army “view Xikang as a foreign 
territory” and were wont to prey on locals, such that “local Khampas fear them like tigers and 
wolves.”70 She concluded that “although we cannot embrace the narrow ethno-nationalism of 
‘Khampa Rule for Kham’ (Kangren zhi kang xia’ai minzuzhuyi康人治康狹隘民族主義), we should 
still give Khampa intellectuals and talents participation in the provincial government.”71 
But Liu Wenhui’s flight to the mountains ensured his sustained hegemony in Kham. In 
July 1934, after years of overtures to forming a Xikang provincial government, he officially 
convened a Xikang Provincial Preparatory Committee (Xikang jian sheng weiyuan hui) in Ya’an 
and established himself as chairman. The agenda of the committee responded indirectly to Liu 
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Manqing’s concerns by emphasizing the value of cultivating “exceptional talents” in Xikang, and 
by identifying Buddhist “lamas” as Kham’s iteration of the intellectual class (zhishifenzi知識分
子). Additionally, at least one of the seven committee members, Ruona 若那, was Khampa. Still, 
the committee’s seven-point agenda made no explicit mention of ensuring Khampa ethnic 
representation, instead invoking the ethnically ambigous “people of Xikang” (Xikang renmin西康
人民) in a tendency that was to endure. The seven points of the agenda were 1) opening up 
transportation, 2) investigating resources, 3) fixing borders, 4) determining local administrative 
systems, 5) determining the trajectory of education, 6) cultivating defense capabilities, and 7) 
enlisting the talents of each locality.72 
By the late 1930s Xikang had spent more than two decades becoming a province but had 
yet to become one. Liu Wenhui had formed a civil administration in Kham and defeated his 
nativist challengers. He and the nationalist government agreed that converting Xikang into a 
province was essential to national defense. What barriers could possibly remain? 
The Preparatory Committee claimed that it lacked the material resources to support a 
robust array of civil organs, and that Kham suffered from a lack of arable land in particular. In 
critical perspective, Liu and the Preparatory Committee were able to use the liminal status of 
Xikang as leverage while petitioning the Center for material assistance. Shortly after the 
establishment of the first Xikang Province Preparatory Committee in 1935, Liu inquired whether 
the Center might reallocate some of the fertile lowland counties under Liu Xiang’s control to 
Xikang in lieu of cash assistance. However, Nanjing was a thousand miles from Kangding (as the 
bird flies), and the Nationalist government had little motivation to invest resources in Kham or 
to get further involved in Sichuan warlord politics. 
Then, in July 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army poured into east China after a skirmish at 
the Marco Polo Bridge near Beijing, overwhelming the strategic centers of Beijing, Shanghai, and 
Nanjing.73 The Guomindang leadership fled west as the Imperial Japanese Army massacred the 
population of Nanjing, killing at least 50,000 unarmed Chinese men, women, and children.74 Not 
unlike Liu Wenhui, the Guomindang central leadership fled westward to the mountains—though 
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in this case it was not the mountains of Kham, but the nearby hills of Chongqing in eastern 
Sichuan. Chiang’s National Revolutionary Army seized control of Sichuan from Liu Xiang, and 
the Executive Yuan expressed a willingness to negotiate the borders of Xikang with Liu Wenhui 
as detailed in the next chapter. In January 1938, at the 347th session of the Administrative Yuan 
reorganized the Xikang Provincial Preparatory Committee and established a Guomindang Party 
Planning Committee of Xikang Province (Guomindang Xikang sheng dangbu choubei weiyuanhui國
民黨西康省黨部籌備委員會), with Liu Wenhui and several others serving concurrently on both 
committees.75 This convergence of provincial and Party interests was unprecedented, and the 
influence of the “War of Resistance” against the Japanese seems fairly transparent. Historian Liu 
Jun writes that “had it not been for the impetus created by the War of Resistance, the momentum 
to establish Xikang Province would have become froth and shadows.”76 
In 1938, the national press broke the news that the creation of a new Chinese province was 
imminent. So did the international press—for example, The Christian Science Monitor reported that 
“government heads at Chungking have decided that with the New Year, [X]ikang—formerly 
known as ‘Inner Tibet’—will be a new province and given full recognition for its role as site of 
vast land-reclamation projects which are to be pushed by both Government and semiofficial 
circles.”77 Then on January 1, 1939, Wenhui mounted a dais in Kangding to proclaim the founding 
of Xikang Province. He told his particular version of the story recounted here, beginning with 
Zhao Erfeng’s brutal campaigns and ending with his own journey to Hankou in 1938 to call on 
the president: 
Since the mandate of border defense was conferred upon me I long wished to 
contribute, but in the past I was impeded by the environment (huanjing 环境), and 
my ability fell short of my desires. […] From the beginning, those who speak of 
Xikang speak not of a little place outside of Sichuan, but rather, of a region of 
greater Tibet, a land without a name, and moreover, without history to speak of 
(you qi di er wu qi ming, geng wu suowei shi ye有其地而無其名，更無所謂史也). From 
this day forth, the process is complete, the borders are clear, and the status of its 
governance, economy, and culture will increasingly be seen as on par with the 
provinces of the interior (neidi).78 
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Figure 6. Liu Wenhui held monthly citizens’ assemblies in the provincial capital of 
Kangding. Pictured here is one such assembly as photographed by Sun Mingjing in 
1939, with contingents holding the banners of the Guomindang provincial party 
organ and the Xikang provincial government in the foreground (Sun and Zhang 
2003, p. 66). 
 
Liu attempted to distinguish himself from his predecessors, including Zhao Erfeng, by 
calling on citizens to respect the religion and customs of indigenous peoples and to avoid “Han 
ethnic chauvinism” (da Hanzu zhuyi大漢族主義). But he also emphasized the importance to his 
development plan of “migrant wasteland cultivation” (yimin kenhuang 移民墾荒 ), which 
unambiguously implied Han agricultural colonization.79 Liu projected an optimistic vision of a 
Kham where new roads linked model farms to the interior. In fact, the Xikang Provincial 
Preparatory Committee had already dispatched agronomist Chen Xingfu 陳形甫 to tour five 
Sichuan counties in October 1938 in search of settlers for an experimental farm in Kangding that 
he was helming: eighty farmers to open up waste, and a hundred stonemasons to build those 
 




roads. The Committee issued a press release in advance of Chen’s tour which claimed that “in 
Kham the wasteland that can be cultivated is extremely vast, and the land that has been tilled is 
very scant.” The notice explained that grain prices were high because of poor transportation and 
a dearth of planters.80 It resonated with the familiar refrain: the land is vast and the people are few. 
 
Was Xikang an “Imaginary” Province? 
From the time that Fu Songmu deigned to “build Kham into a province, confer a name upon it, 
and occupy its soil,” the mission to build Xikang Province was predicated on the hope that its soil 
could feed a Chinese bureaucracy (or “nourish officials” in Fu’s parlance). Chinese administrators 
believed that Kham was underpopulated, and its land gone to waste. Accordingly, the vision of 
cultivating Kham’s vast “wastelands” with migrant farmers was one of the most consistent 
features of Chinese state-building in the region. 
But it would seem that agrarian failure was another constant. In 1931 Ren Naiqiang noted 
uncharitably that “Zhao Erfeng once implemented migrant cultivation, but unfortunately, he did 
not see results.”81 When a surveyor for the Institute of Pacific Relations toured Xikang Province 
in 1940, he reported that “the projects carried out so far have been very limited, and have in no 
way brought about a fundamental change in [X]ikang’s agrarian set-up.”82 The new provincial 
government commissioned the first systematic land and production surveys in Kham, one of 
which found in 1947 that there was “very little farmland of agricultural value.”83 
What should we make of this? One interpretation is that Liu Wenhui merely lip service to 
building Xikang Province in order to gain leverage within the Guomindang, but that he in fact 
had no intention of pursuing his loftier ambitions. In this interpretation, Xikang was—as Warren 
Smith claims—of an “almost entirely imaginary nature.”84 The chapters to follow reject that view. 
Instead, they argue that Liu Wenhui’s regime and its predecessors in Kham took real and creative 
measures to establish a far-reaching Chinese administration over challenging physical and 
cultural terrain. From one government to the next, the incongruity between agrarian visions of 
plenty and actual scarcity was a motivating force in Xikang politics.  
 
80 Similar versions of this press release appear in “Kang sheng nong chang zai chuan” and “Xikang jian 
sheng weihui.” 
81 Ren Naiqiang (2009) [1931], p. 3. 
82 Chen Han-seng (1949), p. 116. 
83 Qiu Demao (1947), p. 48. 




2. “The Food is Spent and the Soldiers are Exhausted”: Taxation as Response to the Friction 
of Terrain 
 
West of the Huai are evil forces unquelled     
A million armored soldiers long encamped     
Our soldiers and the evil ones face off across an age    
The food is spent, the soldiers are exhausted, they turn their eyes to you 
—Bai Juyi, “The Wandering Goose” (ca. 815 CE)  
 
The Qing empire’s annexation of Kham created a nutritional problem for the Chinese state: how 
would it feed the thousands of soldiers and officials that were needed to maintain direct rule over 
the region? The previous chapter introduced the notion that Chinese armies faced a Zomian 
predicament in Kham, where rugged terrain made it difficult to carry life-giving grain. The state’s 
response, as this chapter shows, was to engineer a novel system for appropriating “army food” 
(jun shi軍食) directly from local farmers. This system of grain appropriation had roots in 1906, 
when Zhao Erfeng led his first bloody campaign against Batang rebels. 
At the height of that conflict Zhao was nearly undone by hunger, his Sichuanese soldiers 
languishing for months in their camp outside the tamped walls of Sampeling monastery, where 
monks mocked them by tossing out fish and Litang raiding parties stole off with their grain sacks 
in the night. “Faced with the grim situation of fighting for life without grain in a land of ice and 
snow,” writes historian Xiuyu Wang, Zhao “was at his wit’s end.”1 Eventually the Chinese cut 
off Sampeling’s water supply, stormed the gates, and burned the monastery. Such was the 
campaign protocol: siege, conquer, raze. 
But fighting hunger demanded a different line of attack. In the wake of victories in Batang 
and Litang, Zhao issued a series of edicts to “regularize” (gailiu) the conquered territories as 
Chinese counties, extending them to each new county as the campaign progressed. A core 
function of those edicts was to implement a system of grain and livestock taxation to feed Chinese 
soldiers and officials on the plateau. This tax was to be among Zhao’s most enduring legacies, 
outlasting not only the Qing empire but also the several Chinese regimes that succeeded one 
another in Kham between 1912 and the Communist takeover in 1949. It was not a carbon copy of 
the land tax (tianfu田賦) of the Chinese provinces, but rather, a localized response to the friction 
of terrain in eastern Tibet. 
 




Taxation is integral to James Scott’s notion of the “friction of terrain.” Wet rice cultivation 
was particularly conducive to the formation of states and other asymmetrical power structures 
because it was extremely labor intensive with a higher caloric output per unit of land area than 
any other crop, making it an ideal tax commodity. The landscapes with the greatest friction, in 
his formulation, are those upland settings where oppressive grain taxes are relatively impractical 
because of low population densities and rugged transportation routes.2  However, while Scott 
employs the “friction of terrain” concept to explain the existence of what he calls “non-state 
spaces,” he leaves open the question of how states like China adapted to the challenge of 
governing their Zomian borderlands. Scott limits his discussion on this topic to states’ reliance on 
“distance-demolishing technologies,” culminating with new transportation technologies (such 
air transport) that have allowed modern states to substantially reduce state-free zones since 
World War II.3 However, as this chapter shows, Chinese armies made significant inroads in the 
highlands of eastern Tibet during the early twentieth century through strategic innovations in 
taxation. I highlight the use of an idiosyncratic tax system, involving a land tax and a livestock 
tax, to acquire food for soldiers from local producers. Although taxation necessarily represents 
an assertation of state authority, the system described below relied on a certain amount of 
negotiation. 
Specifically, the land tax entailed an ongoing negotiation between the Chinese state, 
indigenous communities, and local environments. Firstly, governance of certain counties became 
a syncretic operation in which Chinese magistrates collaborated with monasteries and indigenous 
strongmen to collect taxes. Secondly, officials responded to the problem of taxpayer flight with 
strategic tax exemptions and justified these exemptions with a moral vocabulary centered on 
“solicitude” (tixu 体恤) toward poor farmers and herders. Finally, as the Republic of China 
prepared to convert the Kham region into a new Chinese province, the Provincial Preparatory 
Committee negotiated with the national government to re-draw borders so as to include rice-rich 
counties that could subsidize the highland food economy. Each of these strategies was critical to 
the incorporation of Kham into the Chinese provincial system. 
While some who invoke “friction of terrain” adopt a functionalist approach to food (food 
equals calories), I am compelled that its historical importance cannot be understood apart from 
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taste. Taste dictated which crops were proper “food,” and which were not. Accordingly, the first 
part surveys the historical distribution of foodstuffs in southern China (proper) and eastern Tibet 
and ethnocentric attitudes toward those foods. The second part then examines how the Chinese 
state procured food for soldiers and officials in eastern Tibet. The last part of the essay identifies 
environmental and indigenous challenges to these strategies and investigates how the Chinese 
state responded to such challenges. 
 
The Taste of Tibet 
A joke circulated in Republican China in which an exasperated teacher berates his student: “You 
are such an imbecile, were you raised on grass roots?” to which the student eagerly replies, “not 
so, not so! I eat white rice every day!”4 Even among the very stupid, rice was the staple of staples 
in south China and remains as such: “A southerner who has not eaten rice all day,” writes the 
anthropologist E.N. Anderson, “will deny having eaten at all, although he or she may have 
consumed a large quantity of snacks.”5 
This pervasive attitude—that to eat well was, at the very least, to eat rice—posed a 
dilemma for Chinese governance on the Tibetan plateau. China’s core rice belt straddled the 
Yangtze river through seven fertile provinces, from its delta in Jiangsu and Zhejiang in the east 
to its middle course in Hunan and Sichuan in the west. The Chengdu plain in the Sichuan basin 
was known to be among the most fertile rice baskets in all of China, with yields in the 1910s 
reportedly exceeding six dan for each dan planted.6 As one passed west of Chengdu and followed 
the upper course of the Yangtze into Tibet, however, paddies turned into potato, maize, and 
barley plots. The climate was too cold and arid and the soils too poor to sustain riziculture.  
Once Chinese (usually Sichuanese) armies crossed through the city of Dartsedo and into 
guanwai, the lands “beyond the pass,” their rice supplies quickly dwindled and the cost of porting 
more rice into the mountains made doing so impracticable. Accordingly, Zhao Erfeng attempted 
to recruit thousands of Han settlers from China proper and incorporate these farm colonies into 
a series of newly established counties that would serve as a local tax base, assimilate the region 
 
4 Here I quote Liu Hua (1926). At least two periodicals published variants of this joke several years apart: 
see also Ai Wei (1917).  
5 Anderson (1988), p. 114. This may be less true than it was in 1988; today an urban southerner who has 
eaten a quarter pounder with fries would most likely confess to having eaten. 




to the Chinese interior, and bolster Chinese claims to the region against Tibetan and foreign 
claims. From 1908-1910, Zhao issued three calls for settlers, which were directed primarily toward 
Sichuanese men. As Scott Relyea has shown, however, Zhao had tremendous difficulty 
persuading Sichuanese farmers to settle down in Kham because they found that it was generally 
impossible to grow rice and difficult to grow anything at all.7 After two disappointing settlement 
campaigns, the Frontier Commissioner elected to forewarn potential settlers of the hardships 
ahead, as he did in one of his last recruiting notices in 1910: 
Now it has been three years [since the settlement program began]. Over one 
thousand people came from different parts. But people from the interior (neidi) 
are accustomed to eating white rice. Guanwai only produces barley, wheat, 
highland barley ((Tib. nä, Chin. qingke 青稞), buckwheat, and maize. There is no 
rice to eat. Everyone thus complained that the place was bitterly cold. As a result, 
there were those who returned to their native places after going beyond the 
pass.8 
 
The trickle of Han migrants was too slow to significantly transform either the 
demographic or agricultural profile of Kham until much later in the twentieth century.9 The 
problem was not simply that it was impossible to grow food in eastern Tibet, but that 
environmental challenges manifested in conjunction with matters of taste, and particularly, an 
ethnic predilection for rice. 
However, we can dismiss the common Chinese hyperbole of the era that Tibet’s arable 
land was “empty.” There was ample barley flour in circulation, and it had to come from 
somewhere. As the missionary J.H. Edgar noted: 
Tibet to most readers is a land of tent-dwelling herdsmen who live on local animal 
products and tea from China; but, strangely enough, “tsamba,” the “flour of 
parched barley,” the staple food of the nomads is forgotten or unaccounted for… 
to the objection that the term ‘Tibetan farmer” harbours a contradiction it is only 
necessary to point to his dietetic supplies as proof that the same Tibetan is the most 
efficient tiller of the soil that exists anywhere.10 
 
7 Relyea (2019), pp. 199-200. 
8 “Yan shuo” p. 91. 
9 I have shown that agronomists staged notable agricultural interventions in Kham during the 1940s, 
particularly in the area of wheat cultivation, although these were still quite limited in scope (Frank 2019). 
Emily Yeh (2013) demonstrates that technological developments enabled major agricultural interventions 
and population shifts in central Tibet under the Chinese Communist Party in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries. 




Highland barley was (and remains) the dominant crop in Kham, in the senses that it was 
grown over a greater area and in far larger amounts than any other cultivar.11 As I will show, the 
Chinese state appropriated more of this grain from local villages than any other foodstuff during 
the early twentieth century, and it did so in the form of a tax. The basic features of highland barley 
farming were recognizable even to Han farmers who had never grown it. It is a domesticated 
grass of the family poacae like wheat and rice, and like them it is also an annual, or a plant with a 
life cycle of a single year. This made it an ideal tax commodity: tilling, planting, and harvesting 
operated on a predictable calendar, which in turn set the state’s calendar for assessment and 
taxation. Officials also had an intuitive understanding that while under-appropriation of grain 
from farmers might mean hungry soldiers and bureaucrats, over-appropriation might leave 
subsistence farmers with insufficient seed for the next planting, depriving the state of future grain 
revenue from their farms. The similarity of highland barley to the Han staples of wheat and rice 
played a facilitating role in Chinese expansion on the Tibetan plateau. 
But highland barley was also sufficiently dissimilar to Han staples to incur displeasure 
among Chinese and other outsiders. When milled it produced a deep brown flour, which 
Khampas primarily consumed in the form of tsampa, a paste made by mixing unrefined barley 
flour with yak butter, hot water, and sometimes sugar. As mentioned previously, the love of 
tsampa was such a convenient shibboleth that the phrase “tsampa-eaters” became a watchword 
for pan-Tibetan identity at the height of Tibetan anti-Chinese nationalism during the 1950s.12 Han 
migrants were known to eat tsampa, but not without grumbling about it; the British consular 
officer Eric Teichman remarked in 1922 that “Chinese who are unaccustomed to it say chih pu pao 
(‘impossible to satisfy one's hunger on it’), and that would probably be the verdict of most 
 
11 A 1940 survey lists the growing sites for highland barley as “produced in all counties” (SA, Min 231-1-
7), whereas all other crops are identified with particular counties. This is corroborated by production 
reports, including those cited above, except that they list no production for Sershül (Chinese: Shiqu), 
which was often reported to feature a completely pastoral economy. 
12 Tsering Shakya notes that a letter in The Tibetan Mirror was addressed “to all tsampa eaters” in 1959, 
and infers that “if Buddhism provided the atom of Tibetanness, then tsampa provided the sub-particles of 
Tibetanness. The use of tsampa transcended dialect, sect, gender, and regionalism” (1993, p. 9). In 2011 I 
asked a monk in Lhagang what changes he had observed in the town over the past decade, to which he 
replied, “ten years ago we were eating tsampa, and today we are still eating tsampa.” I initially 
considered that response quite banal, but I later realized it may have been a political statement—that the 




foreigners too.”13 Sociologist Ke Xiangfeng had this to say after he started to “practice eating 
tsampa” on his way through Kangding in 1939: 
Han people are unaccustomed to eating it, and take its flavor to be 
overwhelmingly strong, such that it does not suit the tastes of most. Later I heard 
people say that it can be taken mixed with sugar or lard, and that it is then 
appetizing to eat. We tried mixing it with sugar and boiled water, and it was like 
the fried rice noodles that Jiangnan people eat. Everyone finished off one or two 
bowls.14 
Reliance on highland barley entailed a compromise of conventional Han sensibilities. Broadly 
speaking, highland barley retained a liminal status among the Han—it was exotic enough to 
inspire complaints, yet palatable enough to support a settler regime. 
Rows of wheat were known to mark the farmsteads of Han settlers, concentrated along 
the banks of the Gyalmo Ngül River in Tau (Chinese: Daofu). But this was a very different wheat 
from that to which lowlanders were accustomed. Ren Naiqiang observed of wheat in Tau that 
“the grains are exceedingly few, only reaching half of those in the interior.”15 A decade later the 
agronomist Zhang Jinquan 張錦泉 complained that Tau wheat “lacks gluten, and it is not sticky, 
and it cannot be used to make various kinds of noodles, thus the market price is lower than 
highland barley.”16 Wheat in Kham rated roughly on par with barley in terms of its desirability 
among Han communities, at least until crop scientists introduced “improved” strains in the 
1940s. 17  There was also a sizeable corn belt in Eastern Kham that spanned Rongtrak, Tau, 
Chatreng, and Litang. In fact, Rongtrak (Chinese: Danba) produced more maize along the banks 
of the Gyelmo Ngul River than did neighboring Luding county on the Sichuan side of the pass. 
At higher elevations farmers dabbled in various other grains, roots, and legumes, including 
yuangen 元根 radishes, potatoes, buckwheat, and peas.18 
 
 
13 Teichman (1921), p. 62. 
14 Ke (1941), p. 188. 
15 Ren (1930b), p. 6. 
16 Zhang Jinquan (1947), p. 27. 
17 Frank (2019). 
18 This description is based on several historical reports of production by county that corroborate each 





Figure 7. Highland barley drying on wooden racks in Gyalthang, southern Kham. Photograph 2009 by the author. 
 
Procuring Food for the State 
In 1914, amidst troubled negotiations with London and Lhasa over the status of Tibet, Yuan 
Shikai designated most of Kham as the “Chuanbian Special Administrative Region” of the 
Republic of China. Three years later the Chuanbian SAR commissioned an independent inspector 
to evaluate its tax system. The inspector, one Zheng Quan, found it rather peculiar: 
Sorting out the land tax is the hardest thing for Chuanbian. It all goes into the 
army’s food rations. Taxes are levied in kind from each county to meet the food 
needs of soldiers. Levying in silver currency would be difficult to implement. 
[…] Since transportation is inconvenient, porting grain is a hardship for the 
Chuanbian army, and there is no way but to provide food in each county. This is 
indeed the reality of it.19 
 
In the provinces, peasants paid their land tax in silver, while in Kham they delivered bushels of 
barley to the army. Wrote Zheng: “I thought, tax is tax, and army food is army food. It is better 
to plan them as two different affairs, and better that they not be confused.” But the local garrisons 
 




eventually persuaded him that “they cannot do other than to source food from each county, and 
this is the reality of it.”20 
The “confused” tax system in Kham was arguably a logical outcome of past conflicts. 
Chinese armies experienced hunger on the Tibetan plateau not only because there was less food, 
but also because they lacked access to upland food sources. Zhao Erfeng responded to this 
problem by innovating a system for appropriating food from local farms in the name of a “tax.” 
By all accounts, the revenue from this tax wound up in county grain stores on which local troops 
could draw, and it had little relevance to civil administration. The system was designed in such 
a way as to maximize the intake of preferred foods, including wheat, barley, and scant amounts 
of rice, and to minimize the intake of dis-preferred foods or convert them into fungible currency. 
Here I draw on various edicts and internal government communications to outline the logic of a 
rather complicated system for procuring food. 
In 1907 Zhao issued a series of 43 “Regularization Edicts” (Gaitu guiliu zhangcheng 改土归
流章程) for Batang and Litang, which placed these polities under a Chinese bureaucracy and 
declared that their entire areas were “lands of the emperor” (da huang shang ditu大皇上地土). 
Edicts seven through eleven provided an outline of the new grain tax, which would eventually 
serve as the basis of grain taxation throughout regularized Kham. 21  Zhao’s tax system was 
implemented efficiently, but hastily: in place of cadastral surveys, it relied on village headmen to 
report production in their areas. Theoretically, taxes constituted approximately 12% of a given 
village’s harvest. But later observers would report that the tax burden was egregiously unequal, 
with some villages surrendering over 40% of their harvests to the Chinese state.22 Zhao appears 
to have brandished the grain tax as a punitive measure against insurgent villages in Batang, as 
evidenced by the fact that their tax burden was exceptionally large.23 
The fall of the Qing empire and renewed fighting in Kham disrupted tax collection, but 
the Chuanbian government soon reprised the levy under a set of “Temporary Regulations for 
Land Tax Assessment and Collection” (Chuanbian zhengshou tianfu zanxing zhangcheng 川邊徵收
 
20 Zheng Quan (1917), p. 5. 
21 ZECZ, pp. 190-192. For a longer discussion of the political reforms in the Regularization Edicts, see 
Relyea (2011), pp. 282-285. 
22 Chen Han-seng surveyed villages in Gardze in 1940 and found that the actual tax burden among 
households in these villages, which were still using a version of Zhao’s grain tax, ranged from 6.1% to 
over 100% of the harvest (1949, p. 113). 




田賦暫行章程). These measures were more or less a wholesale adoption of Zhao’s original grain 
tax, which they cited as the “old code beyond the pass” (guanwai jiu zhang關外舊章). The term 
tianfu (land tax) invoked the tianfu system of the provinces, but this particular land tax bore little 
resemblance to that of the interior, which generated revenue in silver for the imperial treasury.24 
The land tax in Kham, by contrast, was geared toward procuring “army food” (jun shi) and did 
not remit revenue to the imperial treasury or even the Sichuan provincial government. In fact, it 
specifically required payment in certain preferred foodstuffs to the extent possible, and it 
proscribed the conversion of those food revenues into silver or other items barring exceptional 
circumstances. 
Unlike the provinces, where land tax was calculated according to cultivated land area, the 
system Zhao Erfeng first outlined for Kham in 1908 purported to assess land tax as a function of 
the land grade and the amount of seed planted: headmen graded farms on which they assessed 
taxes into one of three grades: “prime land” (shang di 上地), “mid-grade land” (zhong di 中地), and 
“subprime land” (xia di 下地), corresponding to different tax rates. Theoretically, farmers tilling 
prime land saw higher yields than farmers tilling subprime land and could reasonably be 
expected to remit a larger amount of grain proportionate to what they sowed. Zhao’s scheme 
levied grain as follows: 
 
Table 1. Grain revenue in dou per unit of seed planted. 
 
Land grade 
Revenue per dou 
planted 
Prime 1.2 dou 
Mid-grade 1 dou 
Sub-prime 0.8 dou 
 
 
However, this formula is misleading since the tax system included no mechanism for monitoring 
the annual planting activities of each household. Instead, tax dues were fixed in each village after 
initial calculations that were completed under dubious circumstances. As a result, grain 
extractions in some villages were unreasonably high for decades.25 
 
24 Pomeranz (1992), pp. 305-306. 
25 Ren Naiqiang relates that after Zhao Erfeng regularized Litang, he allowed villagers to collect seed 
from the county office in amounts of their own choosing. The people of Moula Village reportedly 
hoarded more seed than they had means of planting, such that their subsequent tax burden was 
unbearably heavy. This led to large-scale flight from the village as well as an official reassessment of its 




The tax code should have shielded farmers from arbitrary seizure of foodstuffs, but it did 
not always work this way in practice. For instance, in 1917 one Hu Cuncong alerted the 
Chuanbian Garrison Finance Regional Office that a section of twenty-one villages under Dapba 
County had fallen prey to extortion by a certain commander named Wu Yunwu after the latter 
staged a military intervention there that may well have been a pretext for extracting grain. With 
two growing seasons, these villages were among the most productive in Dapba, and Wu 
supposedly levied four units of volume per unit planted in disregard of the official code, later 
raising this figure to as much as eight, which was likely more than the entire harvest. Upon 
visiting the region, Hu witnessed villagers who “could not eat their fill, suffered from hunger and 
cold, and were driven into banditry.” After deliberation, the Regional Office determined that Wu 
was out of line and enacted a relatively low quota of 9% of the harvest in the affected villages 
thereafter.26 
Under certain circumstances as outlined below, subjects could remit their land tax in 
silver. The official currency of remittance in silver was the zangyang 藏洋 or Sichuan rupee, which 
the governor-general of Sichuan introduced to Kham in 1902 in an effort to assert fiduciary 
sovereignty over the Kham region. 27  (In practice, many households paid livestock taxes in 
copper.) Grains were assigned an “official price” (guan jia官價) according to a three-tier scale that 
Zhao devised: “premium grains” (shang liang 上糧 ) included wheat, highland barley, and 
potatoes, while barley was categorized as a “middling grain” (zhong liang 中粮) and buckwheat, 
millet, and yuangen radishes were “sub-premium” (xia liang下糧). Rice, only scantily available in 
the Batang valley, formed an additional category above premium grains. The pricing scheme of 
Zhao’s code was as follows: 
 
Table 2. Silver conversion rates for various land tax commodities in Kham. 
 red rice (hong mi) 4 zangyuan/dou 
 premium grains 2 zangyuan/dou 
 mid-grade grains 1.5 zangyuan/dou 
 sub-premium grains 1 zangyuan/dou28 
 
 
26 SA, Min 197-1-43. 
27 See Relyea (2016), pp. 365-370. 




The code optimized the army’s ability to acquire premium grains by allowing those who 
cultivated other crops to convert their remittance into silver, as well as those who were especially 
“remote,” given the considerable cost of transporting food over long distances in the mountains. 
The army could then apply the revenue from these households towards the purchase of premium 
grain on the market. However, the code did not permit farmers to switch from growing premium 
grains (such as highland barley) to other crops (such as buckwheat) unless it was determined that 
their plots were unsuitable for premium grains.29  
The county was the fundamental unit of tax administration. The county magistrate 
oversaw a number of baozheng 保正 (a sort of deputy), each of whom traveled a particular route 
(lu 路) after the harvest to collect grain and silver from the village heads (cunzhang村長) or clan 
headmen (touren 头人) of all villages and pastoral clans on the route. The baozheng was also tasked 
with “pressing for remittance” (cui shou 催收) from recalcitrant villages. Officials measured grain 
by volume (not weight) and were required to use a standard 30-jin dou scoop. The code specified 
that each scoop was to be leveled, not rounded—a stipulation aimed at preventing officials from 
quite literally skimming off the top. Extortion of taxpayers was also subject to “punishment” (fa
罰), although there was no clear mechanism for identifying incidents of extortion, and nor was 
the punishment specified in the code.30 Zheng Quan’s 1917 inspection of Chuanbian land tax 
collection practices in fact found pervasive corruption among headmen and officials. Zheng 
heard from taxpayers that it was commonplace for grain to “go in rounded and come out level” 
(jian ru ping chu 尖入平出). Another problem was that the size of the dou scoop was different in 
every county, and some headmen used an oversized scoop to collect taxes and standard-size 
scoop to transfer it to the county store, retaining the difference as an illegal collection fee.31 
Decisions about how much grain tax to collect in kind and how much to convert to silver 
fell primarily to county magistrates. These decisions entailed negotiation with taxpayers, but they 
were also informed by Chinese soldiers’ culinary preferences. For example, in 1916 the magistrate 
of Dapba assessed tax on four crops in his county, including highland barley, wheat, (lowland) 
barley, and buckwheat, but the portions collected in kind versus silver differed based on his 
 
29 JDKQ, p. 86. Presumably, the method of enforcing this interdiction on switching to lower-grade 
cultivars was to continue taxing farmers in higher-grade crops, but given that magistrates had some 
leeway to collect tax in converted form, it seems unlikely that this was well enforced. 
30 JDKQ p. 86. 




perception of the desirability of each item. He assessed highland barley and wheat almost entirely 
in kind, citing the judgment that they were “most suitable for army food.” By contrast, he assessed 
the entire sum of buckwheat tax in silver, because “the taste of buckwheat is bitter and inferior, 
and it cannot be used to provision soldiers.”32  
 




















Highland barley 685.055 592.055 93.0 1860 13.6% 20/dan 
Wheat 260.738 214.738 46.0 920 17.6% 20/dan 
Barley 259.870 87.870 172.0 2580 66.2% 15/dan 
Buckwheat 69.800 None 69.8 698 100% 10/dan 
 
Remitting taxes in silver was a privilege, first because the “official price” in the tax code was 
below market price, and secondly because paying in currency allowed households more 
economic flexibility than paying in kind (land taxes could be underwritten by livestock sales, for 
example). The code accorded the privilege of paying in silver to communities that grew 
undesirable crops and communities that were especially “remote.” In practice these two 
categories converged, because the county office was typically situated in the most fertile section 
of a given county and linked to other fertile regions by roads and the ulag transportation network. 
Barley, and buckwheat in particular, were rough grains with low market prices that mainly grew 
at higher altitudes. In short, the more marginal a crop was in terms of its growing sites and utility 
as army food, the more likely it was to be taxed in currency. 
The livestock tax (shengchu shui 牲畜税) represented a further extension of this logic. 
Khampas held far more wealth in the form of yaks, horses, and sheep than in wheat and highland 
barley, and yet livestock was the least pragmatic source of army food. This is not necessarily 
because the meat and dairy were unpalatable to the Han, but likely, because meat is more 
perishable than grain and provides less energy per ounce, and also because pastoralists lived at 
high elevations that were by definition “remote” from the magistrate’s point of view. Magistrates 
 




assessed and collected the livestock tax entirely in currency. Zhao’s tax code assessed tax livestock 
holdings at a half zangyuan (or two ju 咀) per head of yak or horse, and half that per head of 
sheep.33 
The levy varied enormously from county to county. The Chinese state had its most 
lucrative tax base in Gardze, with its abundant farming and pastoral communities. Other sweet 
spots included Batang, the former seat of Zhao Erfeng’s Kham administration, as well as the old 
stomping grounds of the Chakla King (centered in the Kangding-Dau region) and the King of 
Degé (Derge-Pelyül-Dengke-Sershül). 
 
Table 4. Partial list of Chuanbian taxes collected in 1917 by county (JDKQ p.99). 1917 Chinese county names are listed in 
parenthesis. Note the variability of grain and livestock taxes from county to county. 
 




Gardze (Ganzi) 2,653.00 4,829.29 
Batang (Ba’an) 1,300.00 1,073.25 
Dartsedo (Kangding) 994.93 169.25 
Dege (Dege) 1,250,600 13,339.25 
Sershül (Shiqu) 106.688 45,243.25 
Nyachuka (Yajiang) 305.00 119.00 
 
Disaster, Resistance, and the Logic of “Solicitude” 
The stipulations above outlined a system for appropriating food, but a substantial portion of the 
tax code was devoted to relieving people of their tax burdens under exceptional circumstances. 
Communications between county magistrates and the tax office reveal that tax collectors indeed 
requested exemptions on a fairly regular basis. Although magistrates in China proper sometimes 
provided tax exemptions as well as disaster relief, magistrates in Kham were motivated by a 
particular concern over the prevalence of taowang hu 逃亡戶, which I translate as “households in 
flight.” 
Taowang hu were essentially households that disappeared from the gaze of the state. One 
reason for these disappearances was that the climate in Kham was especially harsh. It was not 
 
33 XTG, p. 540. The Draft Gazetteer of Xikang (Xikang tongzhi gao) notes that Zhao initially taxed yaks and 
horses at 1 ju per head, but later doubled this. Republican administrations after 1912 maintained this 




unusual for farmers to abandon a village after a natural disaster, and the population density was 
so low that officials had little hope of tracking their whereabouts. Another, related reason was 
that people were especially mobile. Rates of nomadic pastoralism were highest in northern Kham, 
and magistrates there complained about taxable households disappearing into the remote 
highlands at the border with the Xining administrative region. At one point the exasperated 
magistrate of Dapba declared: 
I cannot manage the people of this land, who are driven like fish into deep 
waters and like sparrows into the thickets… The barbarians take to nomadism 
for a living, dwelling in yak-hair tents, roaming about without a fixed address. 
Though the officials be law-abiding, we cannot stop our residents from 
chaotically absconding in secret.34 
 
Very commonly, these factors complemented one another: a practical response to violence 
or natural disaster might be to pick up and move elsewhere, perhaps by joining an existent nomad 
community. While officials, like the magistrate above, were quick to condemn absconsion, they 
often resorted to tax exemptions in an effort to prevent it, or to avoid depriving farmers of seed 
for next year’s crop. Below I explore the logic of exemptions with reference to several actual cases. 
 
Environment-related Food Shortages 
Even fertile land was vulnerable to the plateau’s distinctive pattern of agricultural disasters. The 
common occurrence of summer hailstorms distinguished Kham from the southern Chinese 
interior, as did early frosts that set in well before the harvest. The Chuanbian tax code allowed 
adjustments in response to the four categories of drought, waterlogging, frost, and hail. 35 
Waterlogging was common in floodplains of the interior, but exceedingly uncommon in Kham; 
it was the upland scourges of frost and hail that prompted the most dramatic reassessments, 
because they could obliterate an entire crop within hours. When villages reported a disaster, the 






34 JDKQ, pp. 94-95. 




Table 5. Chuanbian protocol for adjusting taxes in response to disaster, year? (JDKQ, p. 87). 
Portion Harvested Official Response 
< 10% Total exemption with possibility of relief grain. 
10-20% Total exemption, but no relief. 
20-50% Discuss reduction. 
> 50% May discuss converting to currency 
 
The procedure for requesting a disaster adjustment required that the county magistrate 
or a representative visit the affected villages in person and bear witness to the Finance Branch 
Office, often closing with a concrete proposal to “show solicitude” (yi shi tixu以示體恤) to stricken 
peasants. Many of these evocative accounts survive in the archive. For example, in the autumn of 
1916, three villages in the Taining region of Daofu county suffered a hailstorm that destroyed 
about two thirds of the crop. There was not enough grain left for planting, and most of the 
villagers abandoned their farms. Like villages throughout Kham, these villages were subject to 
back-taxes for the tumultuous first few years of the Republic, and at the time of the hailstorm they 
owed a dizzying sum of 160 dan to the county office for use as army rations. After the three village 
heads appealed to the baozheng for leniency, county magistrate Li Su opted to exempt them from 
grain tax that season and requested permission from the Finance Branch Office to loan seed from 
the county store to villagers for spring planting.36 
As of April 1917 this request had not been approved. This grain in county stores was 
designated for army rations, and a harvest of 30% did not technically meet the criteria for relief. 
Li entreated the office again, this time offering his own eyewitness account. 
The other day, while I was on the road I passed by the three villages in question, 
and at that time I surveyed them carefully. All along the route were dilapidated 
walls and empty houses, and the greater part of the fields had gone to waste. 
Having seen each remnant, all said that the harvest had failed and the people were 
weary, and that because of this, nine out of every ten houses were empty. This 
desolation is truly pitiable. If we do not meet their requests, they will most likely 
continue to abscond in secret as wandering brigands; moreover, I fear that their 
corvee service will be interrupted.37 
 
 
36 SA, Min 197-1-43. 




Li proposed to release twenty-eight dan of grain from his store to distribute to the poorest 
households for spring planting and to “recruit refugees” (zhao liumin) back to the village, 
promising that in the fall he would commission the baozheng to retrieve that amount in order to 
replenish the army’s food stores.  
In the same year, the village of Lamaya in Litang saw its entire crop of highland barley 
destroyed by an early frost. As the magistrate related to the Finance Branch Office, some villagers 
deserted their farms and many of these were driven to begging on the road, while those who 
remained wept and declared that “we have no more seed to plant, and the land will go to waste.” 
The local battalion released the villagers from their corvée duties that year, and their commander, 
Hu Yinxian, authorized his battalion to distribute two dan of grain to twenty refugee households 
with orders to plant it in order to retain them in the village. The magistrate subsequently retrieved 
that amount and returned it to the army.38 
Placing petitions such as these side by side reveals a sort of boilerplate script that satisfied 
the demands of the tax code. Magistrates typically bore witness to the damage wrought by a 
disaster, despaired that many villagers had deserted, and requested tax reduction and possibly, 
a relief loan, in order to “show solicitude.” The moral logic of this script is transparent: the state 
should take pity on the suffering. But parallel to this moral logic was an economic logic: by 
investing a seed loan (quite literally) toward the next crop, the county could sustain an agrarian 
flow of energies that would continue to supply army food and/or corvee labor year after year, 
while also sustaining a sedentist social order. 
 
Indigenous Resistance 
When trauma occurred in Khampa villages, whether it involved violence (luan 亂 ), natural 
disaster (zai災), or both, much of the consequent anxiety among the Chinese bureaucracy was 
directed toward the threat of villager “flight” or taowang 逃亡. This transgressive act had both 
moral and fiscal implications for the state, which were, of course, intertwined. On the moral end 
of the spectrum, it represented an affront to the sedentary, agrarian order of the village and the 
baojia system of household organization. Becoming a “household in flight” was understood to be 
a prelude to crime or vagrancy. Fiscally speaking, it represented the loss of a household’s grain 
 




revenue for the army, or perhaps its corvee service, and the removal of that household from the 
tax ledger. 
County magistrates were forced to report such losses to the finance office, and these 
reports are perhaps the easiest ways to identify incidents of mass exodus. They also offer insight 
on the range of household tax responsibilities, which could range from a few dou to quite a few 
dan. For example, in April 1916, the acting magistrate of Daofu county reported to the Finance 
Branch Office the loss of twelve households that “fled and did not return” from four settlements 
under his jurisdiction after an unspecified incidence of violence (luan) that may have involved 
Chinese in-fighting over the region, as follows: 
 
Table 6. Register of households that “fled because of violence and did not return” in Daofu county, April 23, 1916 (SA, Min 197-
1-43). 
Taining Jiwa Village Gongjia Langmu remits 3.75 dou of grain annually 
Taining Huida 
Temple 
Wengde remits 1 dan 2 dou of grain annually 
Bangsang Zhima remits 3 dan of grain annually 
Jiangjia Pengchu remits 6 dan 5 sheng of grain annually 
Ata remits 1 dan 1 dou of grain annually 
Bamei Village Abao remits 1 dan 5 dou of grain annually 
Shaowushi Village 
Ajia remits 2 dou 5 sheng of grain annually 
Aduo remits 3 dou 7 sheng 5 he of grain annually 
[?]ma remits 5 dou of grain annually 
Silang Zhima remits 3 dou 7 sheng 5 he of grain annually 
Zhima remits 2 dou 5 sheng of grain annually 
[Illegible] remits 6 dan 8 dou  7 sheng 5 he of grain annually 
 
Where did these “households in flight” go? Some probably did turn to crime and vagrancy, as 
officials claimed, but more probably fell back on their herds in the grasslands beyond the reach 
of authorities. Dau, for example, was an overwhelmingly pastoral region, and many farming 
households diversified their subsistence by dabbling in both farming and herding. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that flight occurred on much larger scales in nomadic communities than 
sedentary ones. For example, the magistrate of Degé reported the disappearance of 72 pastoral 
households (189 people) from a single village in 1917, wiping a hefty sum of silver and copper 






Table 7. Households in flight from Dongjibama Village, Derge County, as reported by Derge magistrate Lu Guozhang on May 
10, 1917. 
Household Family Members Assets Tax Duty 
Chengge family 
成哥家 
Two men, two 
women 
115 bovines,39 9 horses, 
116 sheep 




One man, two 
women 
60 bovines, 5 horses, 
31 sheep 




Three men 3 bovines, 2 horses None 
 
Judging from Chinese reports, many refugee households fled west across the Dri river and into 
central Tibet, or north into the sparsely populated corridor between northern Chuanbian and 
southern Qinghai. 
The number of households-in-flight increased consistently over the first several decades 
of Chinese tax administration. This is especially true of the period after 1918, when Frontier 
Commissioner Cheng Xialing suffered a military defeat at the hands of the Kalong Lama, forcing 
a partial retreat of the Chuanbian Administration. For example, the levy in Litang county was set 
at 887.65 dan under Zhao Erfeng, but the 1918 conflict left the Chinese without a garrison in Litang 
and ceded the neighboring territories of Chatreng and Dapba to the Tibetan army. The hapless 
Litang magistrate struck some 94 dan worth of annual income from the county register in 
perpetuity from 1924-1927 alone as dozens of households disappeared over the border. Of the 
remaining 759.7 dan in the levy, certain Litang villages bordering on Chatreng and Dapba refused 
to pay taxes amounting to some 239 dan annually as of 1929, and the magistrate was hardly in a 
position to force their hands.40 Meanwhile, Yajiang 雅江 county (Tib. Nyakchuka) was governed 
by the commander of the local battalion, who fared no better at tax collection. The annual levy 
had plummeted more than fifty percent in the decade since 1918, and of the 377.32 dan still on the 
books, the magistrate succeeded in collecting only some 270 or so annually. The weak position of 
the Yajiang magistrate was reflected in the lackadaisical approach on the part of the staff in 
dealing with the headmen, for, as Ren Naiqiang observed in 1930, “if they do not remit the first 
time, then he presses (cui) them again. If he presses several times and they do not remit, or if they 
do not remit the full figure, he simply yields to them” (jie ting zhi er yi皆聽之而已).41  
 
39 “Bovines” (niu 牛) may have included yaks, cattle, and dri (yak-cattle hybrids). 
40 These are the figures as related to Ren Naiqiang by Wang Zhenghe 王政和, the magistrate of Litang 
county (Ren 1930d, p. 14). 




Over years, indigenous resistance had a considerable impact on Chinese grain and silver 
revenues. Resistance took the two major forms of household flight and simple refusal to pay taxes, 
but these the impacts of these tactics were intertwined: magistrates were unlikely to take coercive 
action against villages with a high risk of desertion, including those surrounded by grasslands or 
bordering on Tibetan territory. Reflecting on the post-1911 history of financial administration in 
Kham, Xikang tongzhi gao records that “governance became irregular, and the counties beyond 
the pass refused grain tax and refused corvee until it became custom. The grain sums that ought 
to be levied grew smaller and smaller until there was no revenue to speak of (hao wu shouru 毫無
收入).”42 For a time, Chinese administrators achieved a crude balance by reducing their military 
presence on the plateau. The problem came to a head only after 1930, when a series of conflicts 
concentrated the forces of warlord Liu Wenhui in and around the Kham region. 
 
Provincial Reassessments 
Liu Wenhui was governor of Sichuan and commander of the Twenty-Fourth Army in 1930 when 
a conflict erupted near Gardze that drew him into a war with Tibet. Liu’s victory against the 
Ganden Phodrang allowed him to retake some of the territories that Tibet had occupied since 
1918, including the lucrative tax base in Gardze. But Liu’s victory in Kham was followed by a 
defeat at the hands of his nephew, Liu Xiang, in Sichuan proper. The War of the Two Lius 
stranded thousands of soldiers from the Twenty-Fourth in and around the Ya’an foothills, where 
they struggled to acquire the thousand or so dan of rice that they needed each month.43 Faced 
with a constant threat of further incursions by Tibet, Liu Wenhui also reinforced Kangding with 
several companies under Brigade Commander Ma Shufan 马叔帆, exacerbating the army’s grain 
shortage there.44 
The Kangding garrison began experimenting with ways to increase its grain supply. As 
an early measure, it demanded that farmers in Kham uniformly remit their land taxes in highland 
barley rather than silver, contravening two decades of administrative flexibility in this regard.45 
Then, in 1935, Liu ordered the magistrate of Kangding county, Wang Ziyuan 汪子渊, to increase 
 
42 XTG p. 526. 
43 “Chuan Kang jun zong bu,” p. 111. 
44 “Xikang zhengshou liangshui,” p. 47 
45The Kham-Tibet Vanguard (Kang Zang qianfeng) reports that Ma “ruled that the counties were no longer 
permitted to tender taxes in silver and must assess and collect qingke in order to supply army food 




both the land and livestock taxes in his county by twenty percent. Wang called the headmen of 
Kangding’s eight districts to a meeting where they were instructed to begin collecting taxes in the 
increased amounts as of autumn.46  The Chuanbian Quarterly reported the tax hike somewhat 
apologetically, remarking that “although the people are miserably poor, they have thus far 
managed to tender their land tax on schedule.”47 
But the twenty-percent hike was a step too far: the next issue of the Chuanbian Quarterly 
announced that indigenous resistance had prompted the Xikang administration to retract its 
Kham tax hike “to show solicitude for the hardships of the people” (yi xu min jian以恤民艱). 
Instead, the army would make up its food shortage in Kham by purchasing rice in the Ya and 
Ning regions.48 Since the army presence in the Ya region consumed most of the available rice 
supply there, Zhang Jie 張傑 of the Xikang Provincial Preparatory Council headed off a new 
Transfer and Shipping Bureau (Zhuanyun Zongju轉運總局) in Yuexi county 越嶲縣 of the Ning 
region to purchase rice from neighboring counties and transport it by pack animal and porter to 
a relay station in Luding about two hundred li from Kangding.49 1935 thus marks a significant 
turning point for the “food sovereignty” of the Chinese administration in Kham: henceforth it 
would be systematically dependent on grain and cash infusions from the lowland Ya and Ning 
regions. Even so, Kham was administratively divided from these regions at the Lu Pass. 
As it became clear that Kham’s land tax could not feed its engorged Chinese regime, Liu 
eyed the prospect of formally absorbing neighboring lowland counties into Xikang to enhance 
his revenue base, starting with the Ning and Ya regions that his army already occupied. War with 
Japan placed him in a position to negotiate with Sichuan for these counties. In 1937, Liu Xiang 
took his armies to battle Japan on the eastern front before his untimely death in Hubei the 
following year. Meanwhile, Chiang’s nationalist government relocated to Chongqing and 
installed a new provincial government over Sichuan. In June 1938, the Xikang Preparatory 
Committee met with the new Sichuan Provincial Government to discuss the transfer of several 
counties from Sichuan into Xikang in anticipation of Xikang’s pending establishment as a Chinese 
province. 
 
46“Chuan Kang jun zongbu,” p. 112. 
47 “Chuan Kang jun zongbu,” p. 111. 
48 “Chuan Kang jun zongbu,” p. 112. 




Of five territories that the Executive Yuan tapped for province-hood in 1928, Xikang was 
the only one that had not yet succeeded in achieving that status. 50  The Xikang Preparatory 
Committee now wielded this fact in its favor by arguing that Xikang had not been afforded the 
material benefits of its peers. It pointed out that the provinces of Chahar (est. 1912), Rehe, Suiyuan, 
Ningxia, and Qinghai (all est. 1928) had all absorbed several productive neighboring counties as 
“mainstays of the new provinces” (xin sheng zhugan新省主幹).51 If Xikang appeared comparable 
to the new provinces in terms of land area, their differences in respects were enormous. For 
example, the new province of Rehe was comparable to Xikang in area but hosted twenty time its 
population, incorporated ten fertile counties, and benefited from good transportation. The 
economy and “culture” (wenhua 文化) of the five new provinces, claimed the committee, were 
fundamentally “no different from the interior,” while those of Xikang were “extremely far below 
the interior.” The Preparatory Committee requested that Sichuan “transfer (huaru 劃入 ) 
neighboring cultivated counties that can provide food grains, and entrust Xikang with the 
responsibility of overseeing migration projects” in those counties.52  
 
Table 8. Chart comparing conditions in Xikang to those of the five new provinces as calculated by the Xikang Preparatory 
Committee in 1938. 
Province/Region Area (km
2




Rehe 173,966 6,000,000+ 10 Unknown 
Chahar 258,815 2,000,000+ Several 3,000,000 
Suiyuan 304,058 2,000,000+ 10 2,000,000 
Ningxia 304,051 1,000,000+ 10 4,000,000 
Qinghai 728,198 1,000,000 7 1,000,000+ 
Xikang 181,000 300,000 None 400,000+ 
 
The request by the Xikang administration hinged on the notion of shu xian, which I have 
rendered here as “cultivated counties” by association with shu di 熟地, or “cultivated land.” But I 
do so with reservations. The suggestion that Xikang altogether lacked cultivated counties is 
 
50 These five territories include Rehe, Chahar, Suiyuan, Qinghai and Xikang. 
51 JDKQ, p. 57. 




nonsensical if taken too literally, since several counties produced substantial crops of barley, 
wheat, corn, and other foodstuffs. The subtext is what they cultivated: unlike the present counties 
of Xikang, the shu xian in question grew substantial crops of rice. Consider the following profile 
of Kangding, Ya’an, and Xichang counties—respectively the administrative centers of Wenhui’s 
Kham, Ya, and Ning dependencies—as surveyed by the Xikang Provincial Government in 1940:  
 
Table 9. 1940 production of rice in three counties. Kangding, Ya’an, and Xichang were the seats of the Kham, Ya, and Ning 
regions respectively. The source lists only rice production for Xichang. Data sourced from Xu Kanwu (1943), p. 21-23. 





0 10,000 30,000 10,000 
Ya’an 雅安 
(Ya 雅) 
105,000 80,000 6,000 12,000 
Xichang 西昌 
(Ning 宁) 
250,000    
 
Further, shu is a polysemous word: to be shu is to be ripe, or mature, or cooked, or 
cultivated. Much like the English word “culture,” it glides effortlessly between agrarian and 
metaphorical usages. Officials in Sichuan and elsewhere spoke of highly assimilated non-Han 
peoples as shu fan 熟番 or shu yi 熟夷 (“cooked barbarians”), a term that invoked both the 
character and culinary habits of the peoples to whom it referred.53 More accurately then, the 
Preparatory Council’s request for shu xian was a bid for “mature” counties that were densely 
populated by culturally assimilated people who grew rice. It was a bid for relief from what Liu 
Manqing had once called “the tsampa life.” 
On June twenty-sixth, 1938, the Xikang Preparatory Committee and the Sichuan 
Provincial Government issued a joint statement to the Executive Yuan indicating that the two 
parties had come to an agreement. Xikang would absorb the fifteen bordering counties in the Ya 
and Ning regions, formerly of western Sichuan, while Sichuan would retain the seven counties 
that were not contiguous with the prior borders of Xikang. The language justifying the transfer 
harped on an old concern accentuated by the war with Japan: the need to consolidate Kham for 
 
53  For a brief discussion of the use of the term shu fan in late imperial Sichuan, see Fiskesjô (1999), p. 147-
148. More recently, in a 1943 a survey report on agricultural production in Xikang, the author clarified 
that “this chart is constricted by governing authority and does not extend to grain production in zones 




national defense. It articulated that “Sichuan Province has become the last bastion for the revival 
of our nation,” and that the relationship between Sichuan and Xikang was like that of “mutual 
dependence between lips and teeth” (chunchi xiangyi唇齒相依). Xikang was “not only the rear 
guard (houfang 后防), but also the front line for national defense in the west of the country.”54 In 
July, at meeting #372, the Executive Yuan approved the transfer and authorized both provinces 
to redraw their maps. 
Kham was now but one of Xikang’s three provincial “dependencies” (shu 属). The Kham 
Dependency still comprised the vast majority of Xikang’s land area but contributed less than 20% 
of its population and less than two percent of its agricultural production. The Han population 
was concentrated in the Ya Dependency, producing an even greater net grain deficit than Kham. 
It was the Ning Dependency, once the patrimony of yi 夷 hill tribes, that showed the greatest 
promise for agricultural colonization. In June 1939 Liu Wenhui chaired a new Ning Dependency 
Land Reclamation Committee (Ning shu tunken weiyuanhui寧屬屯墾委員會) in Xichang, and his 
administration began to promote Han migration to that region with grandiose rhetoric of the sort 
once reserved for Kham. As of 1940 the Ning Dependency produced an agricultural surplus 
roughly equal to the deficit in Kham: 
 
Table 10. Xikang 1940 population, production, consumption, and net product by dependency. Land areas sourced from XTG p. 
299. All other data sourced from Xu Kanwu (1943), p. 21-23. 








Kham 康 239,056 206,079 397,500.0 621,734.0 -224,234.4 
Ya 雅 459,681 3,4981 780,451.4 1,103,234.4 -328,268.0 
Ning 宁 762,789 4,4940 2,035,548.8 1,850,693.6 224,857.6 
Total 1,481,526  32,335,000.0 3,555,662.4 -322,162.4 
 
Xikang’s conversion into a province provoked a public discourse on its “grain problem” 
(liangshi wenti糧食問題) in the press. Why was grain in such short supply? Was the grain tax in 
 
54 JDKQ, pp. 56-57. The statement also proposed a new name for the new province to match its eastward 
shift. Rather than Xikang, or “Kham in the west,” it would be named Jiankang, an amalgam of Jianchang 
and Xikang that also worked as an obvious rebus: Jiankang sheng 建康省 happened to sound exactly like 
jiankang sheng 健康省, or “healthy province.” Although the Executive Yuan approved this name change, 




Kham too lenient? Its idiosyncratic form puzzled Chinese observers, producing evaluations that 
seemed to contradict each other. Even before the 1938 reassessment, some believed that the land 
tax in Kham was “extremely light,” and that perhaps this was because Zhao Erfeng had only 
recently opened the region to direct rule.55 Others decried the tax as an undue burden on farmers. 
Those of the latter persuasion often noted that the Kham land tax originated as a punitive measure 
by Zhao Erfeng against the villages that supported the Batang uprising of 1905, as evidenced that 
taxes in these villages were assessed at unsustainably high levels. 56  These evaluations were 
contradictory in appearance only. Kham’s generally lower yields meant that a “light” tax in terms 
of raw figures could still be an undue burden on farmers. One writer for the Chuanbian Quarterly 
put it succinctly in 1935: “land tax in the counties of Xikang is assessed very lightly because they 
are situated in the remote borderlands, and the place is bitterly cold.”57 
The induction of 15 new “cultivated counties” from Sichuan into Xikang prompted the 
Preparatory Committee to take a more conciliatory approach toward Kham. In August 1938 it 
commissioned a team to reassess the land tax in Kham in order to ensure a more uniform burden 
on farmers. After six months of survey work the committee reduced the tax burden in certain 
villages, lowering Kham’s overall levy by 6,946 new dan, or 18%.58 The reductions in certain 
counties were far higher. The punishingly high grain tax rates in Batang and Dingxiang were 
reduced by 50% each.59 Meanwhile, the revenue department raised land tax rates in Ning such 
that they comprised about 20% of the harvest in most counties.60 
 
Conclusion 
When Zhao Erfeng led his first retaliatory expedition in the Batang-Litang region, his soldiers 
suffered from terrible hunger, so he devised a unique system in the name of a land tax for 
appropriating grain from local farmers to feed Han soldiers. This created the conditions for a 
sustained Chinese military presence, but the scarcity of grain and the considerable mobility of 
 
55 One author for the Chuanbian Quarterly (Chuanbian jikan) claimed that “since little time has passed since 
gaitu guiliu, the grain tax is extremely light. There is only one levy per year, and that which is levied is 
mostly highland barley (“Chuan Kang jun zongbu,” p. 111). 
56 For example, see Chen Han-seng (1949), p. 112; XTG, p. 530. 
57 “Kangding ershi si niandu,” p. 136. 
58 As of 1938 Xikang’s total annual land tax was assessed from 19,280.063 dan (equivalent to 38,560.126 
new dan) to 31,613.981 new dan of grain. One “old” dan in Kham was equal to two new dan. 
59 This figure is calculated from chart 1 (表 1) and chart 2 (表 2) in XTG, p. 531-532. 




highland “citizens” prompted the state to adopt an accommodationist approach to tax 
administration, characterized by progressive reductions and exemptions. Ironically, the process 
by which Kham became integrated into the Chinese provincial system not only preserved its now-
customary land tax in kind, but set its levy further below the national standard as a percentage 
of household production. That is, provincialization substantially reduced, rather than increased, 
tax burdens in Kham. How do we make sense of this? 
It helps to contemplate the plight facing the county magistrate in Kham during the early 
twentieth century, to whom fell the balancing act of exploiting local farmers and herders without 
overexploiting them to the detriment of the system. Coercive exploitation of a village, for instance, 
might lead to its abandonment by villagers and the demise of its farms, striking its households 
from the tax register in perpetuity. The problems of taxpayer flight and simple refusal to pay 
taxes (kangshui 抗税) were frequent bugbears of the Republican tax administration, which had 
little recourse against them. In many ways, Kham resembles a quintessentially Zomian scenario. 
Yet remarkably, magistrates collected millions of dan of grain and many thousand silver zangyuan 
each year. As this chapter has shown, tax collectors accomplished this through strategic 
accommodations for the political and environmental peculiarities of the region.  
There is little in the Zomia model to explain such behavior, but we might adapt one of 
Scott’s earlier ideas, which he in turn adapted from the British historian E.P. Thompson: that of a 
moral economy. In Scott’s formulation, the struggle for basic subsistence has been one of the most 
persistent features of peasant society up to the modern era. He argues that peasant resistance to 
European colonization in Vietnam and Burma reflects a “subsistence ethic” that developed out of 
this long-term struggle, characterized by such attitudes as a demand for reciprocity and rejection 
of even modest tax increases.61 While my inclination to look for a similar subsistence ethic in 
Kham is limited by the nature of the archive, where peasant voices are mostly mediated by 
magistrates’ reports to the revenue office, the materials explored in this chapter nevertheless 
suggest that subsistence—for example, after a hail storm—was a matter over which peasants 
 
61 See Scott (1977), chapter 4 (“The State as Claimant”); Thompson (1993), pp. 341-343. Citing the example 
of Burmese peasants under British colonial rule, Scott writes that “viewed from the budget office in the 
colonial capital, an increase in taxes from five rupees to six rupees amounts to a 20 percent increase in the 
taxpayer’s obligation. Viewed from the taxpayer’s perspective, however, the surrender of five rupees one 
year may still permit the family to maintain the basic features of its life style. But take one additional 
rupee, or, what amounts to the same thing, five rupees after the family has had a bad year, and you may 




might successfully negotiate their tax burdens with the state. The frequently invoked idiom of 
“showing solicitude” in particular suggests that Chinese officials harbored a sensitivity toward 
the subsistence ethic of the Khampa peasant. “Solicitude,” or tixu, was strategy of state survival 
behind a veneer of benevolence to the extent that it sustained the tax base that soldiers and 
officials farmed for subsistence. The idiom of “showing solicitude” betrays what we might call a 
“moral economy of the state.” 
This perspective helps us to look anew at the creation of Xikang Province: its marriage of 
highland and lowland counties allowed Chinese administration in Kham to show “solicitude” 
and still survive its shrinking food revenue from the land and livestock taxes. Practically speaking, 
the absorption of Kham into the Chinese provincial system was less important than the 
absorption of western Sichuan by the Kham administration. Rice farms in the relatively low-
altitude regions centered on Ya’an and Xichang could now subsidize government institutions in 
Kham. 
Another factor behind Kham’s tax reductions of the late 1930s was that administrators 
now had a better grasp of the region. Until about 1930, the upper echelons of the Chinese 
bureaucracy had very little knowledge about the people and environments of the Kham region 
beyond the feedback loop of the tax administration. In 1929-30, Ren Naiqiang surveyed counties 
in Kham and wrote extensively on regional agriculture, pastoralism, and tax practices, several of 
which were cited in this chapter. Over the next decade, a wave of social science and popular 
writings produced a more defined understanding of Kham among the Chinese. New concepts 
like “society” (shehui社會) and “the economy” (jingji經濟) helped policymakers to describe the 
peculiarities of the region with less resort to moralistic language. Consider the following 
statement by the Xikang Finance Office (Caizheng Ting財政廳) in 1940: 
Financial administration is a branch of the economy, and thus the financial 
administration of each country must accord with the social and economic situation 
of that country and its territories and may vary in nature. For example, in societies 
where industry and commerce are developed, the tax situation is different from 
that of agricultural societies, and tax in agricultural societies is different from that 
of nomadic societies. Taxation in the countries of Europe and America is mostly 
that of industrial and commercial societies, and thus production tax and direct tax 
form the core tax revenue. The provinces of our country are agricultural societies, 




developed in [Xikang] province, which is caught in the interstices between 
agricultural and nomadic society, and thus the tax situation is unusual.62 
 
Note the conceptual framework above that sorts people into industrial, agrarian, 
and nomadic societies—a framework that was informed by discourses that began in the 
late 1920s and continued through the establishment of the new province. The next chapter 
explores how notions of the “agrarian” and the “nomadic” and their relationship to the 
environment became central to Chinese understandings of Kham and its people in the 
years leading up to provincialization.
 
62 Xikang sheng tianfu gai kuang, pp. 1266-1267. This passage was reproduced in the “Finance and 
Taxation” annal of the Draft Gazetteer of Xikang (XTG p. 529), suggesting that it is representative of how 




3. Assimilation Ecology: Ethnicity, Gender, and Lifeways in the Chinese Settlement 
of Eastern Tibet 
 
Then by much over-rated accounts of unoccupied lands, 
and a plethora of beautiful and healthy Tibetan women, 
thousands of Chinese were inveigled into this “Land of 
Peace and Plenty.” The idea of a new China in Tibet was a 
good one and its formation was to be along the old lines 
that had made the Empire what it is today. Unoccupied 
alien lands were to be settled with Chinese farmers and 
their progeny by native women were to be standardized 
by the powerful culture of their fathers’ nation. 
—J.H. Edgar, “The Great Open Lands” (1931)1 
 
In 1931 the Australian missionary J.H. Edgar, eyewitness to the Chinese state-building saga in 
eastern Tibet, prognosticated for the Journal of the West China Border Research Society that China 
would eventually absorb Kham and its “ethnic details.” Provocatively, Edgar perceived China 
not as a young republic, but as an empire resurgent and expanding westward. The realist position 
for missionaries like himself, he contended, was “to accept Kham, or E. Tibet, as potentially 
Chinese; and work for a harmonious union of the Tibetan and Chinese races along lines suggested 
by the latter.”2 
Edgar was in tune with his Chinese contemporaries on this matter, not least including Ren 
Naiqiang. Ren, now widely regarded as the preeminent Kham scholar of the 20th century, 
launched his career by setting from out Sichuan on a two-year survey tour of 11 counties in the 
Xikang Special Administrative Region in 1926. Ren’s earliest survey reports were preoccupied 
with basic economic questions about Kham: what were the population and the ethnic 
composition of each county, how did communities eke out a living, and what was the current 
state of tax collection? But by the time he published his magnum opus, the Illustrated History of 
Kham, in 1934, he was more interested in grand theories about the past, present, and future of 
Sino-Tibetan relations. Eventually, he contended, Han settlers would subsume the indigenous 
population. “The ability of the Han Chinese to assimilate others has always been great,” wrote 
Ren, and more diverse populations had not been able to withstand assimilation by the Han, “let 
 
1 Edgar (1931a), p. 19. 




alone such a single and homogenous group as the Tibetans”—a misleading statement given the 
internal diversity of Tibetan-speaking peoples.3 
Assimilation of indigenous ethnic groups into the Zhonghua minzu, or Chinese ethnic 
nation, was broadly characteristic of Guomindang ethnic policy under Chiang Kai-shek. As 
Thomas Mullaney points out, while the leadership continually reaffirmed its dedication to a 
“unity of the five ethnic groups,”4 this concept emphasized not so much multiculturalism as “the 
possibility of and necessity for assimilating such groups into the Han majority.”5 Political leaders 
sometimes promoted assimilation by juxtaposing it with more violent approaches. In his 
landmark treatise China’s Destiny, President Chiang states that “our Chinese nation is the 
amalgam of many ethnic groups,” and that “the method of amalgamation is assimilation, not 
conquest.”6 
This chapter looks at the relationship between assimilation and ecology and argues that 
they were inseparable concerns the Chinese borderlands during the early twentieth century. 
Intellectuals of the 1920s and beyond promoted widespread associations between settled 
agriculture and the Chinese nation that in turn catalyzed land reclamation projects in the 
borderlands in the interest of consolidating Chinese rule there. This “agrarian nationalism,” as I 
call it, was often characterized by a naïve optimism regarding soils and climates on the frontier. 
Calls from the top of the Guomindang beckoned Han Chinese citizens to mold the frontier in the 
image of the interior provinces through “agricultural colonization,” or tunken. Since tunken 
discourse was simultaneously geared toward environmental and ethnic transformation, I refer to 
it as an “ecology of assimilation.” But frontier administrators who tried to put assimilation 
ecology into practice were forced to reckon with the reality that good farming soils might not be 
coterminous with national territory. 
In this chapter I am especially concerned with the wave of discourse that motley Chinese 
and international observers produced about ecology and ethnicity in the Kham region after 
1928—a period that saw Chiang Kai-shek’s consolidation of power over the Guomindang, as well 
 
3 Ren (1934), p. 222, as quoted in Tsomu (2012), p. 19. Ren typically referred to Tibetans (including 
Khampas) as Xifan 西番, an archaic term dating to the Tang dynasty. Here I have changed the word Xifan 
in Tsomu’s translation to “Tibetan.” On the internal diversity of Khampa Tibetans, see McGranahan 
(2019), p. 527. 
4 The “five ethnic groups” in Guomindang ideology included the Han majority as well as Hui, Mongols, 
Tibetans, and Uighurs. 
5 Mullaney (2010), p. 25. 




as heightened interest within the party-state toward converting the Kham region into a province. 
Outside observers of Kham, or “Kham watchers” as I will call them, were among the first people 
in China to articulate distinctly nationalist visions of assimilation by land reclamation. 
New strides in agricultural survey work, however, revealed that growing conditions 
deteriorated at higher elevations. Most concerningly, settled agriculture ran up against an 
absolute limit, or “grain line” as I call it, at about 3,600 meters above sea level—a line that cut 
right through most counties in Xikang. Those who supposed that Han settlers would overwhelm 
the Khampa nomads of the high grasslands were thwarted by the environmental barriers that 
separated these communities. In response to this conundrum, some Kham watchers proposed 
what I call a “conjugal solution,” or the idea that inter-ethnic marriage might amplify the cause 
of assimilation. The conjugal solution was a product of the distinctive way that ethnicity, gender, 
and lifeways intersected in the logic of assimilation. 
 
Assimilation Ecology 
The impulse toward “assimilation” sat at the corner of colonial and national ideologies: it 
reflected the nationalist desire for a body politic that shared linguistic, cultural, and perhaps even 
racial attributes, but also the colonial desire to define this nation in ways that privileged the 
dominant ethnic group—the Han. In some ways Chinese assimilation discourse resembled the 
“melting pot” ideal in American politics. Tom Mullaney notes parallels between the Han ethnic 
group and the white race, each of which comprise “not only an identity, but the power to name 
and shape identities” within their respective hegemonic domains.7 But the Chinese notion of 
assimilation, or tonghua 同化, was more directly derived from the Japanese word dōka, written 
with the same two characters. Louise Young points out that the long-term trend of Japanese 
colonialism, unlike that of most European colonial powers, was toward assimilation of its 
colonized subjects into the Japanese ethnic nation, rather than the segregation or “association” 
politics that were more typical of European colonies.8 The discourse on dōka emerged after the 
Japanese colonization of Taiwan in 1895 but was most notoriously instrumental in the Japanese 
colonization of Korea, where the Government General ordered Korean colonial subjects to adopt 
Japanese names and worship at Shinto shrines. 
 
7 Mullaney (2012), p. 3. Here Mullaney is quoting Flagg (2005). 




While the mandates on names and shrines may have been the most conspicuous exercises 
of dōka, Todd Henry notes that Japan’s assimilation policies in Korea were far-reaching and 
extended to the economy, politics, and culture, and were closely associated with modernization.9 
Similarly, Chinese tonghua policies aimed to draw frontier peoples into the modern ritual, 
economic, political, and cultural fold of the Zhonghua minzu. Politicians and writers typically 
invoked the need for tonghua in response to non-Han ethnic traits that they perceived to pose 
problems for Chinese state-building, such as, say, an ethnic group’s supposed distaste for settled 
agriculture, or its lack of engagement with the national market economy. A deliberately nebulous 
notion, “assimilation” might best be understood as the eradication of inconvenient differences. 
To eradicate inconvenient differences, the Chinese first had to determine what they were. 
Not surprisingly, then, assimilation policies were preceded by information-gathering efforts in 
non-Han regions. In the Chinese context, this kind of knowledge production has roots in the late 
imperial era, and during the expansionist Qing dynasty in particular, when officials turned to 
ethnography, cartography, and travel writing to aid in the governance of newly-acquired frontier 
territories. Laura Hostetler writes that imperial officials employed cartography and ethnography 
“to represent, and thus to claim or define, the scope of an expanding China,” while Emma Teng 
argues that travel writings “played an important role in the creation of the new imagined 
geography of the expanded Qing empire.”10 These same technologies helped rulers to justify the 
colonization of frontier regions by intimating, supposedly based on empirical observation, that 
their indigenous peoples were barbaric and in need of civilization. 
Historians have expended less ink on the role of ethnographic knowledge in supporting 
the colonization of minority regions during the Republican era. One of the few contributions in 
this area is Yudru Tsomu’s study of the writings of Ren Naiqiang. Ren drew Chinese-language 
maps of each county he visited to accompany his ethnological reports, which Tsomu identifies as 
“part of his project of incorporating the Kham region into the Chinese national imagination.”11 
Tsomu, drawing on phrases first coined by Emma Teng, detects a “rhetoric of privation” in Ren’s 
writings about the Khampas, which situated them at an earlier stage of development than the 
Han, as well as a “rhetoric of primitivism,” which (mis)characterized Khampa culture as carefree 
 
9 Henry (2016), p. 5.  
10 Hostetler (2001), p. 30; Teng (2004), p. 5. 




and simplistic. 12  In Tsomu’s analysis, Ren felt that “the people of Kham would be easily 
assimilated” and that “the key to furthering development and integration was the promotion of 
Han settlement together with an associated denuding of local identity.”13 
While I concur with the thrust of Tsomu’s analysis, she glosses over Ren’s concerns about 
the ecology of the Kham region and its implications for settlement and assimilation. Generally 
speaking, to settle the frontier was to farm it, and Ren was well aware that the mountainous 
environment of Kham set severe limits on farming. In the 1934 Illustrated History of Kham he wrote 
that: 
Xikang is high, cold, vast and remote, and most suited for pasture. When the Han 
are transplanted there, other than engaging in trade they tend to reclaim the 
narrow strips of land along the river valleys and engage in agriculture. The 
pastures that cannot be ploughed they generally abandon. It might be said that 
they are predisposed toward agriculture.14 
 
Some Kham-watchers assumed that “primitive” pasture-dwelling Khampas would naturally 
gravitate toward Chinese settlements in the valleys, but as we shall see later in this essay, Ren 
was not so optimistic. On one hand he recognized that agricultural colonization alone was not 
sufficient to assimilate the Khampas, while on the other hand he was unwilling to reconsider the 
necessity of this task.  
More broadly, the relationship between agriculture, migration, and the Han people was a 
persistent concern in social science writings of the Republican era. It was certainly a leitmotif in 
the writings of Fei Xiaotong, whose From the Soil declares on page one that “Chinese society is 
fundamentally rural” and that the rural Chinese have taken “their tradition of making a living 
from the soil” wherever they have migrated.15 Fei was something of a cynic on this front: he 
related a secondhand anecdote about Chinese settlers pathetically scratching away at the sandy 
soils of Inner Mongolia, and a similar anecdote about recent migrants to Siberia (“in total 
disregard of the climate, those Chinese still planted their seeds just to see if anything would 
grow”), so it was with resignation that Fei concluded that “the Chinese are really inseparable 
 
12 Tsomu (2012), pp. 16-18. 
13 Tsomu (2012), p. 13. 
14 Ren (1934), p. 25. 




from the soil.”16 Fei, like Ren Naiqiang, seems to have viewed the agrarian nature of the Han as 
a limiting factor. 
But as Zhihong Chen has noted, many other Han intellectuals saw the Han people as both 
a product of temperate climates, and uniquely capable thriving in foreign settings. For these 
thinkers, “on the one hand, favorable environment determined that the Chinese/Han occupied 
an advanced position on the scale of civilization; on the other hand, the Chinese/Han seemed to 
be able to break the law of environmental determinism, escape climatic destiny, and move around 
without suffering any negative influences from the environment.”17 
As the above quotation suggests, the term “Han” was (and remains) entangled with the 
term “Chinese.”18 Accordingly, just as Han intellectuals linked agriculture to the Han people, 
they often related it to “China” as a whole. One of the more conservative veins of nationalism, 
sometimes labeled “agricultural fundamentalism” (nongbenzhuyi 農本主義), held that the Chinese 
nation was agrarian in its essence. We might trace this school of thought to the influential writer 
and statesman Zhang Shizhao 章士釗.19 Zhang introduced the slogan that “China is a country 
founded on agriculture” (Zhongguo yi nong liguo 中国以农立国) in the 1920s after his experiences 
abroad as a student in Tokyo and then Edinburgh, which were instrumental in his embrace of 
what he perceived to be traditional Chinese values. 20  He outlined a fundamental, binary 
opposition between ‘agrarian states’ (nong guo 農國) and ‘industrial states’ (gong guo 工國), 
associating the agrarian state with the virtues of thrift, modesty and the ancient principle of wu 
wei無為 (non-action) and the industrial state with the sort of greed that begat capitalism and 
imperialism.21  His agrarianism inspired a number of disciples, corresponding to the loosely-
aligned ‘country founded on agriculture’ clique (yi nong liguo pai以農立國派).22 Among the more 
 
16 Fei (1992), p. 38. 
17 Zhihong Chen (2012), p. 82. 
18 Thomas Mullaney writes that “there are at least three ways in which Han and China are entangled: the 
long-standing commensuration between Han and ‘Chinese culture’; a similar long-standing equivalence 
between Han and ‘the Chinese people’; and the intimate relationship between Han and the political-
geographic concept of China” (2012, p.4). 
19 The phrase Zhongguo yi nong li guo is difficult to translate. A more literal translation might be ‘China 
erects the country with agriculture’, but I have opted for the translation ‘China is a country founded on 
agriculture’, which I believe sounds more natural while maintaining functional equivalency with the 
Chinese phrase. 
20 Boorman and Howard (1967), pp. 105-106 
21 Zhang Shizhao (1996), p. 1926 




zealous of his disciples was Yang Kaidao楊開道, a pioneer in the field of Chinese village sociology 
who earned his PhD at the University of Michigan and espoused a utopian vision of rural social 
revival modeled on Neo-Confucian principles.23  
 
 
Figure 8. An agrarian fundamentalist treatise from 1935. The first four lines read, “The 
material for the four great needs of clothing, food, shelter, and travel all grow from the 
earth. Let the earth’s production increase and the welfare of the people will naturally 
increase. As such, farmers are those who utilize the earth to produce and multiply in order 
to give the people their needs” (Chen Baolin 1935). 
 
The “country founded on agriculture” school figured alongside a number of other 
discourses on the fundamental importance of agriculture to the Chinese nation-state that I 
collectively refer to as agrarian nationalism. Agrarian nationalism was an ideological onion 
encapsulating two layers of narrative about agriculture within a third. These first two narratives 
are broadly accepted by historians today: First, that China is one of the oldest agricultural 
societies on earth, since settled agriculture in that region began over 7,000 years ago. Secondly, 
that China is also one of the oldest agrarian states, meaning that the earliest incarnations of the 
Chinese state actively promoted agriculture, a political strategy sometimes referred to as quan 
 




nong 勸農.24 Lord Shang, a founding figure of China’s first imperial dynasty, is recorded as saying 
in the fourth century BCE that “among the affairs of the people, none is greater than agriculture”25 
while the Guanzi管子 (ca. 26 BCE) posits that “if the ruler be adept, the fields are cultivated and 
the state is strong, and the court may rest at ease.”26  
Agrarian nationalists cited such ancient wisdom to argue that agrarianism was a core 
element of the Chinese volkgeist; agrarianism bound together the succession of kingdoms and 
dynasties that they now called “China” (Zhongguo). Agrarian nationalism was thus a recursive 
agrarianism: it held that the Chinese nation should be an agrarian nation because it had always 
been an agrarian nation, and perhaps always would be. While Chinese grammar ensures that the 
phrase “China is a country founded on agriculture” has no clear tense, Yang Kaidao’s 
reformulation of that statement eliminated any ambiguity surrounding its chronology: 
I. The China of the past was a country founded on agriculture. 
II. The China of the present is still a country founded on agriculture. 
III. The China of the future will also be a country founded on agriculture.27 
 
Returning our attention to the frontier, we might ask: what did agrarian nationalism 
augur for indigenous peoples who practiced pastoralism and other non-agrarian forms of 
subsistence? Was the “Chinese nation,” or Zhonghua minzu, a diverse category capable of 
accommodating these lifeways, or was it essentially a portmanteau of the Han? This was not a 
settled issue entering the 1930s, even among those who touted a “unity of the five races.” 
 
Unity of the Five Races—But How? 
These two concepts of the Chinese nation had very different implications for borderland policy. 
If the Zhonghua minzu were to be a multi-ethnic body, then it was compatible with a diversity of 
lifeways. But to those for whom “unity of the five races” implied Hanization (Hanhua 汉化), and 
 
24 Francesca Bray observes that “imperial China was from its inception an agrarian state in the strong 
sense of the term. The promotion of agriculture, quannong, was at the core of the philosophy and 
techniques of government” (2013, p. 73). 
25 Quoted in Liu Zhaoyou (2002), p. 554. 
26 Quoted in Huang Fensheng (1946), p. 175 




to whom the Han were a fundamentally agrarian people, agriculture itself appeared as a method 
of propagating the nation.28 
As we will see, the latter philosophy dominated the ROC’s borderland policy. While 
administrators expressed little concern toward the non-agrarian ways of China’s urban centers, 
they invoked the notion of China as “a country founded on agriculture” in support of assimilating 
the pastoralists of Inner Asia into the Han fold. But this assimilationist position toward Chinese 
ethnicity was not the only one in circulation, even within the Guomindang. Some party members 
took a more accommodationist position, which at least tolerated the continued existence of 
multiple ethnic groups within the Zhonghua minzu. A brief look at the accommodationist 
approach puts the cultural violence of the assimilationist approach in stark relief. Below I raise 
Liu Manqing as an exemplary accommodationist thinker. In the last chapter we saw her railing 
against Liu Wenhui’s power grab in Kham. Here we take a moment to see Kham through her 
eyes as she entered it for the first time.  
 
The Multi-Ethnic Nationalism of Liu Manqing 
Twenty-three years old when she departed Nanjing for Lhasa against the will of her parents on 
July 15, 1929, Liu was a divorcee, a practicing Muslim, a member of the Guomindang, and a vocal 
advocate of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People (san min zhuyi三民主義). As her riverboat 
chugged upstream along the Yangtze, she was struck by how little she had in common with the 
other women in her cabin, for they were preoccupied with “affairs of the home” while she was 
attending to “affairs of the state” (guoshi國事).29 
Specifically, Liu was attending to the “affairs of the state” by traveling through Kham to 
Lhasa, where she would seek an audience with the 13th Dalai Lama in order to convey a letter 
from Chiang Kaishek. In her travel memoir, Journey to Kham and Tibet, she styled herself a public 
servant. As Fabienne Jagou notes, Liu made the journey of her own initiative (albeit with Chiang’s 
blessing), and no one considered it an official state mission.30 She arrived in Sichuan Province in 
August, where she was received by then-governor Liu Wenhui. Historian Ma Dazheng recounts 
 
28 Here I follow Shao Dan’s convention of distinguishing “Hanization” (hanhua) from “Sinicization” 
(Zhongguohua), to specify the assimilation of various ethnic groups within China into the Han ethnic 
group (2011, p. 15).  
29 Liu and Lu (1933), p. 4. 




that the latter was perplexed by this “petite, delicate girl journeying to Tibet” and asked her, “will 
you be able to cross the barbarian wilderness (manhuang 蠻荒) of Kham and Tibet without 




Figure 9. Liu Manqing in Han and Tibetan attire. These two images preface the first 
edition of her travel memoir, Journey through Kham and Tibet (Kang Zang yao zheng). 
 
Key to the ultimate success of her journey was the fact that Liu Manqing had Tibetan roots. 
Born in Lhasa to a Han father and a Khampa mother, she was fluent in Chinese and Tibetan. At 
the urging of her mother, Liu sought out the residence of her maternal family near Kangding and 
arrived to find her grandmother, whom she was meeting for the first time, pacing on a cane. 
Overjoyed, the elderly Tibetan woman remarked that she had once had a photograph of Liu 
hanging in the house, taken in Tibet when Liu was nine sui, in which she wore Tibetan clothing, 
had her hair up in buns, and was “less than half as tall as my cane.” Now she had let her hair out 
and was dressed like a Chinese urbanite.32 But days later, as she and her companion left the aegis 
 
31 Ma Dazheng (1998), pp. 8-9. 




of the Twenty-Fourth Army and ascended the Zheduo Mountains, they covered their Han zhuang 
(Han clothing) with a Tibetan overcoat, began imbibing Tibetan tea, slept in a tent, and in her 
words, “started to live a completely Tibetan life.”33  
Conscious as she was of her Tibetan heritage, Liu was ever an evangelist for the Chinese 
nation-state. For example, on a visit to Batang’s Dinglin Monastery (Dinglin si 丁林寺), once razed 
by Zhao Erfeng’s army, she endeavored to obtain the “faith” of the hutuktu with tidings of a new 
generation of erudite leaders in China. The next day she returned to the monastery with a 
memorial portrait of Sun Yat-sen and proselytized to the monks about the Three Principles of the 
People. “China’s revival is imminent,” she told the head lama, “and true unity of the five races 
has arrived.”34 Elsewhere she related to a young tusi (whom she described as “hardly different 
from the outstanding youths among the Han”) that the Guomindang had long since inducted its 
first Tibetan member, Kalsang Tsering, and now there were many Tibetans serving the party. 
“Now,” she continued, 
the Center has no prejudice against border peoples. So long as you have talent, 
and have knowledge, you can serve as a high-ranking official for the government. 
The interior (neidi) has already been unified, and political affairs are gradually 
becoming regular. The whole country from top to bottom is deeply convinced of 
the principles of Sun Zhongshan [Sun Yat-sen]. Internally we seek the equality of 
the five races, and externally we seek international equality. In the near future, 
China shall reach a day of enlightenment (kaiming zhi yi ri開明之一日).35 
 
Everywhere Liu Manqing peddled the vision of an enlightened, multi-ethnic China. Her 
infectious optimism came at a watershed moment—after Chiang Kai-shek’s northern expedition 
of 1929, before the Sino-Tibetan war of 1930. She could hardly have anticipated that a Chinese 
army would range across Kham within months of her departure, or that in three years it would 
crush Kalsang Tsering’s “Khampa rule for Khampas” movement. 
But one scene in her travelogue augured a less benevolent Han-indigenous dynamic: as 
she entered Kham via the Ya’an foothills in August 1929, she was disturbed to find a military 
colony where the Twenty-Fourth Army had pressed peasants, from the very young to the very 
old, into growing rice for the Xikang government. “Not only did they fine people a sack of rice 
for not working hard enough,” lamented Liu, “but the yamen officials would claim that their 
 
33 Liu and Lu (1933), p. 26. 
34Ibid., pp. 43-44. 




yield was insufficient and demand bribes in rice.” 36  What Liu glanced in passing was the 
consequence another vision for the future of the Chinese nation: one in which Han colonists 
would settle the frontier and remake its land and people in the image of the interior. 
Even before Liu’s book went to press, another writer named Zhang Yunping 張允平
published a nine-page manifesto in the journal Jun shi zazhi軍事雜誌 (Military Affairs Magazine) 
advocating Han land reclamation as a method for consolidating Chinese control in Xikang. Like 
Liu Manqing, Zhang subscribed to the theoretical “unity of the five races,” but his interpretation 
of that phrase could hardly have been more different. 
 
Zhang Yunping’s Agrarian Nationalism 
Chinese land reclamation policy of the twentieth century turned its attention from the imperial 
practice of establishing discrete military colonies (tuntian 屯田 ) to land reclamation as a 
continuous civilian and military enterprise, now referred to as tunken or kaiken.37 To historian 
Wang Xiuyu “the very compound term tunken evokes the agrarian ideals of the central plain: that 
of expanding productive farm land by opening up wastelands and the venerable tradition of farm 
colonization.”38 Kate Merkel-Hess describes tunken-style development as ‘a distinct alternative to 
rural reconstruction’s remaking of the countryside’ that nevertheless coopted rural 
reconstruction’s village utopianism.39 Kham was among the earliest regions to institutionalize 
this approach with the 1926 establishment of the Xikang Tunken Commissioner (Xikang tunken 
shi西康屯墾使). In 1928 the Nanjing government identified 14 zones for institutionalized land 
reclamation, most of which were in the borderlands, including Xikang.40 It was in this milieu that 
Zhang Yunping published his 1931 manifesto on Kham, entitled “Tunken Recommendations 
Regarding the Moving of Soldiers to Xikang” (Duiyu yi bing Xikang zhi tunken jianyi對於移兵西康
之屯墾建議). The author hailed from Sichuan’s Maogong, which had been a land reclamation 
 
36 Liu and Lu (1933), p. 17. 
37 Relyea (2011), p. 50. The words tunken and kaiken are often used interchangeably in Republican-era 
discourse, but tunken implies land reclamation overseen by the army while kaiken has no military 
implication. 
38 Xiuyu Wang (2011), p. 212 
39 Merkel-Hess (2016), p. 82 
40 Huang Fensheng (1946), p. 182. The other thirteen locations slated for tunken development were 
Xing’an, Songhua Jiang, Rehe, Chahar, Gansu, Xining, Qinghai, Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, Tibet, Yunnan, 




station (tunwu ting屯務廳) since the eighteenth century, and now sat on the eastern edge of the 
Xikang Special Administrative Zone. 
Zhang’s essay went to press at the height of Liu Wenhui’s war with the 13th Dalai Lama 
(see chapter 1). To be unified with the Han, Zhang reasoned, the Khampas must be expunged of 
their benighted customs. He particularly targeted the yellow (Gelukpa) sect of Tibetan Buddhism, 
which suppressed population growth through celibacy and disseminated “superstition” (mixin
迷信). In no unclear terms, Zhang wrote that “I would burn their temples and incinerate their 
scriptures to spare the Khampas from these evil influencers.” But equally troubling were the 
nomadic ways of the Khampas; he conjured the image of a Kham stuck in the “nomadic age” 
(youmu shidai游牧時代) and populated with “restless people, wriggling around, accustomed to 
drink, given to drunken stupors, stark raving mad (rukuang ruchi 如狂如癡), with cattle shit all 
over their tents.” 41  Zhang argued that China must civilize Kham through education and 
agricultural land reclamation. At the heart of his manifesto was an agrarian philosophy of the 
Chinese nation, which he articulates as follows: 
Our country is a country founded on agriculture [my emphasis]; the refinement of 
poetry and the discipline of calligraphy take their restraint from agriculture and 
their diligence from agriculture. The governance of agriculture is done by expert 
officials, who in directing the hardships of sowing and reaping must lead by 
example and inspire their countrymen.42 
 
The central premise of Zhang’s proposal was that Xikang administrators could settle all 
of its 34 counties with farmer-soldiers who would “turn stony fields into fertile land,” and who 
could revert to civilian status and receive titles to their land after three years of continuous 
cultivation.43 Much of Zhang’s rhetoric echoes that of Zhang Shizhao, including his depiction of 
imperialist, industrialized powers as posing an existential threat to a fundamentally agrarian 
China. The pastoral nomad, however, figures in Zhang Yunping’s essay as a second foil to 
Chinese agrarianism. His manifesto represents a creative attempt at applying agrarian 
nationalism to borderlands policy that presaged others to come. 
Lacking in most tunken discourse was any serious effort to grapple with the environmental 
suitability of agriculture. In this sense it merely catalyzed what David Bello has called the “’vulgar’ 
 
41 Zhang Yunping (1931), p. 44. 
42 Ibid., p. 43. 




arablism” of the 19th century, which “sought to turn everyone into (Han) farmers and everywhere 
into (Han) cropland” with little regard for ecology.44 This same vulgar arablism was a source of 
pathos for Fei Xiaotong, whose “American friend” (perhaps Owen Lattimore?) had related to him 
a sordid tale about Han migrants to Inner Mongolia. “Mongolian grasslands are best suited only 
for pastureland,” wrote Fei, “but he said that every family had carved up the land into small plots 
for farming. It was as if they had dived, headfirst, into the soil, as if they were unable to see any 
other way of using the land.”45 This was a liability for agrarian nationalism: good farming soils 
were not coextensive with China’s national territory. 
 
The Environmental limits of Assimilation Ecology 
Words for “soil” and “territory” are linked in many languages, and Chinese is no exception: the 
word tu 土  comfortably engenders both meanings. Agrarian nationalism embraced this 
polysemy. One prominent treatise on tunken cited a line from the ancient Guanzi—“If the tu is 
vast but is not tilled, then it is hardly one’s tu,”46—to support its claim that “only through 
cultivation can China have solid borders (shi bian實邊).”47 In a similar vein, the author of the 
Reflections on the Situation in Kham declared that “the people of Kham are citizens of the Republic 
of China, and the tu of Kham is a part of our national tu,” elsewhere writing that the Chinese 
should go to Kham and “tread the solid ground (di) in time-honored ways so that the 
[agricultural] production of the Kham region can reach to the ancient level of our country’s 
interior.” 48  From an agrarian nationalist perspective, control of territory was tantamount to 
exploitation of the soil—indeed, this was the premise of tunken theory. 
Tunken manifestos presumed that soils and climates on the frontier were amenable to 
farming, and indeed, its treatises tended to stake very optimistic claims about soils on the frontier. 
Zhang Yunping’s 1931 essay describes the fields of Kham as “level and fertile, conducive to 
herding and conducive to planting,” and elsewhere refers to Kham’s ‘boundless fertile soil.”49 A 
subsequent book in a similar vein, Reflections on the Situation in Kham, claimed that “Xikang is a 
region of virgin treasure troves (chunü baozang zhi qu處女寶藏之區), conducive to agriculture and 
 
44 Bello (2016), p. 239. 
45 Fei (1992), p. 38. 
46 The original text reads “di da er bu geng fei qi di 地大而不耕非其地.” See Huang Fensheng (1946), p. 184. 
47 Huang Fensheng (1946), p. 186. 
48 See Zhe Si (n.d.), pp. 17, 19. 




conducive to pastoralism, along with the twin riches of forests and mines.” Neither of these 
evaluations, however, had a clear evidentiary basis. 
Empirical observations were mixed. Feng Yunxian 馮雲仙  of the national Tibetan-
Mongolian Affairs Council performed county surveys that seemed to support bold claims about 
the region’s potential, prompting her to return optimistic reports to the Council and issue public 
calls for citizens to settle Kham as tunken workers. In a 1931 essay on “Essentials of Reforming 
Contemporary Xikang” in the journal New Asia she claimed that the “Lamaist religion” (Tibetan 
Buddhism) inducted so many young Khampa men into monasteries that there was plenty of 
abandoned land for the taking. Feng wrote that in Dartsedo, Gyezil, Drango, Rongtrak, Tau, and 
Batang (corresponding to the Chinese counties of Kangding, Jiulong, Luhuo, Danba, Daofu, and 
Ba’an),50 only three tenths of the arable land was under cultivation, while in the more remote 
settings of Nyakchukha, Litang, Garze, Nyakrong, Dappa, Derong, and Tsakhalo (corresponding 
to the Chinese counties of Yajiang, Lihua, Ganzi, Zhanhua, Daocheng, Derong, and Yanjing) only 
half of the arable land was under cultivation. She proposed a dual program of encouraging 
citizens to migrate to the Kham region and resettling soldiers there as tunken workers once the 
civil war ended. “We should absolutely implement cultivation (kaiken),” she urged, “so as to open 
up the spring of benefits.”51 The same year in a private memorandum to the Tibetan-Mongolian 
Affairs Council, Feng would write that”this land is situated in the southwest epicenter of national 
defense,” and that “the fertility of the land and the bounty of its production are not less than those 
of the interior (neidi).”52 
Scientific studies of Kham’s growing conditions began in earnest during the late 1930s. 
These were sobering. The National Agricultural Research Institute (Zhongyang nongye shiyan suo 
中央農業試驗所) carried out an extensive field survey of soils in west China after the Japanese 
invasion of 1937 forced that institute to relocate from Nanjing to Chengdu.53 Among the research 
team was the London-trained soil scientist H.L. Richardson, who summarized his findings in a 
report on “Soil and Man in West China.” West China, he explained, suffered from a phenomenon 
called “fertility migration” in which fast-flowing rivers (especially the Yangtze and its tributaries) 
 
50 The Tibetan names of these counties were Dartsedo, Gyezil, Drakgo, Rongzhag, Tau, and Batang 
respectively. 
51 Feng Yunxian (1931), p. 62. 
52 Bi and Ma (2012), p. 374. 
53 The provinces surveyed included Gansu, Shanxi, Sichuan, Hubei, Hunan, Yunnan, Guizhou, and 




washed nutrients to the south and east, such that “the high productivity of east China has been 
obtained at the expense of the west.” Further, soils in upland and far northern settings were 
subject to podzolization, a process in which key nutrients are leached from higher to lower levels 
of soil because cool temperatures inhibit decomposition near the surface. And western Kham was 
exceptionally arid because the “Szechuan alps” (Zheduo mountains) intercepted precipitation 
(prompting Richardson to dub them the “rainscreen mountains”). 54  The implication, he 
contended, was that the political hype over agrarian migration was unmerited: 
The existence of these immense areas of uncultivated land has suggested to many 
that there must be a fine field in the west for resettlement and the disposal of some 
of the surplus population of the east. Actually this is not so, at least with present 
methods of land utilization and the traditional Chinese pattern of cultivation. 
China has already reached the stage where almost all the land which should be 
cultivated is being cultivated, and much is already being cultivated which should 
not.55 
 
Chinese land use surveys roughly concurred. In 1943, Xikang officials participated in the 
first county-by-county “National Survey of Land Use Status.” 56  Existing farmland in most 
counties of the Kham dependency (Kang shu) was estimated to comprise about 5-10% of total area, 
and arable waste (the site of agrarian potential) was generally estimated at well under 10% of 
total area. Counties in the same province’s Ning dependency, by contrast, were believed to 
feature more arable waste even though this region already hosted a much larger Han 
population—as much as 20% of Xichang’s area was unused and arable. 
There was great variation within Kham as well, consistent with Feng’s observations; 
counties along the southern route such as Ganzi and Danba were associated with greater growing 
potential than those along the northern route, such as Dengke, where it was felt that there was no 
potential for farm expansion. Climate was the greatest obstacle. Land labeled “severely cold and 
not conducive to forestry or pastoralism” (industries more cold-resistant than cereal farming) 
reached 20% in Dengke and Litang and an incredible 40% of total area in mountainous Derong.57 
The Chinese settler regime was clearly running up against its limits in Kham. How had so many 
people so badly overestimated its potential for growth? 
 
54 Richardson (1940). 
55 Richardson (1940), p. 124. 
56 The results of this survey would not reach Chongqing until 1946 due to the war with Japan. 




The answer I propose is that when pundits 
and policy-makers looked at a map of Kham—
such as those from Ren Naiqiang’s 1930 survey 
tour (figure 10)—they saw some lines that were 
politically contrived, such as the borders of 
Kangding county, and other lines corresponding 
to visible objects like the majestic Konka 
Mountain or the mighty Yarlung River. Another 
barrier of great consequence to society, however, 
was the barrier imposed by thin air. Kham-
watchers understood in a general sense that there 
was a relationship between elevation and 
agriculture, but it was difficult to visualize the 
specifics of this correlation in a particular territory 
such as Kham. Some writers simply noted that the 
terrain was “complicated” (fuza 複雜).58 
H.L. Richardson was among the first people to offer a detailed correlation between 
altitude and agriculture in west China (chart 1). He articulated that the effects of latitude and 
altitude on “climate, soils, vegetation, and crops” adhered to two key principles: first, that an 
increase in altitude had similar effects to an increase in latitude—that is, from a given vantage 
point, soils and vegetation at higher elevations were similar to those further north. The second, 
less obvious principle was that the effects of elevation were far more pronounced. He estimated 
that as a rule of thumb, ascending just one meter in altitude had a similar effect to traveling one 
kilometer to the north, or that ascending 100 meters was climatically similar to moving north by 
a degree of latitude. Richardson developed a schematic of seven elevational zones in west China 
at approximately 30° north, corresponding Kham’s middle latitudes, which I present in the form 
of a column chart: 
 
58 For example, see Zhe Si (nd), p. 18: “Its terrain is complicated, rivers are staggered with valleys, and it 
is suitable for farming and suitable for herding, with the two riches of forests and mines.” 
Figure 10. Ren Naiqiang’s 1930 survey map of Daofu 
(1930b). Solid lines correspond to waterways, and 





Chart 1. Climate, soil and crops by altitude zone (based on Richardson 1940, p. 118-119). 
 
Anyone browsing this chart with attention to agriculture (or forestry) will have quickly noticed 
that certain zones supported certain crops, but on a more fundamental level, that all crops were 
limited to the region below 3,600 meters, roughly corresponding to the lower limit of the “alpine” 
zone. Significantly, this figure is corroborated by a number of independent surveys from the 
period between 1937 and 1940. Geographer Ping-hai Chu surveyed Xikang with a team in 1940 
and was careful to note the vertical limits of both human settlements and their food. Wheat, barley 
and “villages” all met their vertical limit at a little over 3,500 meters above sea level, while the 















Some maize up to 2500m; wheat, oats, potatoes; 
deciduous trees  
Maize, rice, soybeans, winter cereals, potatoes; 
pomaceous fruits, tea 
Wheat, barley, potatoes; moorland, meadow, scrub; dwarf 
bamboo, flowering shrubs and herbs, grasses, mosses, some 
spruce, fir and larch forests. 
Rice, maize, sweet potatoes, soybeans, sugar cane, cotton, 
winter cereals; tall bamboos, palms, cypress, alder, pine; 
citrus, mulberry 
Wheat and barley (limit about 3,600m.); 
tree limit about the same; flowering herbs and grasses 
dominant; moss in wet localities 
Glaciers, moraines, alpine deserts; herbs and cushion 
plants up to about 5000m; mosses and lichens. 
Skeletal and desert 





Yellow earth, alluvial 
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Mountain meadow, 





grain of southern Chinese—being grown above 1,522 meters.59  Agricultural modernizer Han 
Dezhang similarly noted in 1941 that house-dwelling Khampas tended to live below 3,400 meters, 
while pasture-dwelling Khampas predominated above this level.60 American ethnologist Robert 
Ekvall noted that altitude ranges for farms and pastures varied according to latitude, but the 
figures he provides would put the upper limit for most of Xikang’s agriculture at approximately 
3,700 meters.61 By Ekvall’s estimate, yak pasture in this latitudinal range extended from about 
3,700 meters at the lower limit to about 4,500 meters at the upper limit. These convergent 
observations point to the existence of a limit for intensive agriculture at approximately 3,600 
meters above sea level. I will refer to this “fuzzy” limit as the grain line. The grain line cut right 
through most counties in Xikang, dividing valley from grasslands (figure 11). We might visualize 
it as a winding line of elevation on a contour map, in some places shooting straight along river 
valleys, but elsewhere snaking around the base of a hill or the foothills of a mountain.62 
The grain line was an environmental border between disparate lifeways. Because a 
suitable elevation is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for agriculture, it was true not that 
all land below the grain line was arable, but rather, that arable land ended at the grain line. 
Philosophically speaking, this is a possibilist observation, and not an appeal to environmental 
determinism.63 Apropos of Donald Worster’s maxim that “in any particular place nature offers 
the humans dwelling there a flexible but limited set of possibilities for getting a living,” getting 
too high up foreclosed on the possibility of farming for a living.64 
To the extent that ethnic identities were rooted in particular lifeways, the grain line also 
delimited ethnic space. Qing historian David Bello argues that agriculture was “the material basis 
for the construction and maintenance of Hanspace,” or Han ethnic space, in the late Qing 
dynasty.65 Richardson arrived at his own version of this thesis in 1940, arguing that the (Han) 
Chinese were “fundamentally cultivators” who thrived on “good, level soils” like those of the 
Sichuan basin. “Here they can squeeze out other races,” he commented. “But on steep hillsides, 
 
59 Chen Han-seng (1949), p. 24. 
60 Han Dezhang (1941), p. 11. 
61 Ekvall (1983), p. 5. 
62 My visual description of the “grain line” is partly inspired by James C. Scott’s similar description of the 
“wet-rice core” in southeast Asia (2010, pp. 54-57). 
63 Geographical possibilism contends that “the environment does not determine human fate, it simply 
provides possibilities for humans to choose from.” See Ehlers and Gethmann (2013), p. 126. 
64 Worster (1988), p. 298. 




or in regions of forest and grassland, the Chinese farmers are less successful, and the native 





Figure 11. Forty- kilometer elevation profiles centered on the 
county seats of Kangding county (Tibetan: Dartsedo, top) and 
Daofu county (Tibetan: Dau, bottom), with the grain line of 3,600 
meters indicated by a red line. This line gives an approximate 
indication of the maximum viable altitude for grain cultivation as 
well as the maximum altitude for Han Chinese villages. Tibetan 
names are given first, followed by Chinese names in parentheses. 
These elevation profiles are based on elevation data from Google 
Earth. 
 
Toeing the Grain Line 
Just below the grain line was a sort of fuzzy corridor: biologically speaking, it was (and is) what 
scientists call an ecotone, or transitional zone between different biomes (biological communities)—
in this case, between forested and arable biomes below, and grassland and mountain biomes 
above.67 In social terms, it resembled what historian Richard White terms the “middle ground” 
in colonial North America: a space of syncretic mixing between ethnic groups and lifeways, of 
without clear dominance of one group over another.68 This was a place, as we will see shortly, 
where Han and Khampa bonded through marriage and sexual unions. To most Han elites, 
however, it was fairly opaque. Through the end of the 1920s, the Chinese had produced little 
 
66 Richardson (1940), p. 123. 
67 “Ecotone: Ecology.” 
68 For White’s own definition of a “middle ground,” see White (2010), p. xii. I make this comparison 
tentatively, because the Kham ecotone may not satisfy all of White’s criteria—particularly in that it was 




written knowledge of Kham beyond a few low river valleys that hosted Chinese migrant enclaves. 
This changed only in the 1930s, which saw an explosion of survey reports by Chinese and foreign 
writers. The most influential of these was Ren Naiqiang. 
Ren was a relatively obscure Sichuanese historian in 1926 when Liu Wenhui 
commissioned him to perform his first survey tour of Kham. Liu must have been impressed with 
his credentials as a graduate of agricultural college in Beijing, because his first survey reports 
focused on political and agricultural conditions. The first half of the itinerary cut north through 
three of Kham’s most arable counties—Luding, Kangding, and Danba. The wide alluvial plains 
along the Gyelmo Ngul river (Dadu he 大渡河) in northern Dartsedo and southern Danba was an 
especially fertile stretch, where sedentary farmers grew wheat, maize, and highland barley. 
This, to Ren, was bona fide agriculture. Chinese intellectuals like Ren expected farmers to 
initiate their land through the practice of kaiken or “opening land for cultivation,” which, at a 
minimum, involved clearing stones, tilling, and periodic weeding. Ren took a keen interest in an 
elaborate multi-cropping system he observed in lowland Danba below 3,000 meters. Farmers 
there first planted potatoes, then wheat, in the same rows in the fall, and then harvested them in 
the reverse order over the summer since the potatoes matured later. In fact, Danba’s alluvium 
farmers were so productive that they exported wheat and maize to Kangding.69 
As the terrain ascended toward the grain line, however, intensive agriculture transitioned 
into shifting cultivation. Ren observed that a single valley might ascend into a “low mountain 
zone” that supported wheat and maize, and then to a “high mountain zone” where shifting 
cultivators grew potatoes, buckwheat, peas, and rape.70 As he crossed west from Rongtrak into 
Dau, with its elevations beginning at about 3,000 meters, shifting cultivation became the main 
form of farming. This way of working the land was less intelligible to Ren’s Han sensibilities. 
“Farmers do not know to till, weed, and fertilize,” he noted disapprovingly, “they only know to 
plant seed and harvest.” Fields he saw were overrun with stones and wild grasses; cultivators left 
them to fallow every other year rather than fertilize. 71  Further afield in Gardze, cultivation 
methods were “extraordinarily simplistic,” and on the plains of Litang, farming became little 
more than a side enterprise for pastoralists.72  
 
69 Ren (1930a), p. 94. 
70 Ibid.,, p. 94. 
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Figure 12. Diagram of “field counters above 13,000 feet” in Kham by J.H. Edgar (1930, p. 33). 
 
A more charitable take than Ren’s was that of J.H. Edgar, who was so impressed by the 
resourcefulness of such agricultural boundary-pushing among swidden cultivators (which he 
declared, admiringly, to be “a definite attack on nature”) that he produced a series of sketches to 
convey to readers of the Journal of the West China Border Research Society “how heroically the 
limited opportunities are exploited” (figure 12). 73  He observed that tiny hillside plots were 
cultivated only briefly before they were “worked out” and abandoned, and reverted to pasture. 
Standing above the fields, Edgar paints a striking image of the view from the grain line: 
Near at hand are the grim castles of another age, and higher up the black spider-
like tents of the nomads. Cow-boys appear and disappear on the landscape, droves 
of yak and flocks of sheep roam over the pastures. Below, autumn tints, while 
exaggerating the contours of the fields, speak of a nature near the verge of its 
winter Nirvana. The alien may suspect the combinations are too magical to be real 
and, as he lazily ponders the matter over, night, soft and caressing, draws her sable 
curtains over a scene that has made the reverie possible.74 
 
Life above the grain line mystified outsiders. A Khampa farmer gazing up at the 
grasslands might perceive the drok or “high pastures,” inhabited by drokpa or “people of the high 
pastures.” But a Chinese observer gazing up at the same grasslands was more likely to perceive 
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the manhuang or “barbarian wilderness.” Foreigners sometimes replicated this pejorative 
language; for example, Edgar wrote of the “Marches of the Mantze” (though more commonly he 
referred to the “Tibetan Marches”). For Edgar, a visit to the high pastures was tantamount to a 
polar expedition. He set out from Danba on an expedition to “the Marches” on November 23, 
1930 to survey “unknown country” and to “test midwinter conditions in the highest altitudes,” 
reaching as far as Nyarong (Chinese: Zhanhua 瞻化). Toward the end of the journey the team 
was hampered by high winds and asphyxiated by blowing snow and “powdered cattle dung,” 
but worst of all was the dryness of the air; “the human skin cracks,” wrote Edgar, “and nails are 
apt to break off.”75 One outcome of the expedition was a new map of the route from Rongtrak to 
Nyarong. Prefacing Edgar’s map in a 1935 edition of the Journal of the West China Border Society, 
his colleague (and close friend) D.S. Dye marveled at the prospect of human life beyond Tau 
(“Taofu”), where lowland valleys all but disappeared, and he described the map as “one big 
question mark.” Specifically, Dye wondered: 
Who was the man there beyond Taofu? When was he there? Why was he there? 
What had the loess to do with his being there, or to his not being there? Was he 
there by choice? Or did he find the pressure from other peoples from below too 
severe? Or was animal and vegetable life below too much for his wit and tools? 
How high was the “ceiling” for living then in these regions?76 
 
Edgar and Dye looked across the grain line with what we might call a “sedentist gaze” that 
branded nomad country as “unknown country,” and that utterly failed to fathom the motives of 
“the man there beyond Taofu.” His bewilderment betrays the common conceit of the sedentary: 
that life above the grain line is odd, uncomfortable, and perhaps unfortunate. Now and then 
Edgar or another adventurer from his “West China Border Research Society” took a foray through 
the high grasslands and wrote about it, but these were not serious efforts to see the world through 
nomadic eyes. 
This sedentist gaze is, unfortunately, replicated in most of the written sources available to 
historians. Detailed sources by twentieth century Khampa nomads are non-extant. However, a 
small number of outsider ethnologists made the effort to understand Tibetan nomads on their 
own terms. Their painstaking descriptions of nomadic pastoralism have the power to demystify 
it, or—as has been said of good anthropology—“to make the strange familiar, and the familiar 
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strange.”77 The following section draws on some of their work to offer a snapshot of Khampa 
nomadic pastoralism on its own terms, and a frame of reference for evaluating the anti-nomad 
rhetoric of the Chinese. 
 
Who was the Man there beyond Taofu? 
Tibetan mobile pastoralists often self-identify (and are identified by their Tibetan neighbors) as 
drokpa (Wiley: ‘brogs pa), a term that is typically translated as “nomad.”78 But those who picture 
the Tibetan nomad as moving erratically or, as Chinese observers often put it, “chasing the water 
and the grass” (zhu shui cao er ju逐水草而居) are mistaken; unlike peripatetic or “wandering” 
nomads (such as Gypsies and Thuggees), the drokpa are transhumant nomads, meaning that they 
move methodically between a certain number of pre-selected locations according to the season. 
Liu Manqing took care to point out to her Chinese readers that the nomads she encountered 
“essentially have a set direction and do not move about however they like, as outsiders think they 
do.”79 
Nomads in other parts of ethnographic Tibet frequently herd sheep, but in Kham the yak, 
as well as yak-cattle hybrids, have provided most of the raw material for everyday life. The black 
tents known as dra in which most Kham drokpa spent at least three seasons out of the year were 
made of woven yak hair and were heated with fires fueled by yak dung. Yak hair was also used 
to make nearly all clothing, and women learned to both weave and felt it. The yak also provided 
all the nutrition that drokpa needed to survive through its milk, which was used to make butter 
and cheese, as well as its meat, although drokpa generally traded with farmers to obtain barley 
flour and other agricultural products as well. In short, the yak potentially enabled the drokpa 
clan to be fully self-reliant, so that in optimal circumstances, it was not dependent on a state of any 
kind.80 
The yak set the normal spatial range of the drokpa clan and limited its movements. Robert 
Ekvall, who conducted extensive field research in Amdo (northeast Tibet) between 1926 and 1941, 
explains that “the prime ecological factor which, with only minor exceptions, sets apart the 
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Tibetan pastoralists from those in the arid zone, is one of altitude.” As he notes, the yak can only 
thrive above 10,000 feet (about 3,000 meters) and below 17,000 feet (about 5,000 meters), although 
its range in any given location is usually far smaller than that.81 The herd must be moved between 
at least three pastures corresponding to the advent of summer, winter, and spring, and these 
movements vary by season in terms of both speed and horizontal and vertical distance. These 
movements were complex and required an intimate understanding of the local environment as 
well as the livestock. For example, anthropologists noted that nomads in Dege would move both 
downhill and horizontally from their summer pasture to their autumn and then winter pastures 
to find fresh grass and escape extreme cold, but executed only a more gradual horizontal 
movement from their winter pasture to their spring pasture due to the weakened state of the 
livestock during this period. This was followed by a rapid uphill move to the summer pasture to 
escape the heat once the livestock had fully recuperated. 82 
From a sedentist perspective, such mobility is unusual and drokpa may appear to be 
unduly influenced by their animals. Recent scholarship, however, has inverted this narrative by 
arguing that settled agriculture reflects a high degree of plant influence on humans in exchange 
for dubious benefits to individual people. 83  In fact, sedentary agriculture appears to have 
facilitated high-altitude nomadism such that it would be more accurate to describe such 
nomadism as an evolution of sedentary agriculture, or an escape from it. The farmer and nomad were 
linked by a continuum of production methods through which individuals might transition from 
the more temperate conditions of the lowlands to the harsher conditions of the highlands. Ekvall 
noted the existence of an intermediary social category called the sa ma drok (Wiley: sa ma ‘brog 
meaning literally, “neither soil nor high pasture”) that practiced a semi-nomadic lifestyle.84 He 
was able to observe the evolution of households from one mode of production to the other–not 
from nomadism to farming, as sedentary outsiders have often assumed, but from farming to 
semi-nomadism and then (sometimes) to full nomadic pastoralism.85 
The multi-step process Ekvall describes implies the transmission of detailed technical 
knowledge across generations. Farm households typically kept a small number of cattle, but once 
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the herd of a farming household reached a certain size, the farmers might establish a separate 
summer pasture within a day’s reach, both to give the herd ample grazing room and to protect 
the year’s crop from those same animals; the herd returned to the farm after the harvest. Some 
households retained their farms while others abandoned them entirely, rotating between pastures 
with the seasons. While Ekvall notes that sa ma drok households never achieved an identity as 
drokpa regardless of their livelihood (and perhaps predominated at a lower altitude than the 
latter), the sa ma drok lifestyle provided excellent technical training in nomadic pastoralism and 
many individuals were incorporated into drokpa lifestyles through marriage or other means. 
Further, these seminomadic households occupied an important niche in the pastoral economy as 
an intermediary between farmers and drokpa; for one thing, with access to both cattle and yaks 
they were ideally positioned to breed the hybrids known in Tibetan as dzo upon which many 
drokpa relied for dairy and other purposes.86  
Moving from lowland farm to high pasture was not simply a matter of preference in that 
it required a high degree of technical knowledge. Anthropologist Rinzen Thargyal provides 
unique insight into this body of indigenous knowledge through his interviews with nomadic 
households that were exiled from Kham’s Zilphukhog Valley by the Communists in 1957. While 
in Kham, his informants had practiced strategic gelding, retaining some virile bulls (or chu-yak) 
for breeding but castrating other bulls for use as docile pack yaks. Keeping track of livestock 
fertility was key to successful husbandry, and Thargyal’s informants had an elaborate scheme for 
identifying the age of yaks, including unfamiliar ones, first by counting their teeth and later, after 
the age of seven years, by counting the lines (or trü) on their horns.87 The naming scheme that 
Thargyal records for yaks at each age is corroborated by Namkhai Norbu, who conducted his 
field research in Dzachuka in 1951 and who reports that the average yak there reached 10 trü, 
corresponding to 17 years.88 Drokpa took care not to milk yak cows (dri) too early since this could 
starve their calves and put an early end to milk production (“to starve dri calves is a self-
destructive act for a pastoral nomad” notes Thargyal) but were more likely to eventually starve 
the calves of yak-ox hybrids (dzo), which are known to be less valuable for most purposes than 
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their parents.89 We should recognize that in addition to these token details, Tibetan nomads have 
developed a vast amount of tacit knowledge that would be difficult or impossible to transcribe. 
But this is now how most Chinese viewed Tibetan nomads. Popular discourse outside of 
Tibet tended to ignore the technical complexity of drokpa transhumance, and instead construed 
it as primitive and simplistic. A 1943 essay titled “Nomadic and Sedentary Pastoralism,” by a 
certain Dong Qin 凍沁 traced the divide between sedentism and nomadism to the ancient sage 
king Fu Xi 伏羲, whose guidelines for the sustainable raising of livestock were articulated in the 
Rites of Zhou (Zhou li周禮). The Han were those who had received the transformative influence 
(hua 化) of Fu Xi, while the nomads on the western frontier were those who had not. Dong faulted 
the decline of the Qing over the previous two hundred years with facilitating nomadism, because 
“the people have not been opened to knowledge.”90 Observers often caricatured Tibetan society 
as neatly divided between nomads and sedentary Tibetans; for example, a journalist for the North-
China Herald and Supreme Court & Consular Gazette pontificated in 1914 that “the population of 
Tibet falls naturally into two divisions, namely, those who live in tents and those who live in 
temples. The people may roughly be divided into priests and nomads.”91 
“Nomads” figured in Chinese-language discourse as youmu min 游牧民  or “ranging 
herders,” an apparent loan-word from the Japanese yūbokumin. The notion of the ethnos or minzu 
民族 remained ill-defined during this period (in comparison to its later Communist usage), and 
nomads throughout Inner Asia were sometimes even referred to as youmu minzu 游牧民族, a sort 
of para-ethnic category. The term niuchangwa 牛場娃 was further implemented as a rough loan-
translation of drokpa, niuchang being the Chinese term for yak pastures. The Chinese journal New 
Asia (Xin Yaxiya 新亞細亞) remarked that “the ethnos (minzu 民族) of Tibet can be approximately 
divided into two groups. The first are the house-dwellers (fangshewa 房舍娃), and the second are 
the niuchangwa.”92 
This perceived division within the Khampa ethnos sparked some disagreement among 
Chinese writers over how to approach the Khampas. Some felt that there was relatively little 
difference between Han and Khampa to begin with. Liu Manqing, who generally held the 
Khampas in high esteem, argued that even uneducated Tibetans were culturally superior to the 
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“southern barbarians” (nanman 南蠻) thanks to the transmission of folk songs and Buddhist 
philosophy. An agricultural expert from Tianjin named Han Dezhang 韓德章 noted in 1941 that 
“Xikang’s nomads are primarily Tibetans” and that “among the various borderland peoples, the 
Tibetans are the easiest race to assimilate.”93 Encouraged by what he perceived to be an ongoing 
population shift from the high pastures to valley regions, Han further argued that contact with 
agriculturalist settlers would inevitably lead the drokpa to abandon nomadism.94 
Others perceived an indomitable gulf between sedentary Han and Khampas on the one 
hand, and nomadic Khampas on the other. The aforementioned 1930 article on “Tibetan Nomads” 
in New Asia commented that the fangshewa (house-dwellers) were “basically the same as the Han,” 
but that the niuchangwa (tent-dwellers) were “not at all like the Han.” 95 Ren Naiqiang complained 
that differing modes of production precluded the frequent social contact upon which assimilation 
was dependent. He writes of Kham that “when the Han are transplanted there, other than 
engaging in trade they tend to reclaim the narrow strips of land along the river valleys. The 
pastures that cannot be ploughed they generally abandon.” However, Ren explains, the “pure” 
Tibetans tended to live on the high plains, where they had for several thousand years been 
“following the water and the grass.” He observed that farming knowledge was not entirely absent 
from Kham’s traditional society, but rather drokpa exhibited a cultural preference for nomadic 
pastoralism, and they generally considered farmers to be of lower status than nomads. Ren put 
his hope for Xikang’s future in people of “mixed blood” (hunxue 混血), describing them as the 
“core” of society. He recommended that “regulating Xikang’s industry must follow from 
harmonizing its blood (tiaohe xueye 調和血液).”96 
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Figure 13. 1933 photograph of Ren Naiqiang’s wife and “mixed-blood” son in the periodical 
New Asia (“Xikang Tujing zuozhe”). 
 
The Conjugal Solution 
“Harmonizing blood” was Ren’s euphemism for the sexual union of Han and Khampas to 
conceive governable “mixed-blood” offspring, marking Ren as something of a eugenicist. Ren 
himself married the niece of a Khampa chieftain from Nyarong and become an advisor to the 
government of warlord Liu Wenhui. When the prominent sociologist Ke Xiangfeng 柯象峰 paid 
a visit to Ren’s government office in 1941 to inquire about the administration of Kham, Ren 
ensured that his wife and their son were present. The entry in Ke’s field journal for that day notes 




that “the experiment of Han-Khampa marriage and procreation is central to the matter at hand.”97 
Ren’s inter-ethnic marriage was also praised in the journal New Asia, which ran a picture of his 
wife and son (figure 13) with a laudatory caption: 
Wife of Illustrated History of Kham author Sir Ren Naiqiang and their mixed-blood 
son. The wife is named Luozhe Qingcuo, niece of the chieftain of upper Zhandui. 
She has been with Mr. Ren for four years. She can already speak Chinese (Hanyu) 
and write Chinese characters and read short passages. She is beautiful and 
demure. The son is also clever and cute.98 
 
At a time when much of the United States criminalized interracial marriage (labeled 
pejoratively as “miscegenation”), Chinese administrators generally applauded it. Inter-ethnic 
marriage (yizu tonghun) was broadly touted as a peaceable method of amalgamating the “five 
races” into the Chinese ethnic nation (Zhonghua minzu). In west China, yizu tonghun had the added 
appeal of smoothing geographical barriers between ethnic groups. Like Tibetans, the Miao 
further east had historically lived on mountainous terrain separated from the valleys favored by 
the Han. One reporter commented that “because there is a natural boundary between them, they 
have not intermarried,” but that “with the onset of the Sino-Japanese War the central government 
relocated to the interior, and thus the Han and Miao came to live together and grew more 
intimate.”99 In Sichuan the warlord Yang Sen pursued a rigorous assimilation campaign among 
both the Miao and the Yi during the 1930s that involved both compulsory education and the 
incentivization of interethnic marriages. A Han woman wedding a Miao or Yi man received the 
largest award (100 yuan), followed by a Han man marrying a Miao or Yi woman (60 yuan), 
probably reflecting the fact that the former case was relatively rare. Interestingly, Yang even 
incentivized Miao-Yi intermarriage with an offer of 20 yuan.100 Though such monetary incentives 
for tonghun were very uncommon, administrators in other borderlands, including Kham, did 
officially endorse intermarriage. 
The official promotion of Han-Khampa marriage dates at least to 1906, when Zhao Erfeng 
tantalized potential Sichuanese settlers with tales about plentiful land and available women. His 
notice in the Sichuan Officials’ Gazette advertised that “the women of this land [are] numerous and 
the men few, the women industrious and the men lazy. If you take a local maiden as your wife, 
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she might very well be able to assist in the work, carrying water, cooking food, hoeing the ground, 
and cutting firewood.”101  With the founding of the Republic, as tunken advocates appealed to the 
patriotic impulses of their readership, so did advocates of inter-ethnic marriage.  In 1931, while 
war raged in eastern Tibet, Zhang Yunping’s “Tunken Recommendations” admonished readers 
to “implement migrant land reclamation and inter-marry to eliminate racial segregation.”102 The 
present conflicts were the consequence of ethnic segregation, claimed Zhang, and they threatened 
to deteriorate into a race war (zhongzu zhanzheng 種族戰爭). The solution was for migrant farmers 
to intermarry with Khampas, so as to “love and cherish one another, and eradicate discord into 
oblivion.”103 
If Kham-watchers saw tonghun as an opportunity for inter-ethnic amity, they were 
similarly compelled by its perceived economic merits; specifically, they felt that a Han husband 
and Khampa wife formed an ideal agricultural production team. This perception was a 
consequence of the way that Chinese discourse construed gender and ethnic identities in relation 
to each other—and perhaps lust for Khampa women motivated such inclinations to an extent; at 
any rate, Han observers generally recognized the utility of conventional Khampa women’s work 
such as cooking, weaving, and bearing and raising children, but denigrated Khampa men as lazy 
and unproductive. The Chinese especially dismissed the labor of nomad men, who were 
preoccupied with herding livestock, and monks, who were preoccupied with Buddhist ritual; 
these were hardly “diligent” livelihoods. If such prejudices originated with Han settlers, they 
bled effortlessly into sociological wisdom, as when Ke Xiangfeng recorded the “deep” (shenke 深
刻) observations of a certain guozhuang鍋莊 (trading house) owner, “Mr. Chen,” with some thirty 
years of experience in Kham: 
Production among the people of Kham is mostly done by women. Men herd 
livestock and plant land, but other inside and outside duties, and the raising (jiaoyu 
教育) of sons and daughters, are mostly undertaken by women. Thus one often 
sees men sitting idly while the woman is the head of the household and does not 
think it inappropriate. In fact, it is said allowing men to do things is a behavior 
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The most “important” labor that Khampa women might perform, from an assimilationist 
perspective, was to bear “mixed-blood” children for Han husbands. These were the so-called 
hunxue or “mixed-blood” children. The label hunxue was not intentionally pejorative in Chinese; 
on the contrary, writers championed the hunxue. Ren Naiqiang (who would soon father a hunxue 
child of his own) theorized that “mixed-blood” children formed the “core” (hexin 核心) of society 
in Chinese Kham; they lived in spaces between river valleys and the high plains, spoke Chinese 
and Tibetan, cooperated with officials, and often identified as “Han.”  Ren’s reasoning resonates 
strikingly with that of the Reverend J.H. Edgar, who supposed that the “valuable half-caste 
progeny” of Han-Khampa unions might afford the church a bridge to the “pure Tibetans” in the 
highlands. J.H. Edgar claimed that the “time-honored” pattern throughout the Chinese 
borderlands was “to absorb non-Chinese material by Chinese males breeding with local females; 
and then by the power of cultural influences, leave the human alloy [ie, the offspring] largely 
indistinguishable from the male constituent.”105 Though they came from very different places, 
Ren and Edgar shared a basic outlook on gender and ethnicity that reflected their respective 
steeping in male-dominated civilizing projects. 
 
Women’s voices 
Most tunken acolytes were men appealing to the desires of other men, and where they waded into 
writing about intermarriage, their presumed reader seems to be a male Han farmer or youth who 
might ponder settling down with an indigenous paramour. There was little regard in the press—
much less a platform—for the opinions of Khampa women or men. But two prominent Chinese-
speaking women did weigh in on migration and gender in Kham from expressly female 
perspectives. Both women, Liu Manqing and Feng Yunxian, have already appeared in this 
chapter: Liu as a critic of assimilation ecology, and Feng as an enthusiastic proponent. On the 
matter of inter-ethnic marriage, each woman departed from the standard male narrative, but they 
also countervailed one another in fundamental ways. 
Liu was herself the hunxue child of a Han official and his Tibetan wife, so we might expect 
her to embrace such marriages. Instead, on the heels of her year-long trek across Kham and central 
Tibet, she issued a scathing rebuke of the tonghun status quo in the form of a 1930 satirical essay 
titled “A Simple History of Han-Tibetan Intermarriage.” The author, credited as “Liu Manqing 
 




(Tibetan girl),” invoked the most famous of Han-Tibetan marriages—the noble wedding of Tang 
princess Wencheng to the Tibetan king Songtsan Gampo in 641 CE—to mock the comparatively 
base marriages between Han Chinese migrants and Tibetan (including Khampa) women in the 
modern era. 
The latter unions, in her experience, were often founded on inter-cultural 
misunderstandings and undone by environmental incompatibilities. Men from the interior grew 
“jealous of the diligent and talented Tibetan girls, so everyone from the envoy and the big official 
down to the soldier wants to get married with a Tibetan girl, even if they have to force her.” Han 
men were ignorant of social status in Tibet and fell for any woman with a pretty face, so that the 
joke in Tibet was that “a girl begging on the street today turns into a [Han man’s] wife tomorrow.” 
They enticed women with fine clothes and makeup from the interior and then cajoled them into 
moving there. But some wives refused to descend to the neidi where, they heard, the weather was 
hot and the elements unsalutary (shuitu bu he 水土不合), and they stayed behind on the Tibetan 
plateau as “abandoned wives.” Others resigned themselves to following their husbands to the 
interior and eventually succumbed to the elements.106 
Feng Yunxiang took a different tack by encouraging Chinese women to go west. In 1947 
she published an essay in Women Monthly (funu yuekan 婦女月刊), titled “Women Should Go to 
the Borderlands” (Funu yinggai dao bianjiang qu 婦女應該到邊疆去), and certain references in the 
essay imply that she is chiefly referring to the Tibetan borderlands.107 Whereas Liu Manqing had 
invoked the  marriage of Wencheng and Songtsen Gampo merely to mock the men who would 
take Tibetan wives, Feng astutely pointed out that Princess Wencheng was a Chinese woman who 
repaired to Tibet for the benefit of her country (the Tang empire). Feng’s concern was not so much 
inter-ethnic marriage as the prospect of Han women migrants educating their minority 
counterparts, just as Wencheng had elevated her sister-wife and the medieval Tibetan court.108 
Note how she subverts the trope of the industrious native woman here: 
Most borderland women have healthy physiques, cheerful demeanors, the virtue 
of diligence and the self-cultivation of religion. When it comes to leading their 
family, managing finances, farming, livestock herding, they are good at all of these 
things. However, borderland people all lack the opportunity of a modern 
 
106 Liu Manqing (1930). 
107 Apart from allusions to Princess Wencheng, who married a Tibetan king, Feng cites the success of the 
1940 University Student Summer Term Borderlands Service Team, which organized male and female 
students from various schools in Chengdu to perform survey research in Xikang and western Sichuan. 




education, so their contribution to the country (guojia) cannot aspire to match ours. 
Thus, the responsibility of molding borderland women with a modern education 
falls naturally to us women comrades of the interior who should rise with 
resolution and bear it.109 
 
Feng’s language suggests a “Han women’s burden” in Inner Asia not unlike Rudyard 
Kipling’s late-19th-century idea of the “white man’s burden” in the Philippines. Instead of luring 
Han women with a promise of plentiful farmland or indigenous husbands, Feng advertised the 
alpine scenery of the borderlands—the “Switzerland of Asia” as she called it. “If your soul yearns 
for the beauty of Switzerland,” she entreated, “you need not seek abroad what lies near at hand. 
Our borderlands are the perfect setting to exercise your body and soul and make a contribution 
[to the nation].”110 
Even so, Feng’s demand for an “equality of opportunities” for women in the borderlands 
reveals that to “go to the borderlands” was primarily a male enterprise.111 Thousands of Chinese 
men were—as Edgar once observed—lured to Kham with promises of “a plethora of beautiful 
and healthy Tibetan women.” This Han desire for Khampa women, and the accompanying 
denigration of Khampa men, conforms to a longstanding pattern in (Han) Chinese attitudes 
toward frontier peoples, which Stevan Harrell has described as “the eroticization and 
feminization of minorities in general and denial, in a male-dominant society, of full male status 
to those whose cultures are of the periphery.”112 
Here I want to go beyond that observation, and to highlight the concomitant sexualization 
of frontier earth. Not only did Kham-watchers concern themselves with the “fertility” (feiwo 肥沃) 
of the land, they often spoke of virgin land—and in the Chinese idiom, chunü di 處女地, the 
terrestrial “virgin” is unambiguously female. Tangible as earth may seem, human discourse 
“constructs” it in various ways, and at some level of abstraction, perhaps, as James Lovelock once 
mused, the earth “has never been more than a metaphor.”113 But in the context of agricultural 
colonization, virgin land and native women bore more than just a metaphorical relationship to 
each other. The assimilationist visio—of a virile Han farmer with Tibetan wife at the loom and 
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If tunken began its life as a sort of policy experiment in Kham and elsewhere, by the 1940s it was 
integrated into the core ideology of the Republican Chinese state. In 1943, Chiang Kai-shek 
implored youths nationwide to ease population pressure in the treaty ports by migrating to the 
borderlands for tunken work, calling it “a great task of the highest order in the building of our 
nation.”114 Ethnologist Huang Fensheng developed Chiang’s terse statement on tunken into a 
manifesto, which he published in 1946 as the Borderlands Tunken-worker’s Handbook (Bianjiang 
tunken yuan shouce 邊疆屯墾員手冊). Huang wrangled a multitude of facts and figures into a 
narrative on the historical trajectory of tunken practice covering two millennia of Chinese history, 
in which tunken figured as an enabling condition of the development of borderlands into Chinese 
provinces.115 The Handbook enticed its readers with the prospect of “limitless virgin land” and 
beckoned youths to “create an ideal environment upon the white paper of this swathe of 
nature.”116 Its rhetoric reflects both Zhang Yunping’s holistic interpretation of tunken and Chiang 
Kai-shek’s concern with population redistribution. Huang wrote that: 
The land (tudi 土地) of a nation should be harmonized with the people of the 
nation. Only then can this land be possessed by the people, be exploited by the 
people, be enjoyed by the people. Otherwise, the relationship between humans 
and earth will be in discord. There are some areas where the human population is 
densely concentrated, and there are other areas where humans have not left their 
footprints and the land is gone to waste. This gives rise to lopsided development; 
not only does it influence citizens’ livelihood, but it threatens the very existence of 
the nation (minzu 民族).117 
 
The Handbook inundated its readers with startling population statistics: for instance, it compared 
the population density of Henan at 211.16 people per square kilometer with that of Xikang, at 
5.76. Of China’s 11,562,888 square kilometers, only 9,300,000 (about 12%) was under cultivation—
far less than that in most industrialized states—and most of this uncultivated land was in the 
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borderlands. Huang offered an ambitious solution: “more than one hundred million people 
should be distributed from the population of the interior to various locations in the 
borderlands.”118 
Tunken’s ascendancy in national policy provided the provincial and central governments 
with a common idiom regarding land use policy. In 1940 Liu Wenhui petitioned the central 
Administrative Yuan to supplement his funding for military tunken in Xikang, with the reason 
that ‘the population of this province is scant and the soldiers deployed are limited.”119 In May of 
the same year, Xikang’s provincial government promulgated a set of twelve stipulations for the 
reclamation of public land, which the central Administrative Yuan approved. Province-wide 
figures on the total number of migrants and the total area reclaimed are exceedingly hard to come 
by, because reclamation was a piecemeal activity rather than a centrally-coordinated strategy; 
various provincial organs ran their own reclamation programs on the land under their control.120 
It is clear that hundreds of migrants from other provinces, including many war refugees, 
came to Xikang each year as participants in land reclamation, but it also appears that relatively 
few of these migrants wound up in the Kham region, where growing conditions were 
exceptionally harsh. Hesitant to financially subsidize Liu Wenhui’s province-building project, the 
Nationalist government in Chongqing instead authorized the redrafting of Xikang’s eastern 
border to incorporate 14 fertile lowland counties from west Sichuan as of September 1939 (see 
Chapter 2). These counties, corresponding to the newly established Ya 雅  and Ning 寧
dependencies, absorbed most of Xikang’s incoming tunken settlers, thanks in large part to the 
1939 establishment of a Xikang Province Ning Dependency Tunken Council (Xikang sheng Ning 
shu tunken weiyuan hui 西康省寧屬屯墾委員會). 
But Liu Wenhui did not abandon the project of opening up Kham to cultivation. On the 
contrary, Kham remained the focus of development under his newly founded Bureau of 
Agricultural Improvement (BAI), the topic of the next two chapters. Over the next decade, 
incoming technicians from around China coordinated on an experimental program of “high-
cold” agriculture at two major sites near Kangding, where they pushed settled Chinese 
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agriculture beyond its prior limits. To better understand high-altitude growing conditions, they 













4. High Cold Country: The View from Kangding Weather Station 
 
There are very few cities or towns in these areas. Since 
there are many mountain slopes, the altitude is high, and 
the temperatures are low, there are many pastures and 
forests and little farming. For this reason, grain production 
amounts are insufficient to provide for a dense population. 
—“Western Sichuan Survey Report” (1943)1 
 
The 1930s saw wild speculation in the Chinese press about the possibility of settling Kham with 
Han farmers. In the 1940s, this gave way to a sobering discussion of a “grain problem” (liangshi 
wenti糧食問題) in Kham. The “problem” was that Kham presently could not feed a dense settler 
population, and that it possibly never would. In this discourse, climate emerged as the main 
culprit behind the food shortage. By 1947, a representative evaluation was that “the terrain of 
Xikang is high and cold, and there is very little tilled land of agricultural value.”2 Official and 
non-state observers were converging on the idea that Kham suffered from a gaohan 高寒 or “high 
and cold” climate. 
If this idea seems obvious, it was not always so. Consider that then (as now), people 
primarily envisioned territory as it appeared on a flat map. Latitude was the main index of climate, 
and Kham was directly west of the Sichuan basin, or “heaven’s granary” (tianfu 天府) as it was 
often called. The Chinese in fact had very little empirical information about Kham’s climate before 
1939 beyond what they gleaned from land tax revenues and survey reports. Many of these reports 
were overly optimistic. The 1930 volume The Xikang Problem described Kham as “characteristic of 
the sub-tropical belt,” if perhaps plagued by cold winds. 3  As recently as 1931, colonization 
enthusiasts boasted of Kham’s “boundless fertile soil” and promised that “the fertility of the land 
and the bounty of its production are not less than those of the interior.”4 Such reports were based 
on little more than hearsay, anecdotal experiences, and wishful thinking. But evidentiary 
standards were changing. Agricultural experts in China, like their counterparts in the United 
States and elsewhere, turned to the science of meteorology to more effectively gauge growing 
 
1 Zhang and Zhang (2009), p. 440. 
2 Qiu Demao 邱德懋 (1947), p. 48. 
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conditions. I will refer to this turn from anecdotal, sensory-based weather reports to standardized, 
instrument-mediated reporting as meteorological modernity.  
Meteorological modernity came to Kangding only after 1939. In its inaugural year, the 
Xikang provincial government established a network of weather stations linked to a central 
bureau in the provincial capital of Kangding, as well as a robust program of agricultural 
experimentation to be explored in the next chapter. Weather observers sought method in the 
madness by transcribing data points on the hand-drawn grid of the weather chart to reveal 
patterns. A monthly weather chart at the station in Kangding recorded nearly a thousand data 
points, and nearly two hundred for temperature alone (figure 14). Through a microhistory of the 
Kangding weather bureau, this chapter shows how a small community of poorly-funded and 
often miserable Chinese migrants produced enough meteorological data to upend some earlier 
assumptions about climate in eastern Tibet. It explains why the Xikang administration achieved 
meteorological modernity where it did and when it did, and what that meant for state-building. 
The history of meteorology in Xikang exemplifies how bureaucratic expansion fostered 
new genres of knowledge production and new, less optimistic narratives about the Kham region. 
This in turn ought to impinge on our own narrative of the Chinese state-building project in Kham. 
William Cronon has emphasized the importance of careful framing as we “choose a plot to order 
our environmental histories,” because the framing of a story has the power to alter the 
significance of its conclusion.5 If the conclusion to this story shall be that Xikang Province never 
attained the resplendence that some had hoped it would, this chapter frames province-hood as 
an epistemic turning-point, a moment of heightened attention to the environment among the 
Chinese settler regime rather than an act of hubris toward nature. Climate facts about the Tibetan 
plateau were never “just there” to be acknowledged or ignored. Rather, climate was an emerging 
field of knowledge. China’s bureaucratic expansion into the Kham region produced knowledge 
about qixiang 氣象, or “atmospheric phenomena,” which combined to form a scientific image of 
regional climate, or qihou 氣候. This in turn contributed to a shift in Chinese attitudes toward the 
prospect of settling eastern Tibet. 
 





Figure 14. The March 1947 weather chart for Kangding (SA, Min 249-1-55). 
 
New Eyes on the Frontier 
The Chinese state began systematic meteorological observation in Tibet only during the 
late 1930s.6 This is remarkable, firstly, because Qing officials in Beijing and elsewhere 
were acquainted with modern weather instruments through foreign influences well 
before the twentieth century, and secondly, because systematic climate data would 
presumably have benefited the cause of frontier agricultural development that became a 
 
6 Here I define ‘meteorology’ narrowly as the practice of making scheduled observations at designated 
stations using standardized instruments. In Chinese, this science is known as qixiang guance or qixiang xue. 
Some might reasonably object that weather observation was in fact important to governance, including 
frontier governance, in dynastic China. Qin dynasty law of the third century BCE already mandated that 
local administrators report on rainfall, drought, and other phenomena; see Hulsewe (1985), p. 1. Most or 
all dynasties collected precipitation reports from the provinces; see Ding and Leng (2009). However, few 
records survive, and these premodern observations differ substantially from the continuous (daily or sub-
daily) scientific observation that emerged in such places as Europe, the United States, and Japan during 




priority for the Qing court and the subsequent Republican administration.7 Consider that 
by the late 19th century, settlers on the American frontier were collecting quantified 
rainfall, temperature, and other data to assess the prospects of agriculture and other 
environmental modifications.8 Armed with the telegraph, they shared readings from old 
instruments in new ways.9 Some in Beijing were certainly aware that the British had 
worked with Jesuits to establish a system of meteorological stations in the treaty ports for 
the Chinese Maritime Customs Service in the 1870s, and that the Japanese had established 
a network of meteorological stations in Taiwan after acquiring the island in 1895. 10 
Several meteorological journals circulated after the fall of the Qing empire, beginning 
with Qixiang Yuekan (Meteorology Monthly) in 1913. But effective meteorology relies on a 
higher degree of centralization and standardization than most field sciences, and the 
political upheavals of the 19th and early 20th centuries made it impractical for China 
establish a national network of training programs and observation stations. 
But during the 1920s Chinese officials increasingly viewed the study of qixiang—
or “atmospheric phenomena”—as economically important, thanks largely to the 
advocacy of overseas-trained scholars like Zhu Kezhen and Lü Jiong. As a professor at 
Nanjing University in 1922, Zhu explained to his protégé Li Zhiji, that ‘the relationship 
between qixiang and agriculture is extremely important,’ and that ‘in ancient times, 
though science was not yet developed, our country already knew this. Agricultural 
products and yield amounts should be determined by looking at variations in qixiang.’11 
As Zhu related to Li, a first step in determining what might grow in a given region was to 
identify the climatic zone in which that region figured. “For example,” he explained, “plants from 
 
7 On meteorological stations in late imperial China, see Williamson, Ren, and Allan (2016). On late Qing 
attitudes toward frontier land reclamation, see Bello (2016), pp. 40-44; Kinzley (2017), pp. 23-42; Frank 
(2019), pp. 217-253. 
8 Joseph Giacomelli writes that American climate scientists working with climate data from various 
observers ‘sought to answer a range of questions, especially the pressing, politically charged issue of 
whether Euro-American settlement could modify climatic conditions through agriculture, afforestation, 
deforestation, and other means.’ See Giacomelli (2017), p. 17; see also Vetter (2019). 
9 Vetter (2019), p. 199. 
10 On the meteorology service of the Chinese Maritime Customs Service, see Bickers (2016). On Japanese 
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the tropical belt absolutely cannot be transplanted to the 
cold belt, and plants of the cold belt also cannot be 
transplanted to the tropical belt.”12 For greater specificity 
he referred to the Köppen Climatic Classification devised 
in 1884 by Russian-German scientist Wladimir Köppen 
(figure 15), who categorized plants according to their 
optimal climates: there were megatherms that thrived in 
hot, wet climates, xerophytes that preferred hot and dry 
settings, mesotherms that appreciated the climatic sine 
curve of the temperate zones, and mikrotherms that did best 
with cold winters and short summers. From an 
agricultural perspective, the mesotherm belt was the sweet 
spot: rice, cotton, wheat, and corn were all mesotherms. 
And the best predictor of whether a given region belonged 
to this or that “belt”—in Köppen’s and most rival 
schemes—was latitude. 
But the Tibetan plateau confounded such schemes. Weather in the Kham region—situated 
roughly situated between 28 and 33 degrees north—behaved unlike either its temperate or 
subtropical neighbors to the east. It had a reputation for climatic extremes, clear one moment and 
hailing the next, freezing one moment and scorching the next. These extremes were a subject of 
fascination to the American missionary Marion H. Duncan, who in 1935 related the situation to 
the Journal of the West China Border Society in a series of anecdotes. “Out in the sunshine in winter 
it is warm so that the Tibetan may slip his sheepskin off the shoulder to display a bare, brawny 
chest,” he explained, “but arriving in the shade he pulls the sleeve over his shoulder again for the 
shade is always cold.” The gust of a southwesterly a moment later could force the same man to 
crouch down and pull his sheepskin over his head. 13 
Duncan understood that the altitude of the plateau was key to its distinctive weather 
profile. His mission was based in Batang valley, about 9,000 feet above sea level (“depending on 
who measured it”) where he estimated that air density was about 90% of its value at sea level, 
 
12 Zhu and Li (1922), p. 651. 
13 Duncan (1935), p. 146. 
Figure 15. Regions of the Köppen Climatic 





and thin air heated and cooled more rapidly than thick air. The valley was also bordered by 
mountains just a few miles to the east that reached “not less than eighteen to twenty thousand 
feet” and were covered in everlasting snow, creating complex weather patterns: rain in the valley 
meant snow on the mountains, and this could mean frost in the valley shortly thereafter. He had 
known farmers to cut their crops prematurely after heavy summer rains for fear that frost would 
descend from the mountains. 14  In 1930, Duncan decided to supplement his anecdotal 
observations with systematic instrument readings. That year he placed a well-ventilated box in 
the shade of the northwest corner of his house inside of which was a thermometer that he checked 
every day for a year producing what was, to his knowledge, the first scientific measurement of 
Batang’s climate. But missionary meteorology was to have little legacy in Batang: much to 
Duncan’s dismay, the United Christian Missionary Society closed the mission in 1932, citing 
insufficient funds.15 
With Xikang Province on the horizon in the 1930s, Chinese knowledge about the region’s 
climate was still very limited. Authors resorted to crude comparisons with other high-altitude 
regions. For example, The Xikang Problem (1930) describes the climate of Kham in reference to 
Gansu, Qinghai, Mongolia, central Tibet (Xizang), the Tianshan Mountains of Xinjiang, and the 
Pamirs of Central Asia. Oddly, this device suggests that there is a “Xikang Plateau” that is 
physically distinct from the Tibetan plateau, with misleading implications: 
The climate of the Xikang plateau is moderated by sea breezes, such that it does 
not reach the bitter cold of such plateaus as central Tibet and Xinjiang. For this 
reason, in biological terms, there is enormous growing power. This is one form of 
proof that the Xikang plateau must be capable of development.16 
 
Field surveys offered more empirical observations, yet survey authors were in no position to take 
systematic readings with instruments. Instead, they spoke to their embodied experiences. 
Preeminent Kham scholar Ren Naiqiang described Kangding as a land of clear skies and howling 
wind, scorching summers and peaks covered in permafrost, declaring it “sincerely an unusual 
place!”17 Others tried to familiarize the weather through analogy, such as one student survey 
team that spent July and August 1940 traveling river valleys in Kham reported that afternoons 
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were “comfortable” like mid-autumns along the lower Yangtze River.18 Even a landmark national 
study of “The Soils of China” by specialists from the Ministry of Economic Affairs and National 
Beiping University had only this to say about climate in Xikang in 1935: “in the deep valleys of 
Xikang, the climate often appears warm. According to longtime residents of Xikang, when 
passing the winter in Batang, one does not need a heavy coat to keep warm.”19 
Scientific weather observations in Kham began in earnest with the founding of Xikang 
Province in 1939. This was every bit as much a bureaucratic development as a scientific one. 
Through the selective placement and equipping of observation stations, atmospheric forces were 
differently prioritized and divided in space, usually according to units on the political map. 
Observation stations were also continuously linked by bureaucratic networks, which made 
somewhat arbitrary decisions about units and methods, facilitated exchanges of information, and 
coordinate movements of equipment and personnel across vast spaces. 
 
The Establishment of the Xikang Weather Service 
China’s first foray into meteorology on a national level began with the 1928 founding of the 
Central Meteorological Institute (Zhongyang qixiang yanjiusuo 中央氣象研究所) in Nanjing, which 
was then newly under Guomindang control. National standardization was an immediate need, 
and in 1931 a meeting headed by that institute promulgated the “Nationally Implemented 
Regulations for Meteorological Observation” (Quanguo qixiang guance shishi guicheng 全國氣象觀
測實施規程). In 1937, the Japanese invasion of Nanjing forced the Meteorological Institute to flee 
west, first to Wuhan, and eventually to Chongqing, where the Guomindang would establish the 
Republic of China’s new wartime capital.20 Observation remained a mostly local affair until 1941, 
when the Central Meteorological Bureau (Zhongyang qixiang ju 中央气象局, henceforth CMB) was 
established and placed directly under the Administrative Yuan. This bureau began to network 
with observation stations in multiple provinces, though these were all situated in China’s far 
west—Qinghai, Gansu, Sichuan, Xikang and Yunnan—because of territorial loss in the east. 
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On the third of October 1938, the studious reader of the Central Daily newspaper may have 
spied a story comprised of a single sentence in the ‘Other News’ section at the very bottom of the 
page:  
The students of the Xikang Meteorology Training Program have determined to 
journey to Kham next month, [where they] plan to establish four meteorological 
observation stations in Kangding, Ganzi, Ba’an, and Xichang, as well as ten rain 
measurement stations.21 
 
The team succeeded in establishing a small network of weather stations in Kham with its 
headquarters in the city of Kangding. The establishment of Xikang Province in 1939 spurred the 
promulgation of the “Xikang Province Temporary Regulations for Observation Bureaus at 
Various Levels” (Xikang Sheng Ge Ji Cehou Suo Zanxing Guicheng 西康省各级测候所暂行规程), 
which mandated adherence to the “Nationally Implemented Regulations” document and 
delineated a hierarchical organizational structure. A Bureau Chief would oversee a 
meteorological bureau under the direct authority of the provincial Establishment Office (Jianshe 
Ting 建設廳), which in turn oversaw a provincial network of county stations. These stations were 
ordered in terms of priority, with stations at higher tiers registering more types of observations 
more frequently than those at lower tiers.22 
 Kangding remained the province’s highest-ranked station as a “tier two observation 
station” (er deng cehou suo 二等測候所) under the new scheme. By 1940 the configuration of 
remaining stations was as follows: tier three stations included the key counties of Xichang and 
Ya’an, the political and economic centers of the Ningshu and Yashu regions respectively, as well 
as Taining, site of the province’s premier high-altitude experimental farm. As of the end of that 
year, these stations were all headed by migrants from neighboring Sichuan Province, while lower-
ranked stations were headed by a combination of Sichuanese and Xikang natives.23 Tier four 
stations included a number of agriculturally viable counties concentrated in the lowland Ya and 
Ning regions, as well as Ba’an—the only fourth-tier station in the Kham region. The vast majority 
of Kham (Kangqu 康區) counties fell under the lowest ranking, “rainfall stations” (yuliang zhan 雨
量站), which were equipped with no instruments beyond a rain gauge. Other counties still were 
absent any sort of weather station, including Yidun, Zhanhua, Dingxiang, Shiqu and Dengke. 
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Table 11. Meteorological observation stations in Xikang Province as of 1940 (SA, Min 249-1-54). 

































Readings from the lower-tiered stations were typically recorded by a single person whose main 
employment was not in the weather service. For example, the February 1943 weather charts Baiyu 
county in northern Kham lists only four types of weather: clear, dark, snow, or hail.24 Without so 
much as a working rain gauge, this fourth-tier station sat at the observational baseline, and yet it 
was typical of the Kham counties during the 1940s. The Xikang weather bureau had very little 
ability to collect information about weather in Kham beyond its headquarters in Kangding. 
Material and human resources were concentrated in the Kangding office. As of December 
1940, it hosted ten personnel, including four observers at its own tier-two station: a supervisor, 
two observers and an assistant observer. It also hosted administrative personnel who oversaw 
the entire provincial operation, including a secretary and an accountant. The average age of all 
personnel was 27 sui, but that of observers (including interns) was 22. The management—acting 
chief Wang Tingfang 王庭芳 and administrative chairman Guo Fan 郭藩—were university-
educated, while others had at most a high school or middle school education.25 
 
 
24 SA, Min 249-1-170, SA, p. 9. 





Figure 16. Illustration of a Stevenson screen 
from a 1937 issue of the Jiangsu Provincial 
Government Monthly Journal of Development 
(Jiangsu sheng zhen jianshe yuekan). 
 
Work as a Kangding weather observer must have been tedious. Archival sources from the 
late 1940s allow us to construct a fairly detailed image: when all went according to plan, a team 
of two observers made seven distinct observations each day between 3am and 9pm for a total of 
217 observations per month. Each observation required a worker to visit the “hundred leaf box” 
(baiyexiang百葉箱), known in English as a Stevenson screen, which the bureau had constructed 
on site out of lumber and placed on a patch of level ground. Its contents included the barometer, 
the hygrometer, the standard thermometer, and the U-shaped Six’s thermometer, which made it 
possible to record daily high and low temperatures by observing the positions of two metal 
sliders.26  A completed chart, such as the one compiled by observers Chen Qingyao and Liu 
Shuxing in January 1948, included 896 data points and dozens of ‘miscellaneous’ margin notes. 
The data included barometric pressure, air temperature, relative humidity, wind force and 
direction, cloud cover, sunshine, rainfall, and visibility. For averages and rainfall totals, one 
observer did the primary calculations and the other checked them. Both observers affixed their 
personal chops in the bottom-right corner, after which the bureau submitted one copy to the 
 




provincial Establishment Office and another to the CMB. Another copy remained in the archive 
of the Bureau of Agricultural Improvement.27 
 
Missing Data 
Any attempt to retrieve these records uncovers a minor mystery: of the 72 monthly Kangding 
weather charts that one would expect to find in the archive for the years from 1943-1948, some 18 
appear to be missing, as do all charts from the months prior to January 1943 (table 12. Only two 
years, 1944 and 1948, are fully represented. Further, there are precious few charts from the many 
rain measurement stations outside of Kangding, or even the tier-three meteorological station in 
Taining.  
 
Table 12. Availability of monthly weather charts for Kangding in the Sichuan Provincial Archives from 1943-
1948, as determined by the author. Available charts are marked with an X and can be found in the archives of 
the Xikang Province Bureau of Agricultural Improvement (Min 249) or the Central Meteorological Bureau 
(Min 19). It is possible that some of the missing charts can be found elsewhere.  
Month: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1943 






1944 X X X X X X X X X X X X 





   
1946 X X 
 
X X X X X X X X X 
1947 X X 
    
X X X X X X 
1948 X X X X X X X X X X X X 
 
Where are the missing charts? Assorted memos present substantial evidence that station 
chiefs were simply unable to obtain consistent readings. Stations outside of Kangding frequently 
reported missing or broken instruments, particularly as the price of new instruments skyrocketed 
 




amid the runaway inflation of the war period. In 1947, alone, the Hanyuan station notified the 
bureau that it was without a wind vane or hygrometer, its rain gauge was leaking, and without a 
Six’s thermometer for registering extremes it could only observe the present temperatures at 2pm 
and 4am. That same year, the Qianning (formerly Taining) Agricultural Station complained to 
the bureau that its Six’s thermometer and other instruments had all been removed after 
administrative changes. Qianning’s charts from those months record nothing but two daily 
temperatures as well as sunlight and other atmospheric conditions that were typically gauged 
with the naked eye.28  
Administrators in Kangding also complained about personnel problems, and specifically 
about indiscipline and absconcion among weather observers. Those same observers, who 
invariably hailed from the neidi, complained of unbearable conditions on the frontier. For 
example, in 1943, an observer named Chen Yongfu angered his supervisor, who complained that 
Chen had been visiting the Stevenson screen just four times daily instead of the usual eight, as 
well as some of his colleagues, who sent a scathing testimony about him to Duan Tianjue (then 
chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Improvement). Their letter paints Chen as a vagabond whose 
daily life is anathema to the bureaucratic discipline required of a weather observer. Chen, they 
claimed, sidelined as a doctor at the Kangding market, where “people from all walks of life” came 
seeking diagnosis. He had fallen into company that was unruly and coarse “without regard to 
time or place” and cavorted with the amorous actresses of the Kangding theater. Because of this 
the “good” people of the Kangding weather bureau and provincial government “look upon Mr. 
Chen with disdain.”29 
Chen offered his side of the story in a series of letters to his superiors in which he insisted 
that he was neither lazy nor undisciplined, but rather, a prisoner of the weather service. After 
Chief Luo of the Kangding bureau repeatedly denied his requests for leave, he circumvented Luo 
and wrote directly to Lü Jiong, then chairman of the National Central Weather Bureau. A letter 
of March 31, 1944 asserts that “four times I requested long leave but I was told that I was making 
things hard for Mr. Luo, when in fact Mr. Luo was trying to make things difficult for me.”30 The 
bureau had reneged on its guarantee of leave after one year of service, and he was determined to 
leave whether or not a suitable replacement was found. He was writing to the central bureau in 
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a final appeal for a “certificate of resignation” (cizhi shu辭職書), an official recognition that he 
had not absconded. 
Similarly, Duan Tianjue received a letter from a disaffected observer named Liang Gongle 
who desperately wished to leave Kham. The previous year, Liang was pursuing an education in 
Sichuan when he grew ill and withdrew from his program with the intention of resuming later. 
In the meantime he resided in Kangding (for unclear reasons), and on November 18 he received 
instructions from the Xikang province meteorological bureau to travel to Batang (then known in 
Chinese as Ba’an) for service as a meteorological observer. In his letter to Duan the following year, 
Liang explained that he obeyed the order in spite of his apprehensions about ‘the myriad 
hardships in material life and transportation in guanwai,” and found himself “very lonely and 
very cold, on a journey of tens of thousands of li across wastelands, traveling solo into the wild.” 
He understood bearing hardship to be part of his duty as a public servant and a member of the 
Chinese ethnic nation (minzu) during the “War of Resistance” against Japan, and felt that he was 
subject to forces beyond his control—or “cast into the Mandate of Heaven” (tianming 天命). A 
year into his service in Batang, however, Liang regretted that he was both underutilized at the 
rain measurement station and unable to support himself on his pay from the bureau, and thus 
forced to ‘rush around’ buying and selling things in order to support himself. “Overall,” he wrote, 
“after one year in Ba’an one sighs with dejection and longs for beloved friends.” He lamented 
that overnight, “a public servant has turned to living as a petty merchant, [and] how despicable 
is that? Moreover, how tragic?”31 
Word of Liang’s flightiness caused concern at the National Central Weather Bureau in 
Chongqing, where chairman Lü Jiong issued a renewed command on August 4, 1943 to instate 
him as “observatory technician's assistant and simultaneously acting chief” of the Ba’an station, 
with a still-paltry salary of 110 yuan per month.32 In November Lü heard back from Chen Yongfu 
at the Kangding Bureau, who informed him that the letter could not be delivered because “the 
manager [Liang] has already absconded.”33 Liang’s disappearance appears to have left the station 
defunct.34 In a 1943 report to the Central bureau, Kangding chief Luo Suoren complained that “of 
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the original personnel, apart from Mr. Liang at Ba'an having already left unexpectedly, the work 
force is insufficient,” citing low pay and high costs of living as the primary reasons.35 
In 1947 the national Department of Agriculture and Forestry notified the Xikang 
Provincial Government by telegram that its meteorological organ should send in monthly 
weather readings because “recordings of meteorological observations are intimately related to 
agricultural and forestry production and farm field water management.” 36  The Provincial 
Establishment Office responded by issuing an instruction to each county government, affixed 
with the seal of Liu Wenhui, to “assign specialized personnel to begin work, make detailed 
recordings, and submit monthly reports.” Each county also received copies of the provincial 
meteorology manual discussed above. Liu qualified his order by asking counties to carry it out 
“to the extent possible” (jiu keneng fanwei nei就可能範圍內).37 
In responses to Liu’s instruction, “to the extent possible” became the operational phrase. 
The magistrate of Baiyu county cited that phrase before explaining that “my county lacks 
observation personnel to make meteorological recordings” and “does not have a budget for this 
item to fund purchase of instruments for the benefit of the work.” “I fear that my county is remote 
on the frontier,” wrote the magistrate of Daocheng, “and it has absolutely no observation 
equipment.” The magistrate of Derong asserted not only that his county had no equipment, but 
that “beyond the pass there is no way to purchase them.”38 One logical option was for the BAI to 
obtain meteorological reports at each of its county farms. The BAI had absorbed the hardware at 
Kham’s major weather stations from the Central Weather Bureau in 1942 under the leadership of 
Duan Tiannjue, so perhaps it had the resources to implement Liu’s instruction? 
That was not the case. Duan’s successor Xu Xiaohui 徐孝恢 penned his own response to 
the Establishment Office, essentially absolving his bureau of responsibility for expanding the 
weather service. He gave four reasons: First, weather observation was by national policy the 
prerogative of the Central Weather Bureau and not the BAI; ownership of equipment in the 
counties had already been returned to the weather bureau. Secondly, prices of meteorological 
instruments were “soaring” and “this province truly does not have the power to purchase them.” 
Third, though it was feasible to purchase domestic manufactures, they were significantly inferior 
 
35 SA, Min 19-1-18. 
36 SA, Min 249-01-0056, p. 102. 
37 SA, Min 234-1-101. 




to imported instruments and gave unreliable readings, making these weather stations a 
“laughingstock” (xiaobing 笑柄 ). Finally, the Bureau of Agricultural Improvement had no 
program for training weather observers, and experiences of the past several years had 
demonstrated that it was nearly impossible to hire someone who had both the technical expertise 
and the strength of character required. “The emphasis is on perseverance and [one] must have 
extraordinary willpower,” wrote Xu. “Otherwise it is difficult to obtain accurate numbers.” He 
rejected the possibility of establishing new weather stations, citing “the awkward situation that 
it is hard for the state farms to bear this enormous responsibility.”39  
 
The Outline of a Borderland Climate 
The many failings of the Xikang weather service accentuate its hard-won victories. Even limited 
successes had a palpable impact on popular perceptions of Kham. In the spring of 1942, Chinese 
readers in the interior might have come across the following weather report in Meteorology News 
and Updates by Wang Tingfan, then the head of the Kangding Weather Bureau: 
In March Kangding’s temperature varied between cold and warm, with the sun at 
intervals blazing high above the sky. At times it was like a sweltering summer and 
at times there was heavy rain or snow with the majesty of a harsh winter, 
conducive to contracting illness. On the afternoon of the 30th, from two o’clock 
onward the air pressure gradually decreased and the wind changed direction, its 
force growing stronger then quickly retreating. Thunder sounded starting at 16:25, 
the first thunderstorm of this year. March received a total rainfall of 16.4mm, a 
mere one-fifth of last year’s.40 
 
Kangding’s weather had never been described in such lurid detail. On display in the Kangding 
bureau chief’s chart-to-narrative translation is not the “banalization of weather” that philosopher 
Justin E.H. Smith has attributed to modern technology, but quite the inverse: here is a compelling 
drama of temperature extremes, of falling air pressure, ambivalent wind and precisely-timed 
thunder.41 
 
39 SA, Min 234-1-101. 
40 Wang Tingfang (1942), p. 88. 
41 In an essay for the New York Times blog Opinionator, Smith claims, with little evidence, that the 
invention of the clock allowed time to become an abstract and absolute concept, “disconnected from the 





Meteorology fostered public associations between Kham’s altitude and its climatically 
outré behavior. Kangding, the gateway to Kham, was only 100 kilometers west of Ya’an (as the 
bird flies), yet the two counties had very different weather patterns. A 1943 report in the journal 
Dushu tongxun articulated that “the latitudes of Kangding and Ya’an are similar, and their 
longitudes differ by approximately one degree, but their altitudes differ by over 1,900 meters.” 
Expressly drawing on 1940 temperature records for the two sites, “taken by the day and by the 
hour,” the author outlines the relationship between climates: The temperature difference was 
greatest in the summer and least in the winter, and Kangding’s lower temperatures were most 
intimately related to the differences in snowfall. Day-to-day, the temperature differences between 
sites were greatest in the mornings and evenings and smallest at noon, except that in summer 
they were most similar in the evenings.42 
The immediate utility of this information was mainly agrarian. Atmospheric data bore 
directly on the agricultural capacity of the earth, ergo, its ability to sustain a settler population. 
By replacing anecdotal reports with systematic instrumental readings, meteorology isolated 
climate as a contributing factor to the “grain problem” in Kham. Agronomists wondered, what 
crops can farmers potentially grow in a given region, and how many harvests can they reasonably 
expect in a year? These led to questions about climate: how many months of nightly frosts does a 
given region experience? How many months of little or no rainfall? 
Nearly all of the province’s meteorological data on Kham came from the two weather 
stations in Kangding and Taining, making them the primary reference points for the Kham 
dependency. Duan Tianjue, tasked with composing the “Agriculture and Husbandry” section of 
the Draft General Gazetteer of Xikang, made the interesting curatorial decision to juxtapose these 
two sites with several stations in the Ning and Ya dependency, even though the observation date 
ranges for each site differed considerably (tables 13 and 14). These tables show Xichang (1759 
meters above sea level) and Ya’an (600m) with fewer than two months of frost annually. In 
Kangding (2600m), conversely, frosts typically set in by mid-October and persisted until late 
March, while Taining (3500m) endured frosts for most of the year. Temperatures in Xichang and 
Ya’an ranged from about 10 to 25 degrees Celsius, while temperatures in Kangding ranged from 
1 to 17 degrees, and in Taining, from -3 to 13 degrees.43  
 
42 Yang Jianchu (1943). 




By extrapolating this data to the greater Kham region with help from anecdotal 
observations, Duan outlined several growing regions in Kham akin to what today’s agronomists 
call “plant hardiness zones.” Kham’s most fertile land straddled the lower reaches of the Gyalmo 
Ngul (Chinese: Dadu he), Yarlung (Yalong), Dri (Jinsha), and Mekong (Lancang) rivers. These were 
places where Chinese settlers had already made inroads during the late Qing dynasty, including 
Danba, Ba’an, and Yajiang, where mild winters and summers were especially conducive to wheat, 
corn and farmers might expect multiple harvests each year. Above this was a “cool zone” 
(qingliang zhi qu 清涼之區) at roughly 2000 meters characterized by short summers and long 
springs and autumns, with rainfall that was sparse but sufficient for agriculture. This zone 
suffered from frosts for much of the year, but little hail, and included the Dartsedo (Kangding) 
valley as well as those of Dege, Pelyül, and Dingxiang. Higher still was the “continental” (daluxing 
大陸性) zone characterized by very cold winters and hot summers, short springs and autumns, 
and regular drought. This zone included Taining (now called Qianning), as well as Gardze, 
Luhuo, and Dau.  In the continental zone farmers could expect no more than one harvest per year. 
Finally, there was the “extreme continental climate” (juedui zhi daluxing qihou 絕對之大陸性氣候) 
above 4,000 meters where grasslands predominated. Duan estimated that 4800 meters was the 
absolute limit of Han settlement, because “the air pressure is low, breathing is labored, and Han 
people are all unable to endure it.”44  
 
Table 13. Average monthly temperatures (degrees Celsius) by county as listed in the Draft Gazetteer of Xikang (XTG p. 304). 
County Month Dates of 
Observation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Kangding  1.1 4.9 8.0 11.9 13.2 16.9 16.5 12.5 9.7 4.5 1.1 1940-42 
Taining -3.0 1.3 2.2 6.4 9.7 11.2 13.0 12.3 10.5 9.2 0.9 -1.6 1942 
Xichang 11.5 13.2 16.2 19.7 22.4 22.7 24.0 24.1 20.8 18.0 14.1 12.4 1926-33 









Table 14. Monthly rainfall in several counties as listed in the Draft Gazetteer of Xikang (XTG p. 304). 
County Month Dates of 
Observation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Kangding 4.2 13.3 46.6 80.1 131.2 181.3 113.8 99.0 102.9 44.5 15.2 6.6 1939-42 
Taining 0.0 5.9 20.0 46.6 92.9 185.8 102.3 113.0 196.9 3.0 5.3 0.0 1942 
Xichang 5.9 14.1 23.1 33.9 89.9 265.5 161.2 199.6 224.6 104.4 34.4 5.0 1925-33 
Ya’an 8.9 28.0 60.1 86.5 140.1 104.6 499.8 439.2 195.8 110.1 37.3 19.4 1940-42 
 
Conclusion 
A number of factors conspired to inhibit the maturation of meteorological modernity in Kham: 
these included instrument shortages, personnel problems, and the wartime financial crisis. 
Nevertheless, over the course of the decade, the Kangding and Taining stations managed to 
produce several full-year observations for the first time. The new climatological knowledge of the 
1940s suggested that the culprit behind Kham’s grain shortage was neither Khampa ignorance 
nor Han dilatoriness, but the non-human environment. So much of the “virgin wastelands” that 
earlier aroused Han interest in Kham was situated in Duan’s cool and continental climatic zones, 
which Chinese sources collectively referred to as a gaohan (high cold) belt. 
For most of the decade, the Xikang weather service operated under the Bureau of 
Agricultural Improvement, so that it directly informed the state’s program of agricultural 
development. As a sobering picture of Kham’s “high cold” climate emerged, the BAI sought 
technical solutions at designated high cold experimental stations in Kangding and Taining. 
Agronomists at these stations hoped that they might adapt to environmental challenges by 
experimenting with new crop varieties and growing techniques. Spirits were especially high 
upon the appointment of Duan Tianjue to the leadership of the Xikang BAI in 1943. The Newsletter 
of the Chinese Agronomy Society declared that “henceforth, the agricultural development of Xikang 
Province is certain to see a turn of new qixiang, which we await expectantly.”45 We turn next to 
the exploits of Duan and his colleagues at Xikang’s agricultural improvement stations. 
 
 




5. Wheat Dreams: Scientific Interventions at Chinese Model Farms 
 
Grain production in the Kham dependency is sufficient 
only for the consumption of a small portion of residents 
within the territory. As migrants reclaim land, grain 
consumption figures will increase accordingly. If we desire 
stable lives for the colonists (kenmin墾民), then by 
undertaking agricultural land reclamation we can increase 
grain production to meet food demands, and by 
undertaking the improvement of crop varieties and the 
improvement of cultivation technology we can increase 
crop production per unit area, and so respond to the 
proliferation of the human population and serve the needs 
of the expansion of colonial affairs (kenwu墾務). 
—Duan Tianjue, “Forecast for Xikang’s Agricultural Development” (1944) 1 
 
Disabused of their wilder agrarian fantasies, the region’s Chinese administrators turned their 
attention from mass Han in-migration to technocratic development on a manageable scale. When 
soil and climate science suggested that Tibetan elevations were unsuited to the preferred crops 
of Han settlers, agronomists speculated that somewhere there might be genetic material that could 
change this sorry situation. Such was the logic that animated one Zhang Jinquan 張錦泉 in his 
quest to grow glutinous wheat near the Zheduo mountains. 
Zhang hailed from faraway Zhejiang Province near the Yangtze delta, and like many civil 
servants, the Japanese invasion of east China in 1937 drove him west. In June 1942, Zhang became 
the chief of an experimental farm station in the mountains of Kham called the Taining Pastures 
(Taining muchang 泰寧牧場).2 He planted his first crop at Bamei 八美 in the spring of that year, 
much as he would have in lowland Zhejiang, only to despair as early frosts kept his stalks from 
producing ears in September. It must have been cold comfort when the Department of 
Agriculture and Forestry telegrammed from Chongqing to recommend that Zhang find more 
frost-resistant strains of wheat to plant next year. Hungry, he resigned to growing highland 
barley like Khampa peasants and learned to forage for wild ginseng roots in the high grasslands 
like Khampa nomads.3 
 
1 Duan (1944), p. 16. 
2 Sichuan Provincial Archives (henceforth SA), Min 249-1-156. 




But Zhang was unhappy. “Highland barley is no good for Han folk,” he complained. 
Wheat was the most common grain on earth; if Siberia could grow wheat, he reasoned, so could 
Kham. As war with Japan raged in the interior provinces, Zhang waged his own war against 
entropy in the highlands. By 1944 he had assembled 25 varieties of wheat seed from different 
Chinese institutions for a variety comparison experiment, which he ran at two different sites near 
Kangding. By 1946 he had identified and re-tested three high-yielding, cold-resistant varieties 
that the government could plant throughout the Kham region at elevations of up to 3,500 meters.4  
Zhang’s experience is extraordinary, but not unique. He belonged to a new professional 
class of agriculturalists that were university-educated, mobile, and well connected. In the late 
1920s Zhang matriculated at the agricultural college of National Central University, where he 
likely brushed shoulders with prominent American agronomists, including the missionary John 
Lossing Buck.5 He graduated from the Department of Agricultural Land Reclamation (Nongyi 
kenzhi ke 農藝墾殖科) in 1931, and served as an agricultural technician in the eastern provinces of 
Anhui, Fujian, and Zhejiang before his thousand-mile exodus to Kham, where he joined the 
government of the newly-established Xikang Province. During Zhang’s time at the Anhui 
Province Cotton Improvement Station he had served alongside brothers Duan Tianjue 段天爵 
and Duan Tianzhen 段天楨, both of whom would join him in the Xikang Province Bureau of 
Agricultural Improvement (Xikang sheng nongye gaijin suo西康省農業改近所, henceforth BAI).6 
There they shared quarters with migrants from several other provinces at experimental farm 
stations modeled on those of the interior provinces, where they managed small local labor forces. 
Their line of work was most commonly known as “improvement” (gaijin 改進, gailiang 改良). 
Improvement was in many ways a precursor to the notion of “development” that found 
prominence in the latter half of the twentieth century. Its origins of improvement are in medieval 
Europe where it signified agricultural innovation, although by the twentieth century 
“improvement” referred more broadly to a range of technocratic interventions in society and the 
environment. Anthropologist Tania Murray Li cogently identifies two core features of global 
improvement schemes: the first is problematization, or “identifying deficiencies that need to be 
 
4 Zhang Jinquan (1947). 
5 The American agronomist and missionary John Lossing Buck moved from Anhui to National Central 
University in Nanjing in 1920. He remained until 1944, traveling intermittently to the United States and 
elsewhere. See Stross (1986), p. 161. 




rectified,” and the second is rendering technical, or assigning resolution of the problem to experts 
in a neatly-defined field.7 This understanding of improvement jives with work at the Xikang 
Bureau of Agricultural Improvement, which conceived its mission in opposition to a supposed 
liangshi wenti, or “food grain problem.” The “problem,” as we have seen, was that Kham 
produced too little of the foods that Han settlers desired. The BAI’s intended solution was none 
other than to alter the region’s biota by experimenting at designated sites and “extending” 
favorable results to a far greater area. This agricultural scheme merged seamlessly the social 
scheme of cultivating model Chinese communities that could be extended across Kham—an issue 
that I will pursue into the next chapter. 
So far, the scholarly literature on improvement and development theory tends to locate 
twentieth-century China on the receiving end of development schemes that were typically 
initiated or guided by foreign institutions. For instance, historians have established that Japanese 
and American experts were instrumental in the development of Chinese agronomy during the 
late Qing and Republican periods, and Euro-American institutions played a less direct role in 
China’s rural reconstruction movement during the 1920s.8 We also know that at some point China 
wound up squarely on the design end of development schemes. Scholars of contemporary China 
note that the state invokes “development” to legitimize its interventions in western Africa, as well 
as its domestic interventions in minority regions of the PRC, most famously with the “Open up 
the West” campaign (Xibu da kaifa 西部大开发).9 Anthropologist Emily Yeh has shown in lurid 
detail how the post-Mao state targets Tibet for what she facetiously calls “the gift of Chinese 
development.” The PRC state bankrolls agricultural and urban development programs that in 
turn justify its demands for Tibetan allegiance, which Yeh describes as a form of “indebtedness 
engineering.”10 This chapter shows that “the gift of Chinese development” has roots in the pre-
Communist history of Tibet.  
 
7 Tania Murray Li (2007), p. 7. 
8 On Japanese and American involvement in Chinese agronomy during the 19th and 20th centuries, see 
Lavelle (2015), Stross (1986). On the influence of European and American institutions on the Rural 
Reconstruction campaign, see Merkel-Hess (2016). 
9 The Open up the West campaign officially launched in 2001 and targeted a broad swathe of western 
China, largely populated by Tibetans and other ethnic minorities. For critical scholarship on this 
campaign, see Goodman (2004), Holbig (2004). Although it is beyond the scope of this study, Andrew 
Grant has written about the impact of the campaign on eastern Tibet. See Grant (2018). 




The efficacy of the BAI’s improvement efforts relied on their diminutive size. The BAI 
responded to adverse conditions in Kham through a strategy that James C. Scott calls 
“miniaturization,” or “the creation of a more easily controlled micro-order” in such things as 
model villages and model farms. 11  Much as American agronomists in Republican China 
“generally dwelt in protective bubbles,” the Han personnel at Xikang’s Kham-zone stations were 
relatively isolated within their agricultural micro-orders, where they could investigate ecological 
possibilities apart from broader social conditions.12 It was the manageability of these sites, rather 
than their size, that allowed Han agronomists to envision large-scale transformations in Kham. 
Drawing deeply from the unpublished archives of the Xikang Province Bureau of Agricultural 
Improvement, I analyze everyday practice at two experimental sites, Simaiqiao 駟馬橋 and 
Taining 泰寧, that occupied different ecological niches within the Kham region. Both were sites 
of significant change, but as I will demonstrate, change flowed in more than one direction. 
 
The Mission to Improve Kham 
To its staunchest advocates, agricultural improvement seemed to be the very condition of human 
progress. “The growth of civilization,” wrote Ezra Parmalee Prentice, the American agricultural 
modernizer, in 1939, “has one single cause—the increasing efficiency of man’s labor. Savagery is 
the condition in which man lived when much effort brought small results. Progress comes with 
decreasing effort and increasing results.” 13  Efficiency was the chief concern of agricultural 
improvement, though not its only concern: as we shall see, improvement specialists in Kham 
were also concerned with matters of taste. 
Improvement had its origins in England of the 18th and 19th centuries, where it fueled a 
dramatic increase in agricultural production that we now call the “British agricultural 
revolution.” The emergence of market capitalism in northern Europe, and England in particular, 
prompted the marketization of crops, which in turn drove the consolidation or “enclosure” of 
land under wealthy landowners. The ensuing privatization of commons provided new incentive 
for increasing yields, and agriculture became an intellectual pursuit of the bourgeoisie, who took 
advantage of the new technologies of printing to share knowledge about it. Noel Kingsbury 
writes that “by 1640 it was possible for an English landowner to have quite a serviceable library 
 
11 Scott (1998), p. 4. 
12 Stross (1986), p. 13. 




on farming matters.” 14  The United States inherited and improvised on these developments; 
Randall Stross notes that there were over 400 farm periodicals in the United States before 1860.15 
The English and American improvement movements benefited from relatively low population 
density and the emergence of print capitalism. 
The population explosion that China experienced during the Qing ensured that it did not 
share the conditions that facilitated the agricultural revolution in the western hemisphere even 
after the fall of the dynasty. By Lloyd Eastman’s calculations, the average size of a farm in north 
China of the 1930s was 5.1 acres, and the average size in the south was 2.8 acres. In the United 
States of the 1930s, “the average farm family of 4.2 people lived on 157 acres; in China, the average 
farm family of 6.2 people drew its sustenance from about 4.2 acres.” 16  Developments in 
(mainland) Chinese agriculture fell far behind those in Korea, Japan and Taiwan during the 
twentieth century because of population pressure. As Philip Huang notes, China’s twentieth-
century agricultural history more closely resembles that of India than those of its East Asian 
neighbors.17  With such diminutive farms, there was little room for most Chinese farmers to 
produce more food than they needed for sustenance and thus little incentive to invest in crop 
improvement. Mass marketization of most food crops would not occur in China until the 1980s. 
Accordingly, agricultural innovation was propelled mainly by the state. Late imperial 
officials provided seeds to peasants, allocated funds for experimental fields, and sometimes even 
invested in agricultural experiments.18 Some late-Qing statesmen were impressed by agricultural 
development in the west, including Kang Youwei 康有為, who in 1895 unsuccessfully proposed 
to the Guangxu Emperor a program of state-guided agricultural improvement modeled on the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, which, we should note, had been established only three decades 
prior.19 Nevertheless, Japan’s stunning victory in the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95 jolted the 
provinces into implementing their own experiment stations modeled on Japanese and American 
precedents. Some of these stations survived the Chinese revolution of 1911, but Peter Lavelle 
observes several marked shifts in agricultural programs during the 1920s. Japanese influence 
waned and the United States emerged as the dominant influence on Chinese agronomy. 
 
14 Kingsbury (2009), p. 57. 
15 Stross (1986), p. 4 
16 Eastman (1988), p. 54 
17 Phillip C.C. Huang (2015), p. 340 
18 Perdue (1987), p. 22 




Universities, rather than provincial governments, were now the epicenter of agricultural 
improvement, and they narrowed their focus to a select few industrial and food crops, like wheat 
and cotton.20 
By the 1930s China had developed its own network of agricultural improvement organs 
thanks in part to direct exchanges with the United States, as institutions (most famously the 
Rockefeller Foundation) and missionaries (most famously John Lossing Buck) made inroads at 
Chinese institutions (especially in Nanjing). Meanwhile, improvement agriculture in the U.S. was 
experiencing its own changes. Deborah Fitzgerald chronicles the rise of an “industrial ideal in 
American agriculture” during the 1920s in which farming came to resemble factory 
manufacturing. 21  Certain aspects of this transformation were impractical for China, such as 
mechanization, which was too costly to implement and uneconomical on small farms. However, 
the Guomindang’s agrarian organs did implement other aspects of farm industrialization. These 
included the establishment of agricultural colleges, which led to the emergence of an agricultural 
professional class, and concomitantly what Fitzgerald describes (in the American context) as a 
“reliance on managerial (rather than artisanal) expertise, and a continual evocation of ‘efficiency’ 
as a production mandate” at state-run agricultural stations.22 
These transnational developments resonated with agricultural innovation in the Kham 
region. Like other provincial leaders, Zhao Erfeng established an agricultural experiment station 
in Batang during the last years of the Qing dynasty, but this did not survive the revolution.23 By 
the 1930s there was renewed interest in implementing a program of experimental agriculture in 
Kham in line with those of more developed provinces. Multiple authors presaged the eventual 
founding of the Xikang Province Bureau of Agricultural Improvement; for example, Chen 
Chongwei’s The Xikang Problem envisioned agricultural experimentation stations and an 
Agricultural Research Council under a Ministry for the Management of Agricultural and Forestry 
Affairs, while Zhang Yunping’s Tunken Recommendations similarly proposed that the Xikang 
administration establish agricultural experiment bureaus in each county. 24  In the following 
 
20 Lavelle (2015), pp. 340-341. 
21 Fitzgerald (2010), pp. 22-23 
22 Fitzgerald (2010), p. 23 
23 Ren Naiqiang noted simply that Zhao Erfeng’s attempt at migrant land reclamation came to naught 
(2009, p. 3), while the manuscript for the Gazetteer of Xikang remarks that “unfortunately, turmoil led to 
overgrowth, the cultivators were murdered, the cultivation service was halted, and the agricultural 
experiment station did not have time to produce results” (XTG, p. 346). 




decade Huang Fensheng invoked the goal of developing scientific and industrial agriculture on 
the frontier, pontificating that “primitive modes of agriculture no longer meet our national 
defense needs in the borderlands.”25 Huang’s statement in particular reflects the synthesis of 
industrialist and agrarian ideals in the larger discourse on the Chinese nation. When Xikang 
Province launched its Bureau of Agricultural Improvement, these aspirations provided it with a 
clear mandate: to grow where no Han had grown before. 
 
The Xikang Provincial Bureau of Agricultural Improvement 
The Xikang Province BAI was chartered in April of 1938 but was officially launched on January 
first, 1939, the inaugural day of the province. Under the direct authority of the Xikang Province 
Establishment Office, the BAI oversaw public forestry, husbandry and agriculture in the 
province’s three dependencies of Kham, Ning and Ya. Its programs in the relatively low-altitude 
Ning and Ya zones were ecologically diverse and included paddy (rice) farming and silk 
production, but its Kham farms were designated as sites for research on “high-cold” crops and 
livestock. The bureau’s two chief sites were located in Simaqiao, near Kangding, and Taining, to 
the northeast of Kangding bordering Daofu county. 
An immediate benefit of Xikang’s establishment as a province is that the provincial BAI, 
could tap into a national network of educated professionals, including agrarian specialists 
educated at China’s premier schools of agriculture. The typical “professional” employee (zhiyuan 
職員) was a male between the ages of 20 and 40 with some higher education, but staff came from 
diverse geographical and professional backgrounds. Duan Tianjue typifies these professionals; a 
native of Anhui Province, he graduated from National Southeast University in 1925 and made a 
career of education and scientific cotton farming in his home province, then traveled to the United 
States on the provincial dime for an agricultural survey tour. Shortly thereafter he moved to 
Xikang to become a member of the Provincial Establishment Council (Jian sheng hui建省會). Duan 
became vice-chairman of the BAI and then chairman in 1945, frequently intermediating between 
its various sites and Governor Liu. Many other professionals moved to Xikang from sites along 
the war-torn and heavily populated east coast, including Hubei, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and 
Shanghai.26 
 
25 Huang Fensheng (1946), p. 185. 




The BAI was also linked to a national network of plant matter. Experimental sites like that 
at Simaqiao sent letters soliciting seed packets to research sites and schools of agriculture around 
the country, as well as other BAI sites within Xikang, and catalogued their holdings on hundreds 
of index cards. The largest donor by far was the National Central University, conveniently based 
in Chongqing during the war. The Xikang BAI received seed stock for nationally-designated 
“good varieties” (youliang pinzhong 優良品種) of major crops and tested them at experimental 
stations in Kham to see whether they could thrive in a high-cold environment. In turn, Liu 
Wenhui authorized the extension of certain good varieties in the Kham administrative zone as 
designated by the BAI, some of which came from other regions, but some of which were 
apparently indigenous. Han culinary prejudices were institutionalized through the designation 
of good varieties. 
Whereas Zhao Erfeng had focused his agrarian efforts on the Batang valley, the 
administration of Liu Wenhui turned its attention south and east. In principle, each Xikang 
county was to have its own agricultural station, or nongchang 農場, subordinated to the county 
government. But only two farm sites within the Kham administrative region were directly 
administered by the province: Simaqiao and Taining (figure 17). These were the BAI’s primary 
interface with the growing conditions of Kham, and experimental results at these sites were 
distilled into directives to extend (tuiguang 推廣 ) premium varieties and growing methods 
throughout the counties of Kham. Below I draw on the unpublished archives of the bureau to 
construct a virtual tour through each of these sites. 
 
Simaqiao駟馬橋 
Situated in a mountain valley at 2,650 meters above sea level and 15 li (7.5 km) south of the 
provincial capital of Kangding (with a comparably moderate climate), the experimental site at 
Simaqiao was founded in 1940 by the provincial BAI and charged with overseeing research on 
high-cold crop varieties. Kangding was set at the confluence of two rivers and host to a large Han 
population, so it seemed like a natural site for the province’s first crop experimentation station. 






Figure 17. Map of Xikang territory under Liu Wenhui’s control showing the locations of the 
Simaqiao and Taining experimental stations. Based on SRTM (NASA) and modern administrative 
borders extracted from GADM database (www.gadm.org, v.2.5 July 2015). (Chaix and Frank 2019). 
 
Interestingly, the BAI leased most of this land from local landlords, including the French 
Catholic mission in Kangding and at least two prominent Tibetan guozhuang trading houses: the 
Wesekyap (Chinese: Wasidiao 瓦斯碉) trading house and the Zhabpetsang (Wangjia汪家) trading 
house.27 The largest tract of land belonged to the See, which provided 40 mu (6.6 acres) of waste.28 
The mission had in turn purchased this land from the Chakla King (Mingzheng tusi 明正土司), at 
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a price of 3,000 taels of silver, and hired laborers to open it for cultivation at a wage of eight yuan 
per mu亩, then rented it to tenants.29 The mission had also cultivated plots in Luding and Ba’an, 
and Kham scholar Ren Naiqiang felt that the French had succeeded where Zhao had failed. “Such 
a vast stretch of fertile earth Han people have not been able to cultivate in over two hundred years 
of management, he remarked, but the French Catholic church has cultivated it in our place—how 
disgraceful ought this to be?”30 
The BAI began planting land in Kangding under informal lease agreements, but the 
concerned county magistrate implored the bureau to sign formal contracts “to avoid conflict.” At 
10 a.m. on July 29th, 1940 the acting head of the BAI met with representatives of its three Simaqiao 
landlords at the office of the magistrate to negotiate lease terms and sign contracts. These each 
stipulated a 20-year lease term at a price the equivalent of 16 jin 斤 of highland barley per mu per 
year after the harvest at current prices, but they made an exception according to a local custom: 
newly opened wasteland (uncultivated earth) was rent-free for the first three years in 
compensation for the labor of clearing and tilling it.31 The BAI additionally negotiated a contract 
for use of the county’s state farm, with the condition that land from the Catholic church and other 
landlords be used first. Absorption of the state farm would disrupt its current work, and farm 
laborers were to be compensated for labor and materials over the past season; the BAI was also 
to offer current farmers position as farm laborers (nong gong 農工), or assist in their relocation.32 
Ten farmers received compensation for human labor, cattle labor, fertilizer and seeds, totaling 
2,453.60 yuan, and they appear to have been retained as laborers.33 Under the administration of 
the BAI, the repurposed Simaqiao state farm had the ambitious goal of transforming agriculture 
in Kham by working on modest parcels of (mostly) rented land.  
 
29 Ren Naiqiang (2009), pp. 3-4. 
30 Ren (2009), p. 4 
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Figure 18. 1940 floor plan of the Simaqiao Experimental Site main compound, traced directly 
from a floor plan in SA, Min 249-1-11. 
 
As with other sites run by the BAI, there was a division of labor between professional staff 
and laborers (gongyi 工役). Laborers were more likely to be local in origin, slept in cramped dorms, 
and were responsible for the back-breaking work of clearing waste, tilling fields, planting and 
harvesting, and so on. From approximately February through September of each year workers 
tended to their crops, while October through February were devoted to various other activities: 
threshing the harvest, clearing the fields, experimenting with winter planting, composting 
fertilizer, and the critical (if tedious) task of kaiken, or opening up waste to cultivation. Quotas 
were set for how much waste a single laborer was to reclaim per day: if they shouldered their 
own yoke, 500 square shichi 市尺 (167 square meters); with a single-ox plough, 2.5 mu (1,536 
square meters); with a double-ox plough, at least 3 mu (1,843 square meters).34  
 




Improvement work at Simaqiao focused on staple crops. Highland barley was the 
predominant crop in the environs of Kangding, but it was not particularly palatable to Han 
migrants and the Simaqiao station sought viable alternatives. It also sought options for increasing 
the number of growing seasons in the region from one to two by experimenting with different 
crops and methods. In some ways its mission was anticipated by the Catholic church, which had 
been introducing new bio-matter for years. Among the bureau’s earliest experiments in Simaqiao 
was a planting period experiment on a variety of rye that was introduced to local communities 
by the French priest, to determine its viability as a winter crop.  Other crops grown at Simaqiao 
initially included wheat, potatoes, barley, highland barley, oats, broad beans, French beans, peas, 
corn, and buckwheat. In 1940, potatoes provided the largest yield by far at 4,072 jin, followed by 
highland barley at 1,078 jin.35 
Shortly after its establishment, the Simaqiao Agricultural Experimental Site performed a 
survey of farming practices in the surrounding area and found that wheat, though 
morphologically similar to highland barley, was entirely absent from nearby farms. The 
surveyors learned that local farmers had little interest in wheat since it competed with barley for 
time and farm space but did not perform as well. Introducing wheat to the region became an early 
priority. The challenge was finding a suitably cold-resistant variety: the maiden crop of wheat 
planted in the spring of 1940 put forth ears but yielded a disappointingly low amount of grain, 
which researchers attributed to the region’s short growing season (planting occurred later than 
in lowland regions).36 
Potatoes were already a moderately popular crop in the region by 1939, and the site 
worked to further encourage its cultivation. This aligned with national policy, since potatoes were 
promoted throughout China as a solution to the Chinese famine of 1942-43. In a memo to BAI 
chief Duan Tianjue, the Simaqiao site chief Liang Daxin 梁達新 noted that “potatoes are a disaster 
relief crop and a wonderful vegetable, and the environment (fengtu 風土) of Kangding is very 
amenable to the production of this crop. Our site has observed this and thus decided to implement 
large-scale planting, and to encourage planting among farmers in the vicinity.” 37  Though 
promotion work was a large part of the Bureau’s mission, usually through lectures and 
demonstrations, Simaqiao was exceptionally aggressive in promoting potatoes. Not only did it 
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distribute 6,050 jin of seed to 14 nearby households, but it leased out 26 mu of land to four 
households with the stipulation that they pay yearly rent in potatoes. When loaning potato seed, 
the site forecasted 600% returns and levied 50% interest, such that a farmer receiving 1,000 jin of 
seed should expect a yield of 6,000 jin and return 1,500 jin to the bureau. At the same time, the 
site planted 70 mu of its own land with potatoes and anticipated a harvest of 84,000 jin in the fall 
of 1943.38  
Meanwhile, the BAI persisted with its wheat experiments. After his disastrous attempt to 
grow wheat in Bamei at 3500 meters above sea level, Zhang Jinquan moved south to Kangding 
and repeated his attempt at lower altitude. There was no guarantee that this would succeed, and 
indeed, technicians at Simaqiao had thus far failed to grow edible wheat in their plots outside the 
southern gate. Over a span of three growing seasons from 1944-46 Zhang experimented with 
altering two major variables in wheat production: the planting period and the varieties planted. 
In the first year Zhang solicited 25 wheat varieties from the Central Bureau for Agricultural 
Research (Zhongyang nongye shiyan suo 中央農業實驗所), and by the second year he had narrowed 
the list to 9 viable varieties, which he then tested the indigenous staple of highland barley. In the 
third year Zhang re-tested these, adding Simaqiao’s original wheat variety.39 
By 1946 he arrived at a breakthrough: Not only did wheat variety Zhongda (中大) III 23-
2419 (known today simply as ‘Nanjing Wheat’) put forth full ears, it also out-produced the control 
variety of highland barley. Two other wheats, #100 and #690 matched this top yield within the 
margin of error. Moreover, Zhang simultaneously tested the same ten varieties in Bamei (3500 
meters) and East Eluo (3100 meters) in 1946 and found that the same varieties out-performed local 
highland barley there as well. Another variety, #487, displayed the shortest growing period, 
making it a candidate for higher elevations. Planting period trials further demonstrated that the 
best results were achieved by planting as soon as the earth thawed in the spring, given the early 
onset of frost at harvest time. In his report, Zhang concluded that “these four varieties can be 
extended throughout Kham, and that generally wherever highland barley can grow, these wheats 
can grow.”40 Finally, the ambition of the BAI to replace indigenous barley with wheat seemed 
empirically feasible. 
 
38 SA, Min 249-1-78. 
39 Zhang Jinquan (1947). 




Though Simaqiao would continue to operate until the Communist takeover and beyond, 
its prominence as a research site seems to have peaked with the culmination of this experiment. 
In 1946 it reported an “enormous funding shortage,” and its scope encompassed little more than 
wheat and grazing grass improvement.41  In its role as an experiment station, Simaqiao was 
eclipsed by the more ambitious target of Bamei, situated in the Taining Experimental Zone. 
 
 
Figure 19. Man, possibly Zhang Jinquan, standing in front of an entrance to the 




About a half-day’s ride to the northwest between Kangding and Daofu counties was a stretch of 
hills and grasslands known as Taining, site of Xikang Province’s oldest experimental farms.42 
Taining was already a Qing military post by the early 18th century, but the rapid expansion of 
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Chinese mining operations and seizure of Khampa farms in 1904 led to discontent among 
indigenous locals and, ultimately, an anti-settler uprising the following year.43 This only resulted 
in consolidation of Qing power over the area, and it became an early target for state intervention 
in livestock and agriculture. In 1913 an agricultural society proposed Taining as the initial site for 
a large-scale colonization project in Kham, while Zhang Yunping’s 1931 Tunken Recommendations 
accurately predicted both Taining and the environs of Kangding as initial sites for a renewed 
attempt at migrant land reclamation.44 Zhang understood that the Chinese state must venture 
into yak husbandry if it wished to control Kham, and that Taining was well suited for such a 
venture.45 
The experimental station at Taining preceded the establishment of the provincial BAI, and 
indeed, the establishment of Xikang Province itself. In 1937 the Provincial Preparatory Committee 
established it as the the Taining Cultivation and Pastoralism Experimental Site (Taining kenmu 
shiyan chang 泰寧墾牧試驗場), then placed it under the BAI in 1942 and renamed the Taining 
Pastures (Taining muchang 泰寧牧場). By 1946 it oversaw a large swathe of land, including 23,000 
shimu 市亩 of pasture and 4,200 shimu of farmland.46 Though deceptively close to Simaqiao, the 
climate of Taining was considerably harsher. Recall from chapter 4 that in 1939 a provincial 
weather observer had stumbled into the meteorological bureau in Kangding after a disastrous 
attempt to reach Taining on horseback; his partner’s horse had collapsed and the pair had fallen 
ill after being “caught in the wind and rain.” Days later, another meteorologist traveled from 
Kangding to Taining for survey work and developed a hacking cough that would plague him 
until his evacuation from Kham the following year.47  
In contrast to Simaqiao, Taining seems like a counterintuitive site for heavy state 
investment. The Gazetteer of Xikang raves about the region’s potential, calling it “conducive to 
pastoralism and conducive to agriculture” (XTG, SA, 111). But other, more detailed sources paint 
a less sunny picture: as of 1943, 70% of Taining’s area was deemed to be “incapable of production” 
and 40% suffered from a “severely cold climate unsuitable for forestry or pastoralism.”48 The 
county experienced as little as 45 days of frost-free growing time annually. In 1943 frosts are 
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recorded as continuing until June fifth; on July twentieth temperatures reached twenty-three 
degrees Celsius during the day but once again dropped to zero degrees overnight. Workers 
awoke to find that frost had obliterated the entire potato crop, half of the peas, a large portion of 
the wheat and some of the highland barley. In a petition to the central Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry, administrators predicted that “if frost continues to descend, there will be nothing 
to harvest in the entire Taining belt this year.” Even so, provincial funding for the Taining site 
nearly kept pace with Simaqiao, ballooning from about 64,000 yuan in 1939 to about 660,000 in 
1946.49 Why? 
The establishment of the Taining site was predicated on an understanding that the 
economy of Kham was dominated by mobile pastoralism, and that the state would need to engage 
this livelihood if it hoped to remain viable. The focus here was on high-altitude livestock of the 
sort conventionally held by indigenous Khampas—chiefly yaks (and hybrid dzo), sheep, and to a 
lesser extent, horses. The BAI’s priorities with these first two animals were to improve wool 
quality and quantity, and to increase the stature and dairy production of yaks.50 In a 1945 work 
report, the Taining site’s activities were enumerated as follows: 1) choosing livestock varieties; 2) 
improving livestock technology; 3) improving and transporting livestock products; 4) grazing 
grass and fodder crops experiments; 5) promoting optimal livestock breeds; 6) managing 
livestock hygiene and preventing veterinary disease; 7) survey and statistics on livestock; 8) Other 
matters pertaining to livestock improvement.51 
Taining was a more ethnically mixed community than Simaqiao, although roles were 
allotted unevenly. Formally educated Han migrants occupied all administrative positions while 
Khampas as well as local Han were most likely to be laborers. When Zhang Zhiyuan 張志遠 of 
the Provincial Establishment Committee established the experimental zone in 1937, he settled 
over 90 indigenous households-in-flight, and some of these were employed as herders or laborers. 
By 1946, the site employed 16 professional staff, eight manual laborers, and an additional four 
farm and livestock hands.52 
The site’s spatial features mimicked indigenous practice to a high degree. Unlike 
Simaqiao, the Taining experimental area was arranged in three distinct branch sites each between 
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five and fifteen kilometers from the others and separated by alpine forest, allowing for seasonal 
migration of its bovine and ovine livestock. The site migrated its yaks between up to five different 
pastures or “zones” (qu區) much like a drokpa clan. The altitudes and types of these pastures 
resembled those of indigenous herders: in the winter months animals were housed at the site’s 
Niujiaoshi Livstock Pastures (Niujiaoshi Xumu Qu 牛角石畜牧區), in spring they moved out to the 
Bamei Plain (Bamei Pingyuan八美平原) and the stretch south of Mengzi Gulley (Mengzi Gou 蒙子
沟), and in the warmest month of July yak were taken up to the top of Xiang’e Mountain (Xiang’e 
gaoshan象鹅高山), with two intermediary pastures on the way up and down.53 
Meanwhile, the site’s scientific reports portrayed the yak in largely quantitative terms, 
with little regard for social context. Deborah Fitzgerald notes that agricultural economics were 
key to the expansion of American agriculture in the early twentieth century such that “it was 
numbers, not narrative, that became the dominant language of agricultural knowledge.”54 In 
China as in the U.S., farm economics enabled a small number of agricultural experts to make 
sense of farm conditions across a culturally and ecologically diverse nation. A cattle expert from 
southeast China could work with the yak so long as it was quantified.  
The notion of the “livestock unit” or LSU exemplifies this approach: farm economists 
devised the LSU as a way of converting diverse species into a single unit for grazing and feed 
purposes. At Taining, one horse or bovid (including yaks) equaled one LSU (jiachu danwei 家畜单
位), and so did five ovine animals (sheep or goats), meaning that five sheep were expected to 
consume as much grass and fodder as a single yak. In 1946 when the site held 57 bovids, seven 
horses and 238 sheep, administrators calculated that they currently held 112 livestock units. The 
livestock unit was useful for calculating fodder consumption on a grand scale: for example, in 
1946 Taining administrators determined that their current store of 41,500 kilograms of stalks, 
7,650 kilograms of beans, 4,000 kilograms of oats, 12,500 kilograms of wheat and 1,500 kilograms 
of hay would be sufficient to feed their 112 livestock units for three months.55 
To determine how much area a single livestock unit required for grazing, Taining 
scientists drew on global livestock research, but at the same time, they recognized that both the 
yak and the grasslands environment of Kham were distinctive. In one experiment they took the 
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creative measure of tying a yak to a pole with a rope of known length and waiting to see how 
long it would take to exhaust the grass within its reach. This experiment, titled “Research into the 
Grazing Potential of the Grasslands,” followed a single yak for a year and recorded its grazing 
volumes in detail. In the first four months of 1946 when grass had withered, the experiment’s yak 
had to be moved six times daily and exhausted about 96 square zhang 丈 (about 1,230 square 
meters) of grasslands per day, so that it required a total of 192 shimu 市亩 (31.6 acres) for the 
season. In the spring (May-June) and autumn (November-December), observers found that the 
grass regenerated within eight days, reducing the area per season to a mere 8.66 shimu (1.43 acres). 
In the summer (July through October), grass regenerated within three days, further reducing its 
minimal grazing area to a little more than half an acre. In the course of a single year, the test yak 
had demanded about 204.66 shimu (33.7 acres) of the Bamei grasslands—in fact notably less than 
the averages from Nebraska and Nevada, where cattle were found to need about 259. 56 
Experiments like this allowed Taining scientists to quantitatively evaluate the potential of 
“natural grazing” (tianran fangmu 天然放牧), the standard scientific term for nomad-style grazing. 
A major motive for studying natural grazing was to test it against alternatives: could the 
inferiority of drokpa production methods be quantitatively proven? Another experiment at the 
Taining site sought to answer this question. From July through September 1939, Zhang Zhiyuan 
led a study in which herders fed their yaks varying amounts of grain fodder and measured their 
milk production and weight on a daily basis. The yaks were divided into four groups based on 
feeding methods: “heavy fodder,” “standard fodder,” “subsistence-level fodder,” and a control 
group that underwent “natural grazing.” The results demonstrated that cattle given grain fodder 
unequivocally produced more dairy and fat than those subjected to natural grazing. Cattle given 
standard levels of grain produced over 55% more milk and 57% more fat per day than those 
naturally grazed; even cattle given subsistence levels of grain produced 18% more milk and 20% 
more fat per day than naturally grazed cattle.57 
However, investigators recognized that their most impressive findings might not translate 
well to a regional scale and signaled this insecurity in their reports. The internal report for the 
1943 grazing experiment notes that “because of limitations on man-power, we used only one yak 
and carried out the experiment only in the grassy valleys of Bamei. If we were able to use more 
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cattle, horses or sheep and test the livestock of each given area separately in each given area, this 
would form a basis for grasslands management and would truly be a work of prime value and 
importance.”58 Similarly, the published report for the 1940 fodder experiment concedes that while 
grain-fed cattle were clearly superior, it remained uneconomical to feed cattle with local grain at 
current prices, which the report terms the “greatest shortcoming” (zui da quedian 最大缺點) of the 
project. Undeterred, author Zhang Zhiyuan noted that grain could be imported from the nearby 
counties of Danba and Xichang as well as the nearby provinces of Sichuan and Shaanxi, and 
estimated that just enough dairy can be produced to turn a profit at current Sichuan market 
rates.59 
From that point on, Taining fixed its sights on growing food for yaks and sheep, including 
fodder crops but also superior grazing grasses that scientists hoped would replace indigenous 
ones. Fodder crops included (in order of prevalence) highland barley, wheat, oats, hay and peas, 
supplying livestock with a diet heavy in carbohydrates and protein. 60  As at Simaqiao, crop 
scientists at Taining conducted experiments to determine the most productive varieties and the 
optimal planting periods and methods. International grazing grasses also vied against one 
another in experiments. The American west served as a model for bovine and ovine production, 
and in 1946 Taining received an infusion of 56 American grasses to be tested against indigenous 
varieties and found 11 of these to be viable; as of 1947 the site cultivated 12 grazing grasses from 
China and 16 imported from other countries, primarily the United States.61 
After establishing the value of fodder, two more major victories over indigenous 
methods—this time farming methods—seemed evident when scientists attempted to employ 
deep ploughing and to subvert the local practice of leaving fields to fallow every other year. The 
only reason a fallow year was necessary, they suspected, was that local farmers did not fertilize 
properly. Manure production was a major enterprise for the BAI, and in fact much of it was made 
of plants that were grown and composted specifically to produce what is known as “green 
fertilizer.” “After applying fertilizer and planting equally each year,” wrote site chief Liang 
Daxin, “the result is that crop viability is the same as planting every other year, effectively 
smashing the superstition among Khampas that crop viability will be poor if you plant every 
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year.”62 Scientists also experimented with using deeper ploughs than were used by locals, and 
found that a single shidou 市斗 of wheat seed now yielded six shidou of grain instead of the usual 
three—a 100% increase! Imagining the combined results of deep ploughing and fertilizing rather 
than fallowing, Liang wrote that “if we are able to extend these experimental results throughout 
the Kham region, Kham’s grain could increase four-fold.”63 
 By the late 1940s Taining expanded into human food. The site held vastly more land than 
it needed for experiments, and much of this—tens of thousands of mu—was put to use through 
the 1944 establishment of a Taining Tunken Zone, through which the state solicited cultivators to 
convert waste into farmland. In 1947, the experimental zone at Taining Pastures officially 
branched into growing and experimenting with its own food crops, chiefly wheat and highland 
barley. But it also began working with greenhouse vegetables, among them carrots, cabbages, 
peas, garlic, onions and American cucumbers. Liang explained that “the lands beyond the pass 
are lacking in vegetables and [Taining] has no vegetables to speak of; nutritional vitamins and 
nutrients cannot be obtained.”64 
The processing of yak products was one more avenue for “improvement.” Yak butter was 
in high demand among Tibetans, and highly priced. The North-China Herald and Supreme Court & 
Consular Gazette commented in 1939 that “rancid yak butter is and will continue to be the pièce de 
résistance in the nomad’s menu. He drinks it, eats it, rubs it on his body, offers it to his god and 
burns it in his temple.”65 Unlike yak meat however, consumption of traditional yak butter had 
difficulty crossing into the Chinese market as it was too pungent for most Han Chinese (as well 
as foreigners). Taining administrators noted in their 1945 work report that “the yak butter that 
Khampas produce is very much lacking in clarity and is not conducive to packaging.”66 By the 
mid-1940s, Taining had imported both English and Danish butter churns and food scientists were 
working to produce something more palatable to consumers outside Tibet. The result, of which 
the Bureau was quite proud, was a more refined butter that they named “stupa butter” (baita you 
白塔油). In the 1940s Taining packaged up to 400 pounds (181 kg) of white stupa butter per year, 
along with 180 shijin (90 kg) of dried meat.67 
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Taining Pastures was broadly touted as a success in its time. In the press, its real estate on 
the printed page was disproportionate to its physical area. One headline read “Migration for 
Planting the Borderlands Sets Great Example, Xikang Experimental Planting Succeeds, Taining 
Experimental Zone Plants over 300 Mu,” and intoned that “one cannot but beam with 
happiness.”68 In 1947 the region surrounding Taining Pastures was established as its own county, 
Qianning County, and the following year the site was renamed the Qianning Provincial 
Agricultural and Pastoral Site (Shengli Qianning Nongmuchang 省立乾寧農牧場). In 1950 the 
Communists would rename it the Bamei Agricultural Experimentation Site (Bamei Nongye Shiyan 
Chang 八美農業試驗場), and this would eventually develop into the Agricultural and Pastoral 
Scientific Research Institute (Nongmuye Kexue Yanjiusuo 農牧業科學研究所) in 1963.69 Bamei is 
to this day a thriving (and largely Han) township, owing largely to the experimental programs 
that began in 1937. While Simaqiao was a fairly conventional growing site, Taining showcased 
the adaptability of scientific agrarianism to unconventional and environmentally challenging 
settings. 
 
Beyond the Experiment Stations 
Administrators envisioned the BAI’s experiment stations as incubators for a comprehensive 
program of tunken-style development in Kham. In 1942 the provincial government, in 
consultation with the central Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, set a land reclamation target 
of 45,000 shimu in Kham spanning ten counties.70 Development was to begin on the outskirts of 
the Simaqiao and Taining stations, which were declared “model cultivation districts” (kenzhi 
shifan qu 墾殖示範區), and radiate gradually outward. The experiment stations would perform 
the dual role of modeling scientific land reclamation for neighboring areas and providing seed 
for “good varieties” to incoming migrants in their respective regions. The Simaqiao site was to 
oversee extension work, including seed distribution, in southeast Kham, while the Taining site 
would oversee extension west of the Zheduo mountains.71 
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Reclamation efforts were further consolidated in 1944 when the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Forestry established a “Taining Tunken Experimental Zone” (Taining Tunken Shiyan Qu 泰寧
屯墾實驗區) that subsumed all wasteland in the five counties of Kangding, Taining, Daofu, 
Luding, and Ganzi.72 The Ministry appointed a management staff of several dozen personnel, 
including administrators, technicians, a physician, and a full complement of policemen. Some of 
the administration held concurrent positions in the provincial BAI, including Duan Tianjue, who 
was appointed head of the experimental zone, and Zhang Jinquan, who was appointed to the role 
of technician.73 In 1944 the Experimental Zone recruited 11 migrant households that opened some 
1,269 shimu to new cultivation. Meanwhile, recruiters journeyed to northern Sichuan as well as 
Xikang’s own Hanyuan county in an effort to recruit a further 500 cultivators (kenmin) who might 
eventually colonize 200,000 mu of wasteland in the cultivation zone.74 
These local schemes meshed neatly with the national tunken ideal of ethnic assimilation 
through agricultural migration. In the scenario that Duan Tianjue and Xikang superindendent of 
grain production Liu Yiyan jointly proposed to the central government in 1942, tens of thousands 
of Han migrants would transform the landscape over several years by planting empirically tested 
“good varieties” of wheat, potatoes, highland barley, rye, and peas. The 1943 work plan for 
Taining alone would require 30,000 migrants to clear and till wasteland, and another 7,000 to 
cultivate it. Duan and Liu specified Han laborers, claiming that Khampas were indisposed to 
arduous reclamation work by nature. Provincial estimates set the cost of land reclamation in the 
Kham dependency at twice that of simultaneous reclamation in the Ning and Ya dependencies 
per shimu, due mainly to the cost of labor.75  
In retrospect the most ambitious goals of these extension schemes were unrealistic 
because they were prohibitively expensive. Theoretically, the province was to pay for tools, 
fertilizer, and migrant resettlement with loans from the Farmers’ Bank of China (Zhongguo 
nongmin yinhang 中國農民銀行), and repay these loans with sales proceeds after the harvest. But 
runaway inflation during the war made long-term financial planning all but impossible. In fact, 
the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry was unable to adequately fund even the management 
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office of the Taining Tunken Experimental Zone, which complained in 1944 that its stipends 
covered less than half of personnel expenses after inflation, such that staff were “all beset by 
hardship.”76  By the time of the Communist takeover in 1949 laborers had reclaimed at least 
several thousand shimu within Kham’s two model districts.77 
 
Conclusion: The BAI in Critical Perspective 
Unlike Zhao Erfeng’s agrarian exploits during the late Qing, those of the Xikang Provincial 
Bureau of Agricultural Improvement have been regarded kindly by Chinese historians. The 
historiography of the PRC, while devoting little attention to Xikang Province, appraises the BAI 
as having made impressive contributions to both Kham’s regional economy and the national war 
effort in spite of adverse conditions. Wang Chuan 王川 writes that the work of the BAI “may be 
considered the beginning of agricultural and husbandry modernization for the areas inhabited 
by Sichuan’s Tibetan, Yi and other ethnic groups,” while Liu Jun 刘君 notes that Xikang became 
a major domestic supplier of wool products to the war-torn interior, such that “the people of the 
borderlands made their own appropriate contribution to the War of Resistance.” 78  It is not 
difficult to imagine that the provincial government might have come closer to realizing its 
ambitious land reclamation goals had it not been impeded by the bleak wartime economy. 
But in evaluating the success of Xikang’s ‘improvement’ efforts, we ought to ask: for whom 
was agriculture improved? The history of U.S. agricultural interventions in the developing world 
during the mid-twentieth century, commonly known as the Green Revolution, offers an 
instructive analogy. The Green Revolution has been widely praised for roughly doubling 
agricultural production in much of the developing world, but it has also come under criticism. 
Some scholars argue that United States initiated environmentally unsustainable patterns of 
growth by disregarding local ecologies and indigenous practice. Others observe that national 
security, not altruism, was the driving factor behind these interventions, and that they fostered 
economic dependence upon the United States.79 
 
76 JSG, 20-26-039-15. 
77 There is undoubtedly more information on the outcome of Kham land reclamation efforts in the PRC-
era archives of Xikang and Sichuan provinces at the Sichuan Provincial Archives, but I was not granted 
access to PRC-era documents during my research. 
78 Wang Chuan (2009), p. 234; Liu Jun (1988), p. 326. 
79 For a critique of the environmental impact of the Green Revolution, see Shiva (2016); for a critique of 




These same criticisms are applicable to the study of Chinese agricultural interventions in 
Kham. We should not ignore that where the BAI achieved results that it considered successful, it 
did so according to criteria that it imputed on indigenous agriculture. This is most evident in two 
scientific endeavors of the BAI that I chronicled in this essay: the effort to identify wheat varieties 
that could replace highland barley, and the effort to develop a sedentary mode of yak production 
that out-performed nomadic yak production. In both cases, technicians ultimately seemed to 
arrive at “improved” methods that produced higher yields than indigenous methods. In pursuing 
those results, however, they were driven by ethnocentric concerns that were extraneous to 
production targets: namely, a cultural preference for wheat over barley, and a cultural preference 
for sedentism over nomadism. The latter preference is particularly problematic. Today Chinese 
and international scientists increasingly recognize that nomadic pastoralism has salubrious 
effects on the grassland ecology of the Kham region, which faces serious degradation from other 
human causes.80 
The experiment stations fostered sustainable Han micro-orders that in turn engaged in 
broader social interventions, including compulsory education. One of the most widely 
broadcasted victories of the Taining experimental station was its re-opening of a primary school 
in the vicinity that had been shuttered because of funding shortages and political turmoil. When 
Zhang Zhiyuan carried out his initial census in the villages of the Taining district, he informed 
families with school-aged children that they should register for the new term by May 15, 1937, 
and made every effort to allay their fears that “after learning to read Han books, [the children] 
will be led away by Han people.”81 Of the 116 school-aged children on the census, some 72 
reported for the first assembly, where Chairman Zhang delivered a lecture on the benefits of 
education and gave each student one ping-pong ball. He and principal Fan Wenjing also enticed 
them with free food: the school would provide free meals for children from poor families so long 
as they performed well on monthly exams, a policy subsidized by the district’s experimental 
farming program.82 
When sociologist Ke Xiangfeng toured the Taining elementary primary school two years 
later, he found that teachers were poorly compensated and that parents were reluctant to send 
their children to school when those children could otherwise be in the monastery or at home 
 
80 For example, see Feng Hao (2017), Lei Dongjun (2013). 
81 “Daofu: Taining shiyan qu kaiban xiaoxue.” 




lending a hand. The students, who were overwhelmingly Khampa, took some interest in practical 
training but saw little use for math, Chinese, and civics courses, which “for the most part bear 
little relation to their lives” in a subsistence economy. Ke’s final impression was that “if they wish 
to assimilate Khampas (Kangren) this way, it shall truly be very hard going!”83  The Taining 
Primary School was viable for a period because it was attached to a state farm that produced 
enough surplus grain to subsidize non-agrarian activities. Implementing Chinese education on a 
larger scale in Kham would require the province to draw on agricultural resources from beyond 
the Tibetan plateau. 
 




6. “Enlightening the Natives”: Schools and Grain in Wartime Kangding 
 
I am Chinese, you are Chinese, he is Chinese, everyone is 
Chinese.  
—Lesson in a Xikang Province textbook for Yi children1 
 
In 2002, a professor at Nanjing University unearthed 400 feet of 16mm film containing silent 
footage that the late cinematographer Sun Mingjing 孫明經 captured during his two visits to 
Xikang Province in 1939 and 1944. The found footage was soon repackaged in book (2003) and 
television (2005) formats for a twenty-first century audience and offered graphic evidence that 
Chinese state investment in the Kham region began well before the Communist “liberation” of 
the region.2 PRC citizens were especially struck by Sun’s contrasting shots of uniformed youths 
posing in front of magnificent school buildings on the one hand, and county magistrates posing 
by decrepit government offices on the other (figure 20). Was the filmmaker making a point about 
Liu Wenhui’s priorities? The images fueled an internet rumor that Liu Wenhui had once declared, 
“if the county government building is better than the school, I will execute the county magistrate 
on the spot” (jiudi zhengfa 就地正法).3 But not everyone was convinced about Liu: a 2012 online 
essay titled “Smashing a Great Big Myth about Republican-era Education” charged that the 
execution anecdote was most likely a fabrication and that Sun’s images had been curated in a 
misleading way, and that “while Liu Wenhui was governor of Xikang, he did not place great 
emphasis on education.”4 
 
1 The Yi writer Luohong Lahe later recounted in his autobiography that this was a portion of the first 
lesson in a textbook for the Liangshan region. See Lawson (2017), p. 165. 
2 The book 1939: Enter Xikang (1939年: Zoujin Xikang 走进西康) features black-and-white stills from Sun’s 
reel and explained that “in the decades that Liu Wenhui governed Xikang, he put some force into local 
development” (Sun and Zhang 2003, p. 64). 
3 For example, in an article for Tencent News (Tengxun xinwen 腾讯新闻), writer Li Mingyu claims that 
“Liu Wenhui was an enlightened gentleman (kaiming de shenshi 开明的绅士). […] He placed 
extraordinarily great emphasis on education, once saying: ‘If the county government building is better 
than the school, I will execute the county magistrate on the spot.’” See Li Mingyu (2012). It is likely not a 
coincidence that this online praise of Liu Wenhui’s approach to borderland education emerged after the 
Wenchuan earthquake of 2008, when shoddily-constructed schools collapsed and killed hundreds of 
schoolchildren in the Aba Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture, drawing widespread criticism of local 
Communist officials. 





Figure 20. 1939 photographs by Sun Mingjing. Left: The magistrate of Ba’an county at his office (Sun and Ming 2003, p. 221). 
Right: The Baiyu county primary school (Sun and Ming 2003, p. 212). 
 
These reactions highlight a common inclination in the PRC (and beyond) to place credit 
(or blame) for developing Xikang on the person of Liu Wenhui. But as the preceding chapters 
have shown, Liu and his government navigated a maelstrom of forces beyond their control. To 
understand why institutions developed when and where they did is to situate them within an 
ecosystem.  This final chapter shows that the ideological mission of “frontier education” (bianjiang 
jiaoyu 邊疆教育) was contingent on the production, distribution, and consumption of grain and 
other plant-derived goods. 
Public education represents both an expression of state power and a critical source thereof. 
Even in the best of circumstances, public schools induct children into compulsory participation 
in the nation-state. This was painfully clear against the jingoism of World War 2. Nazi-era German 
exile Hannah Arendt described the public school as an institution interposed between the family 
and the state to facilitate a transition from private to public spheres of activity, while the 
American historian Bessie Louise Pierce commented cynically in 1934 that “the purpose of schools 
continues to be the making of citizens, the making of good citizens.”5  The power dynamics 
 
5 Arendt (2006), p. 185; Pierce (1934), p. 119. As Peter Lilja notes, Hannah Arendt’s definition of the state 
is somewhat ambiguous, and she sometimes seems to refer to “the state” and “the world” 




inherent to public education are still more apparent in settler colonial contexts, where schools 
have historically aimed to erase indigenous identities through resocialization, a pattern Julie 
Kaomea has described (in the Hawai’ian context) as “education for elimination.”6  We find the 
same nationalist and colonial dynamics at play in Xikang. A 1946 article in Kham Guide Monthly 
reported that  
Chairman Liu [Wenhui] already clearly recognizes that education is the 
foundation for the building of our country. If we look at the civilized countries of 
the world, like England, America, Germany, and Italy, they are the countries with 
the most developed education in the world, and also the strongest countries in the 
world.7 
 
In the Xikang government’s effort to meld Han, Khampa, and Yi into a single Han-centered minzu, 
schools were integral to teaching indigenous and settler youths that—as a reader text in the 
Liangshan region put it—“I am Chinese, you are Chinese, he is Chinese, everyone is Chinese.”8 
To public schools fell the task of assimilation through education. 
Decades of Qing and warlord intervention in Kham had already left sundry public schools 
and private academies strewn across the landscape from Luding to Batang and beyond. Weaving 
these into a coherent system was beyond the means of the new provincial government in 1939. 
Here agricultural improvement provided a useful template: the provincial Department of 
Education (Jiaoyu Ting 教育廳, henceforth DOE), like the Bureau of Agricultural Improvement, 
approached its daunting mission by experimenting with new approaches to education on a 
manageable scale and then “extending” best practices over a broader area. But farms and schools 
were less comparable in material terms: while state farms produced, schools consumed. Boarding 
schools in particular took young boys (and sometimes girls) of about 7-15 years out of the labor 
pool or the monastery, threatening to impoverish their households, and possibly, the regional 
economy. 
Feeding students was especially troublesome. The provincial and county governments 
experimented with several approaches to the “food grain problem” at schools: they might attach 
a school to an existing state farm, as we saw in the last chapter, or conversely, attach a small farm 
 
6 Kaomea (2014), p. 127.  On schools and settler colonialism in general, see also Wolfe (2006), p. 388. On 
boarding schools as tools of settler colonialism in North America, see Woolford (2015); Jacobs (2009), pp. 
30-31. 
7 Hu Yanxian (1942), pp. 46-47. 




to a school. The provincial government also provided teachers and many students with cash 
stipends so that they could buy food, clothing, and fuel on the local market. But as grain prices 
soared during the 1940s, the province turned to a fourth strategy of directly redistributing rice 
from farms in the Ning-Ya piedmont to schools in Kangding. This last plan ended in spectacular 
failure as soldiers competed with civilians for grain, leaving Kham’s flagship schools virtually 
defunct at the arrival of the Communists. Even so, the Liu Wenhui administration succeeded in 
establishing the outline a highland school network with trans-regional connections whose legacy 
persists to this day. 
Kangding county was the nerve center of public education in Chinese Kham, and it once 
again serves as my primary vantage point in this chapter. Students, teachers, resources, and ideas 
flowed between Kangding and its peripheries. At the East Eluo Experimental Primary School 
(Dong Eluo Shiyan Xiaoxue 東俄洛實驗小學 ), the DOE experimented with boarding school 
education for local Khampas before extending proven methods to other counties. At the 
Kangding Provincial Secondary School (Kangding Shengli Zhongxue 康定省立中學), exemplary 
Khampa children from other counties received government scholarships to live and study in a 
majority Han environment. The Kangding Provincial Normal School (Kangding Shengli Shifan 
Xuexiao 康定省立師範學校) trained teachers to send to primary schools throughout the Kham 
region. Drawing on detailed records from these high-profile schools and more fragmented 
records from others, I show that the project of assimilation through education was materially 
“rooted” in ecology through its food needs. Local grain shortages incentivized new linkages 
between the Kham region and the piedmont, as well as further integration of eastern Kham into 
China’s national economy. This study of school-building foregrounds the relationship between 
food and assimilation, but it secondarily offers perspective on the territorial reconfigurations that 
made “Kham” an obsolete political category for PRC administrators. 
 
A History of Violence 
Chinese educators in Kham during the Republican era generally saw themselves as successors to 
an older tradition that began in the late Qing dynasty, and that history is worth briefly recounting 
here. As Republican educators were well aware, school-building during the late Qing period 





It so happened that the Qing imperial court abolished one of China’s oldest institutions, 
the Civil Service Examination (keju 科举), in 1905, the very year that Zhao Erfeng began his 
conquest of Kham on behalf of the Sichuan governor-general Xiliang. This was no great 
coincidence, since the overhaul of Chinese education was an outcome of the same “New Policies” 
(Xinzheng 新政 ) from the court of the Guangxu Emperor that established Zhao’s modern 
Sichuanese army. But it meant that his subsequent “regularization” of Kham into a Chinese proto-
province would target local Han and non-Han children alike for education reform. A lamasery 
education hardly met muster, but neither did the private Confucian academies (sishu 私塾) of the 
Han settlers, geared as they were toward the defunct civil service exams. 
The building of new schools followed the razing of monasteries and tusi castles. After his 
first, victorious campaign in the central-Kham polities of Batang, Litang, and Dabpa, Zhao (now 
Sichuan-Yunnan Frontier Commissioner) founded the Guanwai Education Bureau (Guanwai 
xuewu ju 關外學務局) in 1907 in the Sichuanese capital of Chengdu with a small staff of about a 
dozen people, including an accountant, a writer, a translator, and a publisher.9 In a memorial to 
the emperor about the Guanwai Education Bureau, he articulated that: 
West of Dartsedo we have only colonial subjects (waifan 外藩) who render tribute. 
From the beginning we have not exploited the land, and thus the situation with 
the indigenes (yi qing夷情) grows more capricious by the day. [They] even slayed 
my minister [Fengquan] and resisted my own advance. Cowed by your august 
celestial grace, they shall be pacified once again. [We] take this opportunity to 
welcome them toward goodness and accept them into the domain of civilization 
(wenming zhi yu 文明之域). This is truly a grand occasion.10 
 
Zhao’s head of primary education, Wu Jiamo 吳嘉謨, arrived in Zhao’s stronghold of 
Batang on October 18 and dispatched a survey team along each of the routes. His first step toward 
school reform was to combine two extant academies and one Chinese language school into a 
Batang Primary school with sixty students and two classes. 11 This and the Litang Primary school 
were the first two public schools in Kham. When they opened in 1908, study and recitation of the 
Confucian classics were combined with more modern courses in self-cultivation (xiushen 修身), 
reading, writing, mathematics, history, science (gezhi 格致) geography, and physical education. 
The Batang school also offered electives in chorus and library reading during the second year of 
 
9 Zhang Jingxi (1939), pp. 1-4; see also XTG p. 558. 
10 Quoted in XTG p. 558. 




study.12 During its initial three years, the school district under the Guanwai Education Bureau 
was limited to the handful of polities regularized during Zhao’s first campaign, centered on the 
Batang-Litang region.13 It was hemmed in on all sides by alien forces: the Tibetan army across the 
Dri river to the west; the governor of Nyarong to the north, and the Chakla King to the south and 
east. 
Zhao began his second major military campaign in 1909, deposing strongmen throughout 
northern Kham with assistance from an awe-struck Chakla King, who also submitted his own 
domain in eastern Kham to Qing direct rule. By the following year, the school district had 
expanded from four to eight zones that were coterminous with Zhao’s conquests, each supervised 
by one of Zhao’s grain officers (liang yuan 糧員); at least on paper the education district now 
stretched west across the Dri River as far as Chamdo, north to the wide grasslands of Sershül, 
south into the valleys of Derong, and east to the great pass at Dartsedo. Batang, site of Kham’s 
first primary school as well as Zhao’s own yamen, retained pride of place as the “Central Zone.” 
By the autumn of 1910, there were over 160 primary schools in Kham enrolling over three 
thousand students, Han and otherwise.14 These schools, founded on imperial patrimony, did 
their best to legitimate the condition of their existence. Lesson 13 of one Mandarin-language 
textbook read: “The great emperor is the sovereign lord (zhuzi 主子) of our China. That which we 
eat and we wear, and the houses in which we dwell, the land where we cultivate grain, all belong 
to the great emperor. The grace of the great emperor is vaster than the sky!”15 
Finding teachers versed in Chinese and Tibetan and willing to endure life beyond the pass 
was an ordeal, but the education bureau extemporized by enlisting merchants and publishers as 
temporary instructors while training a first batch of professional teachers at the new Tibetan 
Language Academy in Chengdu. (Xiliang had grudgingly accepted that monolingual education 
in Mandarin was ineffectual in Kham.)16 In 1911, acting Frontier Commissioner Fu Songmu eyed 
a major expansion of the Kham education system with a new teacher’s college in Dartsedo that 
would recruit Chinese students from the Tibetan language school in Chengdu as well as 
 
12 Zhang Jingxi (1939), pp. 83-84. 
13 Namely, these were Batang, Litang, Nyakchu (Chinese: Hekou), Dappa (Daoba), Chatreng 
(Xiangcheng) , Derong, and Tsakhalho (Yanjing). 
14 Zhang Jingxi (1939), pp. 37-38. 
15 Zhang Jingxi (1939), pp. 75. 




exceptional Khampa students with strong Mandarin abilities. 17  At the urging of the nascent 
imperial Ministry of Education, he planned and budgeted. That year Fu also submitted his 
memorial requesting that the emperor convert Kham into a province. 
Then, before the first class had even graduated from the teacher’s college in Dartsedo, the 
Revolution of 1911 unraveled plans for Xikang Province and its emergent education system. Zhao 
Erfeng’s schools, much like his farms, fell into disrepair as commissioners and warlords fought 
over the region. Classes in Chinese-style schools were convened on an ad-hoc basis in most 
counties, if at all. Over the subsequent two decades, the center of Chinese power in Kham slid 
east from Batang to Dartsedo as upland households disappeared from the tax register and hungry 
Sichuanese soldiers gravitated toward the piedmont (chapter 3). By the time Liu Wenhui’s 
Twenty-Fourth Army made its retreat to the foothills in 1934, Dartsedo—now Kangding in 
Chinese—was the longtime seat of warlord regimes in Kham. 
The Japanese invasion of eastern China in 1937 catalyzed both Chinese migration to 
Xikang and Guomindang investment in Xikang, but most of these yuan and migrants went to the 
fertile Liangshan region of the Ning dependency in the far south of the province. Not one but two 
agriculture bureaus operated in the Liangshan region as of 1939, cultivating rice, silk, and other 
precious commodities that were impossible to produce in the Kham dependency. 18 All of this 
production subsidized rapid institutional growth. Historian Joseph Lawson writes that the 
Liangshan metropolis of Xichang “flourished during the war” and that, according to one 
contemporary observer, it was “a city of civil servants.”19 Things were different in the Kham 
region, where the state farms were barely solvent, there was little investment from the Center, 
and Han migrants remained distinctly in the minority.20  
These regional disparities were reflected in the education sector. By the end of 1939 the 
Ning dependency featured 660 primary schools that catered to over 36,000 students. 21  One 
primary school in Ning’s Huili county made the national press when forty of its schoolboys put 
 
17 XTG, p. 572. 
18 These bureaus, which I briefly discussed in the previous chapter, were the Xikang Province Bureau of 
Agricultural Improvement and a separate Ning Dependency Tunken Council (Ningshu tunken weiyuanhui 
寧屬屯墾委員會). 
19 Lawson (2017), pp. 163-164. Lawson quotes Yao Guangyu (1943), p. 8. 
20 Precise figures differ from survey to survey, but while Han people constituted the majority in Luding 
county and in the Kangding urban district, they were a minority elsewhere in Kham and in the region 
overall. 




in a day of hard labor laying brick for a new provincial road, then mailed their meagre earnings 
to the National Salvation Fund in hopes that soldiers on the front line would “add another round 
of bullets and kill one more invading soldier for us.”22 Could there have been a more picturesque 
answer to the Guomindang’s call for “resistance and construction” (kang jian 抗建)? But no such 
stories emerged from the Kham region, where school-building proceeded at a slower pace. By the 
end of 1939, Kham featured just 122 primary schools housing fewer than 7,000 students. 
 
Frontier Education under Liu Wenhui 
Liu Wenhui officially launched the Xikang Province Department of Education in Kangding on 
January first, 1939, with Sichuanese educator Han Mengjun 韓孟鈞 as its inaugural head.23 Some 
early vignettes of Kangding education during this era appear in the travel writings of the 
sociologist Ke Xiangfeng, for whom education was a focal interest. Ke found that Luding, just 
east of Kangding, was a majority-Han farming society that grew seven thousand dan of rice a year. 
But people lived mostly on a diet of corn, there were no secondary schools, and “the level of 
culture is fairly low.” Nevertheless, there were over a thousand students in the primary schools, 
“the local natives (bendi turen 本地土人) are mostly assimilated, public order (zhian 治安) is kept 
marvelously, and the baojia 保甲 [a conventional Chinese system of social organization] is also 
quite successful.”24  
Continuing west, Ke paid a visit to a Gelukpa monastery in neighboring Kangding, and 
the transition was jarring. Ke described “lips chanting the sutras without rest, the tone grave and 
monotonous, its sound like the feeling of death, lulling me to sleep.” When chants were over, the 
young boys in the monastery roamed idly on the street or played games in the courtyard. “With 
this as a basis for education,” wondered Ke, “how can they hope to become perfect citizens in the 
future!” Ke next stopped into the Kangding Provincial Primary School (Shengli Kangding xiaoxue 
省立康定小學) just in time to see principal Yang Zhonghua 楊仲華 preside over the opening 
ceremony, dressed in a sharp black suit. Once he was off duty, Yang took Ke to his office and 
offered his perspective on the status of local education: 
 
22 Zhi Sheng (1939), p. 8. The author raved that “in [Xikang] province’s Huili county, there is a school 
called the Number Four Junior Elementary School where all of the elementary school students are 
children who love their country (aiguo 愛國) very much.” 
23 XTG, pp. 557. 




The level of culture in Xikang is very low. Although there are currently five 
provincial primary schools, the model is preliminary, and there are quite a few 
shortcomings. The secondary schools have not been able to connect with the 
primary schools; plus, most of the students are not natives, so it is very 
unsuccessful. Guanwai [people] still see going to school as corvée service [ie, a tax 
in labor], and they pay people to substitute for them. Today A comes, and the next 
day A is gone and B comes, and they mostly just go through the motions. Besides, 
there is no connection between studies and life. Thus, borderland education must 
be started over again. If the scale is reduced and investments are increased, the 
food and housing problem and the study problem can be solved at the same time; 
moreover, we can simultaneously eliminate the suspicion and avarice of the 
lamaseries, and the results will be even more impressive.25 
 
The fact that Khampas “see going to school as corvée service” was a persistent bugbear of the 
Chinese state. That attitude was rooted in a disconnect between settler and indigenous values, 
and also in the fact that the typical Khampa primary school student was not a young child, but 
rather, an adolescent whose school attendance deprived his parents of important household 
labor. Headmen and other wealthy families hired children from less prosperous families to 
substitute for their own children at schools, either by paying them in cash or by negotiating their 
corvée and tax duties. This tactic developed into a well-organized system by the 1940s. Khampa 
families within a given bao (a Chinese unit of households) pooled resources to hire a token 
number of children to send to Chinese public schools. Notes the Simple History of Ganzi, this quiet 
form of resistance to compulsory Chinese education “had become an open secret.”26 
Drokpa children were the hardest to reach. In the early years of Xikang Province, an 
experimental outreach program sent teachers out into nomad encampments. One administrator 
explained to Ke Xiangfeng that teams of one Han and two Khampa teachers would “follow 
nomad children, live in tents, and teach the children practical knowledge” that included scientific 
animal husbandry, veterinary medicine, agriculture, math (or “abacus”), and the Chinese 
language.27 An article from 1943 explains that education teams would place a large tent in a 
nomad encampment for use as a classroom, without the desks or chairs typical of an urban school. 
When the clan migrated between pastures, the “classroom” would be packed on yaks and moved 
along with the other tents.28 This, along with other kinds of rural schools housed in temporary 
 
25 Ke (1941), p. 184. 
26 Jiang and Xin (2012), p. 155-156. 
27 Ke (1941), p. 185. 




structures, fell under the DOE’s rubric of “short-term” schools (duanqi xuexiao 短期學校, figure 
21), which comprised a majority of schools in the Kham region.  
 
 
Figure 21. A short-term school in Pelyül as photographed by Sun Mingjing (Sun and Ming 2003, p. 215). 
 
But if Han teachers embedded themselves in nomad camps, who was assimilating whom? 
Kangding’s urban schools placed students in an immersive, majority-Han environment that 
facilitated their acquisition of the Chinese language and their assimilation to Han culture. In the 
grasslands, by contrast, it was the educators who were forced to adapt. Teachers in nomad camps 
were dependent on their host clans for safety, if not for food and shelter. As Ma Yanling 麻延齡, 
an official in the Department of Education specializing in Tibetan education, pointed out, Han 




because “if they don’t send their children to study, what will you do then?” 29  Few Chinese 
thought nomadic schools were the solution to ethnic difference. 
Agricultural development modeled a promising solution. As we saw, the Bureau of 
Agricultural Improvement approached its mission by experimenting on a manageable scale with 
the aim of “extending” successful methods beyond the experimental site (chapter 5). If that 
strategy made cultivating Kham seem more practicable, it could do the same for educating Kham. 
Xikang officials broadly shared principle Yang’s sentiment that the DOE needed to localize its 
education model in order to succeed, perhaps by experimenting in one site and then extending 
insights across the broader landscape. Accordingly, the DOE assembled a Borderlands Education 
Committee (Bianjiang Jiaoyu Weiyuanhui 邊疆教育委員會) made up of people knowledgeable 
about the “borderland situation” (bianqing 邊情) that met monthly to discuss solutions. The 
committee determined that while religious conviction was one reason for the high percentage of 
“lamas” (a term the Chinese often inaccurately used to designate all Tibetan monks) in Khampa 
society, another was economic hardship. Parents struggling to support their sons could send them 
to monasteries where they received clothing, food, and shelter, and, after years of study, became 
esteemed members of society. To compete with the monasteries, public schools needed to meet 
the same needs. Additionally, the committee found, there was a disconnect in values. Khampas 
saw little point in Chinese language and academic study, which offered no clear economic 
benefits. 30 The provincial administration clearly saw the monasteries as competition, but the 
example of Zhao Erfeng had proven that destroying monasteries was unlikely to win over the 
people. In fact, Liu Wenhui was a practicing Buddhist who occasionally patronized Gelukpa 
institutions, most prominently with his founding of the Five Sciences Academy (Wu Ming 
Xueyuan 五明學院) in Kangding in 1939 (reportedly intended to spare cash-strapped monks in 
Xikang the need to journey to Lhasa for ten years of study).31 To its credit, the DOE sought ways 
to incentivize voluntary enrollment in elementary schools. Toward this end it decided to create 
its own experimental site where it could implement the insights of the Borderlands Education 
Committee.32  
 
29 Ma Yanling (1939), p. 8. 
30 XTG, pp. 605-606. 
31 Hu Yanxian (1942), p. 48; see also Tuttle, p. 213, Sun Mingjing and Zhang Ming, p. 103. 
32 James C. Scott describes “miniaturization” as “the creation of a more easily controlled micro-order” in 




The immediate outcome of this decision was the East Eluo Experimental Primary School, 
housed in four plain buildings on a tract of land near the airstrip that looked south on the snowy 
peak of Minya Konka. Unlike the Kangding Primary school, this was expressly a school for 
Khampa boys (mostly adolescents). The school provided simple clothing and accommodations, 
as well as practical training. Students could choose between handcraft and agriculture tracks even 
as they learned to read and write in Chinese. It housed, among other things, a cowshed, two sheep 
pens, four sewing machines, a loom, and a basic set of agricultural implements. Nearby, the 
school incorporated a large pond and several plots of wasteland that administrators intended to 
develop. 
The school solicited Khampa students around Kangding county through village headmen 
until the school reached its capacity of about forty students and had to decline further enrollment 
(though not before replacing some of the short-term schools in the vicinity). 33  A mysterious 
illness plagued the school in the first year and one student died, but overall, the DOE 
administration was pleased with the year’s outcome. Upon visiting, not only did they find a 
synergetic community of students and teachers engaged in farming, fishing, sewing and weaving, 
but students’ gains in (Chinese) literacy exceeded expectations. According to the education annals 
of the Draft General Gazetteer of Xikang, the first year proved that “there is a way to resolve the 
education problem in Kham without great difficulty.”34 The terms in which Chinese discussed 
the school closely mimicked the language of experimental agriculture; “if the experiment 
succeeds,” one observer wrote in 1943, “then it must be extended through the whole of Kham, 
serving as a basis for reform.”35 
The greatest barrier to extending primary education throughout Kham was a paucity of 
qualified teachers who were willing to take a post beyond the pass. The ideal teacher was a 
Sinophone with a secondary school education, a fair command of Tibetan, and good 
understanding of the “frontier situation.” Kangding had been the training ground for Kham-
bound teachers since the late Qing.  As the “gateway” (guan) between Kham and the interior, it 
was an ideal site for melding conventional teacher training with guan xue 關學, which we might 
translate in this context as “Kham studies.” By the 1930s era, however, the Kangding Normal 
School was in a sorry state, its classes held in barebones classrooms and taught by army 
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personnel. In 1935, Liu Wenhui’s Xikang Provincial Preparatory Committee revamped the school 
to form the Xikang Provincial Kangding Normal School, and two years later it released its first 
batch of thirty-eight graduates into the field at primary schools around Xikang. Their training, in 
addition to the usual subjects of elementary education, included Tibetan history, geography, and 
language.36 Accordingly, 1939 saw the opening of eight new province-level primary schools in 
the Kham dependency, including schools for Tibetan-speaking students. As of that year there 
were 16 province-level primary schools in Kham, seven of which were designated “provincial 
primary school for ethnic Tibetans” (Shengli Zangzu Xiaoxue 省立藏族小學). All but three of 
Kham’s most remote counties were now served by a province-level primary school of some sort 
(table 15). 
Educating Kham was an extraordinary challenge: Chinese writers liked to point out that 
it was a province-sized area with the population of a single county or even a large town in the 
interior. Indeed, Ya’an and Xichang county (seats of the Liangshan and Yazhou dependencies 
respectively) each had more primary schools and primary school students than all of the Kham 
counties combined. Kham primary schools comprised only about 10% of the provincial total 
(table 16). 
While a given county in the Ning-Ya piedmont might have a half-dozen primary schools, 
most Kham counties were serviced by a single county primary as well as a fluctuating number of 
short-term schools. Sources on schools outside of Kangding are relatively scarce, but we can 
achieve a general sense of their curricula and material conditions through financial records. One 
1945 expense report from the Zhanhua Provincial Primary school reveals an apparent adoption 
of the East Eluo model: it hosted a farm encircled by a wall (136.5 chi high to keep out livestock 
of course!) and a wooden textile factory with at least three looms. The school supplied students 
with basic needs: tea leaves, wheat flour, fuel for the wood stoves, and—since there was no 
electricity—oil for the lamps. That year the school replaced its memorial portrait of Sun Yat-sen 
(the old one had taken rain damage), repaired its clock, and purchased a national flag.37 This 
iteration of the primary school, not unlike the state farm, was a regime of the plough, the flag, 
and the clock. 
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As for the content of frontier education, a 1941 classroom supplies order from the Ba’an 
Provincial Primary school—likely one of the more rigorous programs—reveals that this school 
operated on a six-year curriculum in which students at all levels took courses in Chinese language, 
math, nature (ziran 自然), history, geography, and civics (gongmin 公民), while a hygiene (weisheng 
衛生) class in the earlier years was replaced with geography after year four. Students began 
writing Chinese characters in year two, for which purpose the school supplied each boy with a 
brush, a shared inkstick (one for every two students), and writing paper.38 This six-year program 
will have been the extent of formal education for most students at the Ba’an elementary, but in 
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Table 16. Number of primary schools, primary school students, and primary school teachers in each Xikang dependency, 
1939 (Min 231-1-7, SA). 






Kham Kangding 16 1,275 50 
 Kham region total 122 6,518 224 
Ya Ya’an 133 7,537 215 
 Ya region total 456 28,316 768 
Ning Xichang 189 11,834 230 
 Ning region total 660 36,037 839 
Province Total  1,238 70,871 1,831 
 
Table 15. Type of provincial primary school by county in Kham 1939, with Tibetan names in parentheses (SA, Min 231-1-7). 
Type of Provincial School Counties (as of 1939) 
Standard Provincial Primary school 
(Shengli putong xiaoxue) 
Kangding, Luding, Danba (Rongtrak), 
Jiulong (Gyezil), Ganzi (Garze), Zhanhua 
(Nyarong), Dege (Degé), Lihua (Litang), 
Ba’an (Batang) 
Provincial primary school for Tibetans 
(Shengli Zangzu xiaoxue) 
Daofu (Tau), Baiyu (Pelyül), Yajiang 
(Nyakchukha), Dingxiang (Chatreng), 
Daoba (Dappa), Derong (Derong) 
Only non-provincial primary schools Luhuo (Drango), Shiqu (Sershül), Taining 





1941, two boys, taking advantage of a new provincial incentive “to encourage guanwai students 
to continue their studies,” applied directly to the office of Liu Wenhui for a travel allowance (150 
yuan each) so that they could relocate to the Provincial Kangding Normal School, presumably to 
become guanwai educators themselves.39 
A small percentage of graduates from other guanwai primaries traveled to the the Xikang 
Provincial Kangding Secondary School, which opened in the former temple of the city god (cheng 
huang miao 城隍庙) during the first half of 1939. If the East Eluo school emphasized local trades, 
the program over at the Kangding Middle School was decidedly more civic-minded. One class’ 
book order reveals courses in Chinese reading, Chinese and foreign geography, Chinese and 
foreign history, and civics, mostly taught with textbooks from the nationalist government’s 
Zheng Zhong press (including High School Civics for Building the Nation).40 
 
 
Figure 22. Portion of a photo spread of school activities in Batang (Bianmin 
jiaoyu 1940). 
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The school’s Chinese-language library—one of the best in the province—was a window 
to the outside world. An invoice from 1946 reveals the titles then held, which totaled 1465 
volumes, including many Chinese classics: the Laozi, the Guanzi, the Book of Rites; even an ancient 
almanac of admirably chaste women, the Sima lienü 司马烈女. There were books on China’s 
tumultuous modern history (A Guide to the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, A History of the Japanese 
Invasion of our Country), and other tomes that were more forward-facing (Human Progress, Model 
Citizen). The practical reader will have found reference books on agriculture, husbandry, applied 
science, even birds and insects. Conspicuously missing from the invoice are titles on the history 
or geography of Kham and Tibet. Instead readers at the Kangding Secondary School library might 
find guides to China’s eastern provinces, European countries, or the United States.41 
To further ease the burden of attending school at all levels, the province implemented a 
program to enroll poor youths as “government-sponsored students” (gongfei sheng 公费生) in 
1939. It set quotas for the percentages of students who were to receive these government 
scholarships, including 40% of primary school students at a given school. Schools waived any 
tuition and fees for scholarship students and provided them with a living stipend. In primary 
schools, scholarship students might receive from four to twelve yuan a month as a living stipend; 
at secondary schools, the range was from sixteen to forty yuan.42 
Within a few years, the Chinese administration in Kham had developed a school system 
that looked surprisingly similar to counterparts in the interior. The Education Annals of the Draft 
Gazetteer of Xikang took pride that: 
Although the average Khampa sees going to school as corvee labor, and we are 
still unable to eliminate the custom of one student substituting for another, still, 
Xikang’s virgin frontier has seen alignment with the modern education mandated 
by the Center. That it is no longer seen as being on par with Mongolia and Tibet is 
no minor progress.43 
 
A Shattered Wartime Economy 
Under more stable conditions the DOE might have continued to expand, but China was at war. 
The Xikang provincial government drew its budget, including its education budget, in the new 
national currency of fabi (“legal tender”) that began circulating in 1935. As historians are well 
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aware, fabi suffered from runaway inflation during World War 2 and the Chinese civil war that 
complicated government finances. 
Consider scenarios at two primary schools in Kham during an advanced stage in the 
inflation crisis: In 1945, the principle of the Daofu Provincial Primary school, one Shi Zhangrui, 
requested a raise for the instructors at his school. Most teachers earned a monthly salary of 80 
yuan in fabi, to which the province added a “supplementary living allowance” of 12,000 yuan 
(equivalent to 150 times their “salary”) to compensate for current prices in Daofu (Tib. Dau). For 
the months of August through November, Shi requested an addition of 7,200 yuan to the living 
allowance to keep up with inflation.44 Startling as these figures are, they pale in comparison to a 
request three years later (1948) by the principle of the Luhuo Primary school that the Xikang 
Education Office increase teacher living allowances at that school by 15.5 million percent (or 
155,000 times the base rate) in April, 21 million percent in May, and 28 million percent in June. 
Principle Zhan himself, with an unadjusted base salary of only 37 yuan, was slated to receive 
10.36 million yuan (280,000 times 37) for June 1948.45  
The financial crisis originated not in Kham, but in the Chinese interior. Broad lack of 
confidence in the new currency prompted farmers and speculators in the interior to hoard grain, 
especially after much of China experienced a poor harvest in 1940. The price of grain shot up, 
urban wages were raised accordingly, and a rapid inflationary cycle ensued. The nationalist 
government compounded the problem by printing money to fund government operations, then 
curtailing this behavior as it realized its error after 1941. Unable to keep up with rising prices, 
national government expenditures diminished by approximately 75% between 1937 and 1944 
when adjusted for inflation. If there was any hope that Japanese surrender would restore financial 
stability, the resumption of the Civil War quashed that hope. Between 1946 and 1948, the Red 
Army occupied a third of China and further disrupted the fabi economy; the Guomindang printed 
money to fund the war, and the number of yuan in circulation ballooned from 9 trillion to 700 
trillion.46 
 
44 SA, Min 228-1-167. 
45 SA, Min 288-1-25. This document appears to be a ledger of payments (fa xin jisuan發薪計算) rather than 
a request, so it would seem that these figures reflect actual payments to teachers. 




The effect on public institutions was devastating. According to The Cambridge History of 
China, “the government was starving.”47 This was especially true of the education sector, which 
was a lower priority for the Guomindang than was the army. In the interior (neidi), inflation 
“ravaged the well-being of students and intellectuals. Books were few, scientific equipment 
sparse. Students lived in poorly lit, unheated dormitories, their beds crammed together like 
bunks in a ship... both teachers and students were living ‘on the verge of starvation’, ‘under the 
most miserable conditions imaginable’.”48 
Teachers and other public servants (gongwuyuan 公务员), unlike farmers, relied on cash 
salaries that lagged behind the rising cost of living.  In the wartime capital of Chongqing, food 
expenses for public servants were 1,600 times as much at the end of 1945 as they were in 1937 
(chart 2); by contrast, house rents had increased by a multiple of just 622.49 Professionals and 
public servants were overwhelming concentrated in urban areas. Since grain served as a 
numeraire (or price-setting commodity), inflation in grain-producing rural settings was 
substantially less severe.50 
 
The Crisis Comes to Xikang 
The establishment of Xikang province had a complicated effect on the longstanding grain crisis 
in Kham: on one hand, Kham was more linked than ever to grain networks in the interior, 
physically (by roads) and institutionally (as part of a larger Chinese province). On the other hand, 
the interior was in crisis. Grain was wealth. The Kham administration was both tethered to a 
rapidly deteriorating currency and short on the local grain supplies that might stabilize its 
finances. One solution was to withdraw cash from banks and convert it immediately into rice, 
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Chart 2. Chongqing retail prices in yuan (fabi) from 1943-1946, developed from data in JDJJ. 
 
 
Conversely, where funds were not forthcoming as was often the case in the education 
sector, the bust economy merely exacerbated the association between grain shortage and poverty. 
Consider a case from Luding county, situated in Kham’s eastern corn belt in 1948: when the 
principle of the county’s provincial primary school, Wang Huiying 王惠英, wrote to the governor 
to request funds for renovating the decrepit facilities (desks were broken, the roof was leaking), 
he quoted expenditures based on current corn prices—a hundred new desks for the price of 30 
dan of maize, eight lecterns for the price of two dan three dou of maize, thirty-thousand clay roof 
shingles for the price of twelve dan of maize, and so on. Wang’s request looked very much like 
the magistrates’ petitions for grain relief that we saw in chapter 3: he had spoken to families who 
were destitute, “without a stick to hold in their two hands” and felt that the provincial 
government should “show solicitude for their sufferings” by subsidizing school repairs because 
“the environment is unusual” (huanjing teshu 環境特殊).52 And to think that this was one of the 
more fertile counties in the Kham dependency! 
 



















Xikang had no large urban centers on the order of Chongqing or Chengdu. Piecemeal 
price reporting suggests that inflation in the piedmont dependencies hewed close to that of 
neighboring rural Sichuan. Kangding, meanwhile, was somewhere in the middle: the cost of 
living for public servants in 1943 was about five times its level in 1941, compared with about four 
times in Xichang (the administrative seat of the Liangshan dependency) and about six times in 
Chongqing. The Xikang Provincial Statistics Office calculated that the overall monthly cost of 
living for Kangding public servants in April 1943 was about 1,386 yuan, versus about 842 yuan 
in Xichang and 897 yuan in Huili, both situated in the Ning dependency.53 
One reason that Kangding suffered from worse inflation than the piedmont was its 
ecology: the fertile Ning and Ya regions produced, stored, and exchanged large volumes of price-
setting agrarian commodities like rice and cotton while “high-cold” Kham was environmentally 
limited to relatively low-value crops like wheat, barley, and in the eastern corridor, maize. In 
Kangding, retail prices for rice ballooned much faster than wheat or barley (chart 3), which had 
several implications: the value in fabi of the state’s grain stores was rapidly decreasing, the 
spending power of the state in real terms was thus decreasing, and it was increasingly hard for 
Han settlers to purchase the rice they so coveted with whatever funds they had on hand. 
 
 
Chart 3. Changes in three Kangding commodity prices between February 1939 and February 1942 (SA, Min 231-1-6). 
 
 




















Food preference was another culprit. Government memos articulated food shortages 
primarily in terms of “staple foods” (zhushi 主食). Maize, root vegetables, and legumes were never 
“staple foods.” At institutions that mainly served Khampas, like the East Eluo school, highland 
barley might qualify, but the term generally designated rice. Chinese administrators intended to 
assimilate Kham, and they took it for granted that an assimilated Kham was one where people, 
and certainly settlers from the interior, ate rice on a regular basis. In terms of education, it was 
understood that Han teachers and state-sponsored students should have access to rice.  
Why were Kangding schools so insistent on rice when, for environmental reasons, the 
surrounding countryside grew barley, wheat, and corn instead? Since the reasoning behind this 
preference is never explicit in the documents, one can only speculate. An agricultural historian 
might point out that rice agriculture offers a higher caloric output than any other crop per unit of 
land.54 In terms of securing food energy, targeting rice farmers was more efficient than targeting 
barley farmers. Secondly, as we saw in chapter 3, the mobility of farmers in the highlands created 
what I called a “moral economy of solicitude,” in which tax increases often backfired as 
households disappeared from the tax register. 
But ethnic sensibilities about taste surely played an enormous role as well. Here we might 
glean insight from Japanese cultural history. In Rice as Self, the anthropologist Emiko Ohnuki-
Tierney contends that Japanese historic encounters with ethnic “others” catalyzed an association 
between rice and self.55 She further argues that the notion of rice as the “staple food” (shushuko 主
食), which strikes many Japanese as commonsensical, has roots in World War Two, when the 
public was subjected to government food rationing and soldiers received stipends of rice from 
the Japanese islands. 56  As Japanese ventured to faraway imperial spaces during the war, 
maintaining a rice diet differentiated them from natives and tied them to the naichi, the Japanese 
homeland. Josh Levy writes of the South Sea Islands that “rice became a racial borderland, where 
naichi (home island) Japanese could be marked from Islanders and one’s standing within the 
colonial order realized and contested.”57 Chinese in Kham deployed a very similar vocabulary to 
the Japanese abroad, undoubtedly derived from Japanese terminology. As Japanese settlers 
longed for the naichi, Chinese in Kham longed for the neidi, written with the same characters. Just 
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as Japanese conceived of rice as shushuko (staple food), Chinese came to think of it as zhushi, 
written with the same characters. This is to suggest, the hunger that Chinese settlers experienced 
as rice supplies dwindled, while undoubtedly real, was a function of both material forces and 
cultural predilections incubated in a transnational milieu. 
When grain prices soared, schools were particularly vulnerable—not only did they 
struggle to pay a living wage to salaried professionals, but they had a self-imposed obligation to 
feed students whose presence at school might have prevented them from engaging in food 
production at home. By the late 1940s, state-sponsored students had become a major liability. 
Consider the East Eluo Experimental Primary school, which should have been relatively solvent:  
In 1942, the school reportedly cultivated 4,000 potatoes and an unspecified amount of corn, and 
caught 1,000 fish in its on-site lake, which fed students and teachers. The school expanded into 
community land reclamation in 1947 by giving temporary land use contracts (linshi yueju臨時約
據) to seven households, involving a total of 80 mu.58 Presumably, the school collected rent from 
tenants in kind. All of this productive capacity, however, was insufficient to feed students year-
round, and the school depended on the Education Office for a “staple food stipend” (zhushi fei 主
食费). 
Even with this stipend, the school could not keep up with rising food costs. Part of the 
problem was its custom of plying Khampa families with “recruitment grain” (guxue liang 雇学粮) 
to compel them to send their children to school. Railing against this practice, principal Peng 
Quansen 彭全森 once charged that “unscrupulous students and parents treat enrolling their 
children in school as a business.” But the bigger problem was local grain prices. People in the 
community were now bartering highland barley for gold and tea, and between March and June 
1948 the price in currency of a 63-jin bag of highland barley rose from four to six million yuan. 
“Buying grain with fabi is not easy” he related to the Education Office in April. The school’s actual 
staple food expenses were six times the amount of fabi provided by the Office. Peng borrowed 
from the community to feed his students, and by the middle of 1948, the school was deeply in 
debt.59 
Peng’s predicament was maddening. He needed barley, and the East Eluo school was 
situated near several barley-growing villages whence his students originated. To the DOE he 
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proposed: why not feed students with the grain tax from nearby Rongguan village? The Office 
consented and relayed the proposal to the Finance Office, which objected that it needed approval 
from the provincial government at the highest level. The provincial leadership, however, was 
inclined toward another solution: since prices were much lower in the Ning and Ya dependencies, 
officials reasoned, they could appropriate a certain amount of rice from piedmont farmers as gong 
liang 公糧, or “state grain,” and allocate it to state-sponsored students in Kangding. This ill-fated 
move had roots in major changes to the tax policy of the embattled republic. 
 
The Rise of “State Grain” 
Viewed from Kham, the institution of “state grain” resembles a dramatic expansion of the 
longstanding practice of appropriating grain from farmers and redistributing it to the state. The 
Chinese administration in Kham had for decades collected land taxes in grain to feed soldiers 
(chapter 2). The Nationalist government now had similar motives: it needed to secure precious 
grain for its bloated army while it fought a war on two fronts (against Japanese and Communists). 
The Administrative Yuan responded to this need by commandeering the land tax from the 
provinces in 1941 and collecting it in rice and other grains, rather than currency. 
This desperate move introduced a plot twist to the history of Xikang land taxes. In 1939 
Xikang administrators had justified Kham’s taxation in kind on the grounds that Kham was stuck 
in the “nomadic age,” which implied that Kham would eventually transition to a land tax in 
currency like the other dependencies.60 In the short term, the inverse happened: not only did the 
Kham dependency maintain its land tax in kind during the 1940s, but the Ning and Ya 
dependencies adopted a similar tax in kind as of 1941 in accordance with the new national policy. 
Specifically, their land taxes were assessed in rice, while other grains were converted into rice for 
the tax books according to a pre-determined scale, similar to the way that taxmen in Kham had 
for decades converted assorted foodstuffs into “premium grain.”61 
Key differences remained between Kham and the piedmont dependencies. Kham was 
exempted from remitting its land tax to the Center, and rates were reduced so that they comprised 
about 12% of the harvest across the region. The Ning and Ya dependencies were made to pick up 
the slack. In 1939 they were reassessed, and land tax rates raised to about 20% of the harvest, 
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collected twice per year from villages with two growing seasons. The difference between the grain 
levies in the most grain-rich counties of Kham and those of the Ning region was extreme. The 
1939 land tax was assessed at 5,244 dan in Ganzi county (Kham dependency) versus 18,264,900 
dan in Huili county (Ning dependency).62 
The base tax rate was only the tip of the iceberg. In 1941 Ning-Ya counties began to remit 
their land tax in kind to the center, at which point they were hit with a “security fee” (bao’an fei保
安費) equivalent to one assessment of the land tax, and a “national crisis fee” (guonan fei國難費) 
equivalent to nine-tenths of one assessment, each paid in grain. Kham, meanwhile, paid security 
fee equivalent to just 20% one assessment.63 In short, the counties of Liangshan and Yazhou were 
expected to surrender over 50% of the harvest to the national government, while Kham tendered 
less than 15% of the harvest, mostly to local government. All of these surcharges in the piedmont 
raised overall grain collection in Xikang from about three million dan in 1940 to eight million the 
next year.64 Much of the increase was accomplished through a policy of “compulsory purchasing” 
(zhenggou徵購), which required Ning-Ya farmers to sell grain to the state at pitifully low prices. 
In 1943, the central government dropped the pretense of purchasing this grain and renamed it 
“compulsory borrowing” (zhengjie徵借).65 
With all of this tax farming, it is hard to imagine that farmers in piedmont had any rice to 
spare for non-essential institutions, much less for schools on the Tibetan plateau. But beginning 
in 1942 the province invoked compulsory purchasing (later “borrowing”) to collect an additional 
100,000 dan of “county-level state grain” (xianji gongliang 縣級公糧 ) each year. This grain 
supported local administration, with educators as the most direct beneficiaries: in 1943 the 
provincial government implemented a policy of sending a portion of its gongliang revenue 
directly to school personnel and selling the rest at market prices. This partly relieved teachers 
struggling with rising grain prices. For now, scholarship students purchased food locally on a 
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Administrators understood from the beginning that Kham was a hardship post for teachers from 
the neidi. Zhang Jingxi of the provincial Establishment Committee found in a detailed historical 
investigation that attrition rates among teachers had been high since the late Qing. The imperial 
Guanwai Education Bureau once complained that “whether because they cannot adjust to the 
environment (shuitu bufu 水土不服), or they resign their duties because their parents are ill, or 
perhaps their character is not good, teachers need to be replaced, and such cases are not rare.”66 
Kangding, Zhang found, was the only site with a favorable record of training teachers for the 
Kham region. To better assess the state of its teaching staff, in 1940 the DOE began a registry of 
current teachers, past teachers, and people with teaching qualifications who were not currently 
serving in that capacity.67 
By 1942 it was clear that the Xikang DOE was facing a severe shortage of qualified teachers 
throughout the province. The provincial registry revealed that only about 10% of Xikang’s 2,000 
or so teachers had qualifications above the primary school level.68 Liu Wenhui issued a call to 
action on behalf of the DOE, proclaiming that: 
In this time of national crisis, the need to cultivate talents for resistance and 
construction is dire, and the service of teachers is of greater import than in 
ordinary times. Since prices have risen, teacher salaries have become lean, and a 
teacher’s life is no small hardship. If this is not remedied and [teachers] change 
professions, it will affect the future of the nation (guojia minzu). 
 
Liu mandated a response from both the government and the public. For its part, the 
provincial government would adjust salaries and implement a supplementary rice stipend. It 
placed a surcharge of 10,000 shidan of rice on the 1942 land tax in Ning and Ya, and assigned this 
“state grain” to instructors throughout the province, including Kham. The priority was on 
retaining the most qualified personnel. Teachers at secondary schools would receive three times 
as much rice as teachers at primary schools, and laborers (gongyi 公役) received half as much as 
teachers.69 Later records suggest that a teacher at a secondary school might expect to receive one 
dou (about 2.7 gallons) of rice per month. 
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From the public, Liu demanded deference towards educators by launching a “Respect the 
Teachers Movement.” Some of its stipulations were purely symbolic (people must henceforth 
address teachers as “sir” (xiansheng 先生) instead of “teacher so-and-so”), but the overall bent was 
toward “respecting” teachers in a material fashion. Students of means were asked to offer 
teachers rice and cash at the start of the school term as well as more gifts at festival times (and 
“not just an egg or a cake”).70 In urban Kangding such offerings became institutionalized as 
families of schoolchildren were required to submit a certain amount of “teacher respect rice” (zun 
shi mi 尊師米) each month.71  Village leaders were also never to demand labor service from 
teachers. On Teacher’s Day (August 27) every year, the DOE was to ply teachers with food and 
drink at a feast in Kangding attended by the governor himself. These measures were reportedly 
a response to low morale among teachers. The Draft General Gazetteer of Xikang lamented that 
“society looks down on teachers, and views them as educated people (shi 士) at the end of their 
rope.”72 By a generous interpretation, the “Respect the Teachers Movement” was a creative way 
to consolidate the twin needs of emotional and material support. In a more cynical view, “respect” 
was likely a pretext for leaning more heavily on local communities to ease the state’s fiscal burden. 
If teachers endured lean years during the war with Japan, they became positively destitute 
in subsequent years. The education annals of the Gazetteer complained that “as prices soar, no 
matter how teacher salaries are raised, it is impossibly difficult to maintain an individual living, 
much less support a family.”73  Tension between the schools and the Establishment Council 
reached a boiling point in October 1948, when six DOE personnel aired their grievances in a joint 
five-page letter to Liu Wenhui, claiming that teachers in Xikang worked longer hours for less pay 
than their counterparts in Sichuan Province. Moreover, they claimed, the provincial government 
acted disingenuously by raising salaries on paper and then prorating them by as much as 20%. 
Such treatment “certainly does not encourage talented people to go into education,” charged the 
letter-writers, who insisted that “salaries must be raised so that [teachers] do not return to the 
interior.”74 
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The collective panic was hardly limited to the education sector. Daily rice had become all 
but unattainable for a broad swathe of salaried government officials and public servants in 
Kangding. Even if they were not starving per se, there was a perpetual temptation to abandon 
one’s post and return to the neidi. In November, the provincial government moved to “relieve” 
the city by consolidating the city’s rice purchases under a “Provincial Grain Reserve Committee” 
(Xikang sheng liangshi chubei weiyuanhui 西康省粮食储备委员会).  The Grain Reserve Committee 
quickly realized it could not hope to service the whole city: “there are extremely few counties in 
this province that produce plentiful grain, on top of which transportation is difficult,” advised 
the Committee in December. It would be impossible to coordinate purchases on too large a scale.75 
Instead, the relief program catered to public institutions. By January 1949, the Grain 
Reserve Committee moved over 212 shidan of provincial rice from the county stores in Ya’an, 
Hanyuan, and Luding to the city of Kangding, where it disbursed the rice to the provincial 
government, the police, and the provincial schools. The Committee continued purchasing rice 
from lowland counties with loans in the millions of yuan from the Bank of Xikang Province and 
the Central Bank of Ya’an. By August the relief program had moved a total of over 1,004 shidan 
to Kangding and disbursed it to twenty-nine recipients. These included the aforementioned 
institutions as well as the Xikang Daily newspaper (Xikang ribao西康日報), the electric station, and 
the sundry laborers and personnel who operated the rice transport.76 
For now, it seemed, Liu Wenhui’s earlier maneuverings to incorporate 14 rice-growing 
lowland counties from Sichuan into Xikang Province had become its saving grace. Paltry as their 
salaries might be, teachers in Kangding could hope to receive one dou of precious rice each month 
through the provincial relief program. Not covered by this program, however, were the students. 
 
Students on Standby 
If officials anticipated material hardship among teachers in guanwai, those that faced students 
came as more of a surprise. Provincial officials viewed students, and especially scholarship 
students, as beneficiaries of the school system rather than bearers of hardship. Upon the founding 
of Xikang Province in 1939, there was good reason to believe that the education system would 
succeed if only it could maintain a supply of qualified teachers: its schools were situated within 
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a robust provincial bureaucracy, funded in a newly minted national currency, and aided by the 
central government. The central and provincial governments supported hundreds of scholarship 
students, comprising most of the student body at some schools. 
Ironically, these same national linkages conspired to produce student hunger as the 
republic disintegrated during the war years. Students struggled to meet the ballooning expenses 
of everyday needs: clothing, books, cooking fuel, lamp oil, sometimes electricity, but above all, 
food. Since school administrators acted as middlemen by collecting fees from students and 
purchasing goods on the market, price inflation put them in an awkward spot. This is especially 
evident in the plight of government scholarship students (gongfei sheng公費生), who came mainly 
from poor and non-Han families and were promised cost-free tuition, room, and board on the 
government’s dime. Between Kham’s longtime grain shortage and the shattered wartime 
economy, it became increasingly difficult for schools in Kangding to deliver on that promise. 
Fabi inflation accelerated dramatically after 1946 with resumption of the Chinese civil war.  
The central government was slow in adjusting scholarship amounts for Xikang. In May 1947, the 
Xikang DOE notified the Administrative Yuan that “the schools of this province have long since 
opened [for the year]” but food stipends had not been adjusted, so “it is difficult to satisfy hunger 
and all students are awaiting nourishment.” Could the Administrative Yuan please multiply the 
previous figure to reflect current grain prices?77 
In response, the Republican government set the monthly food stipend at 14,000 yuan per 
student and capped the province at 15,000 state-sponsored students. But the cost of grain was far 
higher in Kham than it was in the rice-growing dependencies. Liu Wenhui compensated by 
lowering the amount of the individual food stipend in Ning and Ya while raising it in Kham from 
14,000 to 35,000 yuan per month. Kham evidently took priority among the dependencies of 
Xikang. After adjustments, a given government scholarship student in Kangding received over 
four times as much as a student in the Ning dependency.78 State-sponsored students in Kham 
comprised only a third of the province total but received more in food stipends than the rest of 
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Table 17. Number of state-sponsored students at each province-level school in Xikang in early 1948 (Min 228-1-117) 
and monthly food stipend per student in each dependency (Min 228-1-122). 
Dependency School Students   
Kham 
Kangding Normal School 128   
Kangding Professional 
School of Agriculture 
60   
Kangding Professional 
School of Medicine 
50   
Kangding Professional 
School of Business 
45   
Kangding Secondary School 27   
Number One Borderland 
Normal School 
54   
East Eluo Experimental 
Primary School 





(yuan) (Ba’an) Zhuwasi Primary 
School 
20 
8 schools total 418 35,000 14,630,000 
Ya 3 schools total 300 12,000 3,600,000 
Ning 13 schools total 775 8,000 6,200,000 
Province 
Total 
24 schools total 1493  24,430,000 
 
At schools in Kangding, fiscal planning became exceedingly difficult. Between student 
fees and scholarship money, the Kangding Secondary School was able to cover its expenses for 
cooking fuel and electric power (for the lights) during the first semester of 1948, but principal Wu 
Weiquan faced a shortfall in the food budget—what, Wei asked the DOE, should the school do 
about food?79 Funneling cash into Kangding’s grain market was unsustainable. Already by the 
second half of 1947, the DOE was cabling government offices in various counties to inquire about 
local grain prices, suspecting that it might be more cost-effective to purchase rice in the lowlands 
and move it to the provincial capital. With approval from the Finance Office, the DOE settled on 
a bold new plan: the state granaries of two designated counties, Ya’an and Rongjing, would each 
allocate a certain volume of rice to scholarship students at particular Kangding institutions. It 
must have seemed practicable since the distance from Ya’an to Kangding along the road was only 
440 li (220 kilometers).  
 




Come April, the rice had yet to materialize. A joint letter from Kangding educators 
notified DOE chief Xiang that “this term [the matter of] student staple food remains unresolved” 
and that “we wish to communicate the severity of the rice problem.” Could schools get an 
advance on the supplementary food allowance, inquired the petitioners, so that they could use it 
to purchase rice? Xiang affixed his chop and wrote ten oversized characters in the margin: 
“FINANCE OFFICE TAKE MEASURES FOR ALLOCATING FUNDS TO MEET URGENT 
NEED.”80 The next day the DOE commissioned a team of four personnel, including the Ya’an 
superintendent of education, to investigate the problem and press the grain divisions of Ya’an 
and Rongjing for release of the vital rice.81 
One of the schools waiting on relief grain from Rongjing was the East Eluo Experimental 
Primary School. Enrollment had dropped from over 130 students in 1942 to just 40 students in 
1947, 34 of whom were state-sponsored.82 Still the school still could not keep up with food costs. 
Throughout 1948, Principal Peng Quansen fired off a series of increasingly aggravated petitions 
to the provincial DOE. Each student, he noted, needed about 50 jin of highland barley each month, 
or roughly one full sack, to sate their hunger. A delivery of 93.34 shidan of rice promised from 
Rongjing had never materialized. The DOE had issued a cash infusion to the school as a stop-gap, 
but it was a mere gesture. There was little use for fabi in East Eluo village, where a sack of barley 
presently sold for six or seven pieces of gold. The DOE increased the monthly food stipend from 
40,000 in March and April to 80,000 yuan per student in May and June, but Peng complained that 
the cost of a sack had risen to 600,000 yuan in those months. The cash stipend, he complained, 
is like trying to extinguish a cartload of burning wood with a cup of water (bei 
shui chexin 杯水車薪). We still have no way of covering the deficit. My school has 
already taken large loans for student grain. This shortfall has us facing a 
mountain of debt (zhaitai gaozhu债台高筑). I worry about it day and night, and I 
do not know where a solution will come from.83 
 
The DOE investigation revealed that the rice promised to Kangding schools was being 
siphoned off by Nationalist soldiers. It is unclear how aware Kham personnel were of the 
Nationalists’ deteriorating position in the civil war, but six Kangding educators issued a second 
joint letter, this time to Liu Wenhui, to propose a simple fix: since Ya’an and Rongjing had failed 
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to deliver rice, Liu should allocate state grain from Hanyuan county instead, and “strictly 
command the Hanyuan division of grain management to transfer it within a limited time frame 
without shifting around.” If soldiers needed grain so badly, they suggested, perhaps the army 
could purchase it from the DOE and the provincial government could foot the price difference 
between Hanyuan and Kangding so that schools could acquire grain locally.84 
So Hanyuan it was, but the switch made little difference: as of January 1949, only one 
institution, the Kangding Professional School of Agriculture, had received a grain infusion (of 138 
shidan) from Hanyuan. During the holidays preceding the spring term of 1949, various Kangding 
schools sent representatives to press the Hanyuan Office of Grain Management, who were told 
that the army had overdrawn and there was nothing to transfer. By now the DOE was resigned 
to the inevitable. “As the past has proven,” wrote a representative of aggrieved schools to the 
governor, “we will not receive this state grain for students in the short-term.” Even if the schools 
somehow acquired rice from Hanyuan, the author acknowledged, transportation costs had risen 
so precipitously that the Education Office could not afford to move it. Instead, the Kangding 
schools would spend all of their supplementary food allowance on rice and “borrow” one dou of 
rice from each of the wealthier students to redistribute in the future with the intention of repaying 
that amount once they found a way to obtain it from Hanyuan or elsewhere.85 
The Hanyuan Office of Grain management shortly informed the DOE that it simply did 
not have the rice, chiefly because it had authorized a loan of 500 shidan to the Fourth Regiment 
(di si dadui 第四大隊) after their supply lines were cut off, after which the same soldiers proceeded 
to commandeer further 1,500 shidan. Consequently, wrote the Office, there was “no way” to 
submit it as staple grain for state-sponsored students in the Kham dependency.86 
 
The End of an Era 
Chiang Kai-shek dealt a fatal blow to the fabi currency when he moved assets in gold and US 
dollars to the island of Taiwan in 1948. Kangding’s rice relief program in fact reflects an awareness 
of the imminent collapse of the ROC economy in the mainland: the program enjoyed limited 
successes only because Liu Wenhui ordered provincial banks to “loan” the government 
enormous sums without interest so that the Grain Reserve Committee, backed by military force, 
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could “strictly press” (yancui 严催 ) citizens to sell their rice, probably at sub-market rates. 
According to a memo of August 11, 1949, Kangding’s grain relief program had by that point 
withdrawn a total of 22.9 million yuan from the Bank of Xikang Province and the Ya’an branch 
of the Central Bank. The Shanghai-based Central Bank (Zhongyang yinhang 中央銀行 ) 
subsequently charged the Grain Reserve Committee 80,000 yuan in monthly interest, roughly on 
par with inflation, but the Grain Reserve Committee was not amenable to that rate: “[We] feel 
deeply that the burden of this figure is exceedingly great,” wrote a representative. Instead, the 
Committee would be willing to pay an interest rate of two jiao (0.2 yuan) a month, “for the benefit 
of the public, on orders of Governor Liu.”87  By this point, Xikang Province had adopted an 
apparently adversarial stance towards the Guomindang’s financial institutions. 
Word reached Kangding in late 1948 that the Guomindang was losing spectacularly in the 
northeast. Most disturbingly, it surfaced that Chiang’s forces had suffered defeat at the Battle of 
Siping, a month-long engagement in Jilin Province that resulted in about 3,000 deaths on the 
Guomindang side. Liu was losing faith in Chiang and increasingly convinced that a Communist 
victory was inevitable. He convened a meeting in Kangding of his top officials, including acting 
governor Zhang Weijiong 张为炯 and representatives from the police, the Twenty-Fourth Army, 
and the Finance Administration Office. In a later reflection, Zhang recalls Liu announcing to the 
assembled cadres that: 
Chiang Kai-shek may flee to Taiwan. But Chongqing has a field headquarters, 
Xichang has a field headquarters, and [Chiang] certainly will not let the provinces 
of the southwest go lightly. The two provinces of Sichuan and Xikang will become 
the last battleground in this struggle. I am of no use in Kangding. To adapt to the 
changing situation in the southwest and guarantee the collective safety of Xikang, 
I must go to Chengdu and take charge.88 
 
Liu placed the Kham dependency under Zhang’s authority, and the Ning and Ya 
dependencies under other officials. With that, Liu Wenhui left Kangding for good, and Xikang 
braced for the arrival of the Communists.89  In December 1949 Liu Wenhui met with fellow 
Sichuanese strongmen Pan Wenhua and Deng Xihou at his villa in Chengdu, where the three 
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formed a pact to surrender to the People’s Liberation Army. When Chiang Kai-shek telegrammed 
to summon them to Taiwan, Liu famously declined on account of illness.90 
In Xikang Province, Liu Wenhui’s departure produced a schism along somewhat 
predictable lines. The Twenty-Fourth Army was concentrated in the grain-rich piedmont and had 
reason to protect its interests there. It was joined by Guomindang soldiers retreating from other 
provinces, who now prepared for a final showdown with the PLA in and around the cities of 
Xichang and Ya’an. 
Meanwhile, the cash-poor and grain-starved civil administration in Kangding cast its lot 
with the Communists. On December 10, Liu Wenhui cabled Kangding with news of Sichuan’s 
pending surrender. Zhang Weijiong swiftly convened a meeting of Kangding government heads 
at the government ceremonial hall, where, according to Zhang’s later account, the gathered 
officials moved to welcome the PLA and sever all ties with Chiang. Zhang soon learned from the 
magistrate of Danba that an anti-Communist force of about 2000 men under Guomindang 
commander Tian Zhongtian was approaching that county from Maogong and intended to seize 
control over southern Kham. Zhang ordered Danba to resist, but Tian overwhelmed the county 
seat as its magistrate fled toward Qianning (formerly Taining) and was killed en route. As Tian’s 
army approached the north gate to Kangding, Zhang and a small retinue set out north across the 
Zheduo Mountains, taking refuge in a stockade near the town of Xinduqiao. Before fleeing he 
entrusted management of the capital to locals and gave government workers explicit permission 
to return to their ancestral homes in the neidi if they wished.91 
The PLA encountered considerable Guomindang resistance in and around Ya’an. 
According to Zhang, the PLA did not have access to enough grain to complete the long uphill 
journey from Tianquan to Kangding until March 1950.92 Tian’s forces battled the Communists on 
the outskirts of the urban district, and when this proved futile, they looted the city and fled south. 
On March 24, a portion of the PLA’s 26th army entered Kangding without resistance on March 24 
and placed it under a Kangding Military Management Council (Kangding junshi guanzhi 
weiyuanhui 康定軍事管制委員會).93  
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When news of the Communists’ victory in Kangding reached Zhang Weijiong, he 
returned from his brief exile to the city that had been his home for eleven years, and accepted the 
position of vice-chairman of Xikang Province under the People’s Republic of China. In that 
capacity he would help to oversee the transition of Xikang’s agricultural, educational, legal, 
health, and other institutions to Communist rule. 
 
Conclusion 
Kangding’s public schools were in poor shape when the PLA arrived. The East Eluo Experimental 
Primary School had reportedly dwindled from a peak enrollment of over 130 students to roughly 
20 students.94 The new Kangding Military Management Council assumed control over the urban 
district and its environs and quickly set to work relieving hungry teachers with infusions of 150-
180 jin of corn kernels apiece. The PLA command also set to work restructuring schools, merging 
the county’s various primary schools into just two primaries in the urban district, and merging 
its various secondary schools, including the Kangding Provincial Secondary School and the 
Kangding Provincial Normal School, into a single “Kangding Secondary School.” An earthquake 
toppled a large portion of the Kangding Secondary School in 1955, killing 40 students, but the 
school continued to operate in a limited capacity until 1958 when it was revived in a new location 
as the Ganzi Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture Kangding Secondary School.95 
If we look beyond the cataclysm of the late 1940s, then, Chinese efforts towards 
“borderland education” were hardly abortive. The legacy of Xikang’s education system, like that 
of its state farms, far outlasted Guomindang control over the region. It was not the Communist 
takeover of Kangding, but rather, the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) that brought this phase of 
school-building to its knees: the Kangding County Gazetteer laments (in boilerplate CCP fashion) 
that during the Cultural Revolution, misguided agitators “destroyed education, attacked teachers, 
denied knowledge, and thoroughly crushed the whole county’s vulnerable educational 
foundation and the ethnic [minority] education that had only begun to take off.”96  Even so, the 
decades since the death of Mao Zedong (1976) have seen a revival of the Chinese education 
system in Kham. 
 
94 KDXZ, p. 473-474. 
95 KDXZ, p. 482. 




Transregional developmental strategies like the grain relief arrangement between 
Kangding and the piedmont that appear desperate or even futile in the short-term actually set in 
motion long-term trends in Chinese governance of eastern Tibet. Chinese state-builders had once 
hoped to establish Kham as a province comprised of self-sufficient counties. But as we saw, events 
of the 1940s enmeshed eastern Kham into a close economic relationship with the piedmont 
regions that formerly comprised western Sichuan. The PRC again reframed this territory in 1955 
when it dissolved Xikang and transferred eastern Kham and the piedmont to Sichuan Province. 
For schools and other institutions in Kham, this entailed new subsidies from one of China’s 
wealthier provinces. 
Consider the Kangding Secondary School: in 1980 the Sichuan Province Department of 
Education declared it to be among the first set of provincial “well-run focal point schools” (ban 
hao zhongdian xuexiao 办好重点学校) and it thrived with provincial support, reaching over 1000 
students by 1985.97 Today a slogan on the school’s Chinese-language website boasts that it is  the 
“pearl of education for Khampas and a cradle of talent in a Tibetan region” and traces the school’s 
history to early 1939, when Xikang officials founded its first incarnation in the temple of the city 
god. The school’s Guomindang-affiliated founders would have appreciated much of its mission 
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Conclusion: The Imagined Community vs. the Rooted State 
 
Is Kham Chinese? Are its people Chinese? These questions unsettled certain leaders of the young 
Republic of China, who adopted a range of strategies to persuade people, both inside and outside 
of Kham, that the answer was a definite yes. How did they make it so? 
Perhaps Kham became part of the Chinese nation-state through the illocutionary force of 
policy decisions. By Yuan Shikai’s presidential order of 1912, all of Tibet was “the territory of the 
Republic of China,” and its people were “citizens of the Republic of China.”1 Then, according to 
the 1914 Simla Accord negotiated between Britain, Lhasa, and Beijing, the ROC was to retain 
Kham as part of an “Inner Tibet,” which vaguely prefigured Xikang Province. But Simla was 
never ratified, Lhasa continued to covet Kham, and indigenous rulers had their own ideas about 
local governance. In the tradition of Zhao Erfeng, strongmen of the Chinese republic from Yin 
Changheng to Liu Wenhui followed illocution with percussion, leading Sichuanese armies into 
the Hengduan mountains to quash their non-Han challengers. 
Now was Kham Chinese? Were its people Chinese? Rarely did anyone ask outright. 
Instead, these questions were implied by the ardor with which they were answered again and 
again. When Dapba nomads dodged taxes by fleeing to Xining, a magistrate demanded 
rhetorically, are these “not territories of our nation-state?”2 When, in 1928, the central government 
had shown little interest in actually governing Kham, a delegation from Xikang felt compelled to 
remind the Administrative Yuan that “the Kham territory is national territory of our Republic of 
China, and the people of Kham are citizens of our Republic of China.”3 Publications like the 
Reflections on the Situation in Kham reminded (or informed) readers that “the people of Kham are 
citizens of the Republic of China, and the land (tu) of Kham is a part of our national territory.”4  
These lingering insecurities reveal a disconnect between the sudden, formal incorporation of 
eastern Tibet into the Chinese nation-state and the gradual process of Sinicization—that is, the 
always incomplete project of making it more Chinese. 
This study argued that Sinicization was as much an ecological project as a cultural one, 
beginning with the act of conquest. When Zhao Erfeng led his first retalliatory expedition in the 
Batang-Litang region, his soldiers suffered from terrible hunger, so he devised a unique system 
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in the name of a tianfu or land tax for appropriating grain from local farmers to feed Han soldiers. 
This created the conditions for a sustained Chinese military presence, but the scarcity of grain 
and the considerable mobility of highland “citizens” prompted the state to adopt an 
accommodationist approach to tax administration, characterized by progressive reductions and 
exemptions. During this period, Kham was neither independent of China nor dominated by it. 
To the west of Kangding, Chinese officials were a fairly inconspicuous and unimposing presence. 
Liu Manqing offered an extreme example in her Mission to Kham and Tibet: in high-altitude Litang 
she encountered a Chinese magistrate with a Khampa wife who was “thoroughly Xikang-ized” 
and who, with little actual authority, “governed only over himself.”5 
That state of affairs struck many Chinese as inappropriate during the Nanjing decade, 
when Chinese ethnic policy and popular attitudes emphasized “assimilation” (tonghua) of ethnic 
minorities into the Han-dominated Chinese nation (Zhonghua minzu). Kham watchers now 
largely subscribed to an agrarian nationalism, which held that China was “a country founded on 
agriculture.” Inconveniently, the population of Kham was predominantly pastoral. Agrarian 
nationalists proposed what I called an “ecology of assimilation,” in which Han masses were to 
migrate to the frontier and remake it in the likeness of China’s rural interior. 
True, the Han Chinese presence in Kham remained small when the ROC integrated that 
region into Xikang province in 1939. This might suggest that Liu Wenhui and Chiang Kai-shek 
fabricated “an imaginary Xikang province” to ward off foreign claims to the region, but I have 
argued that such a view ignores the very tangible steps that the Liu Wenhui administration took 
toward making the reality of Xikang match its collective imagination. In many ways, 
provincializing Kham was merely a first step toward understanding the environmental 
challenges it posed. The new provincial bureaucracy supported new techniques of observation, 
which produced new forms of empirical knowledge that transformed Chinese views of Kham. 
This epistemic shift is exemplified by the implementation of meteorological observation after 
1939. When surveys suggested that Kham suffered from a “food grain problem,” meteorology 
supported the theory that climate was to blame. It is imaginable that the Xikang administration 
might have abandoned its goal of creating a self-sufficient province. Instead, the provincial 
government, in high modernist fashion, concentrated its agrarian energies on small “high-cold” 
experimental sites run by the Bureau of Agricultural Improvement, where scientists identified 
 




regionally-appropriate “good varieties” of wheat, barley, and other food crops that might be 
extended across southern Kham, if not the entire region. 
Meanwhile, the Department of Education adopted a similar model, concentrating its 
efforts in Kangding and sending methods and teachers further afield. At schools for Khampas, 
public schools practiced what I called “education for assimilation,” emphasizing Chinese 
language, civics, and agricultural skills. But the state apparatus was growing faster than its 
food. Desperate administrators turned to farms in the Ning-Ya piedmont to feed students and 
teachers on the Tibetan plateau, forging linkages between ethnically Tibetan and non-Tibetan 
zones that foreshadowed the incorporation of the Kham dependency into Sichuan Province 
under the People’s Republic of China. 
 
Chinese Roots 
The always-incomplete process of Sinicization in Kham operated (and operates) not only between 
people of different ethnic groups but also in the space between people and the non-human 
environment. The difficulties that the state experienced in trying to make Kham more Chinese 
can only be explained with reference to ecology. How else do we explain the relative success of 
“assimilation” in arable settings vis-à-vis the grasslands? Or the popularity of tunken-style land 
reclamation and agricultural “improvement” among proponents of assimilation? 
On first look, there may appear to be a primarily cultural explanation, which is that certain 
historical actors discursively “constructed” China as an agrarian nation, that this particular 
“construction” of China was to a degree arbitrary and historically contingent, and that, had they 
constructed it differently, there may have been no necessary correlation between ecology and 
Chinese identity.6  As a thought experiment, can we imagine a scenario in which the deeply 
prejudiced author of the 1931 manifesto entitled “Tunken Recommendations on the Moving of 
Soldiers to Xikang” had been socialized to think of China not as “a country founded on 
agriculture” (yi nong liguo), but instead, as “a country founded on agriculture and pastoralism” 
(yi nong mu liguo)?7 Perhaps, if his vision of China were just “constructed” differently, he might 
have taken less offence to nomadic pastoralism. This supposition would seem to jibe with much 
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of the current literature on nationalism, which holds that the nation-state and nationalism are 
“cultural artefacts of a particular kind.”8 In Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson argues that 
the rise of printing in vernacular languages starting in the 16th century allowed people with no 
tangible connections to imagine themselves as co-members of a national community through 
shared vernacular texts, essentially by writing the nation into existence. Anderson’s inquiry into 
“the cultural roots of nationalism” thus traces it to yet other cultural artefacts.9 In this assessment, 
nationalism appears to exemplify what Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman famously called 
“the social construction of reality.”10 
Put differently, scholars have primarily approached nationalism and the nation-state as 
affairs rather than objects—in the lexicon of classical Chinese, as shi 事 rather than wu 物. An early 
Chinese maxim from The Great Learning (Da xue大學), which reads shi you shi zhong, wu you ben 
mo 事有始终 物有本末, would seem to correspond to this dualistic worldview: “affairs have 
beginnings and ends, while objects have roots and branches.”  Conventionally, the history of the 
nation is approached as the history of affairs with beginnings and ends, rather than objects with 
roots and branches—as shi rather than wu. Its roots are understood to be metaphorical. 
Yet as an agricultural artefact of a particular kind, agrarian nationalism suggests that the 
nation can have roots in the most literal way. At its core is a material practice, farming, that both 
performs the intangible agrarian “spirit” of the nation and sustains the tangible body politic in a 
biological sense. While Anderson perceived that the nation is founded on an ultimate emptiness, 
the nong guo, or agrarian nation, is founded on a manifest thing-ness; it is awash with what Jane 
Bennet calls “thing power.”11 To Anderson, the textbook nation is imagined in reference to the 
empty tomb of the Unknown Soldier; the nong guo, however, is conceived in reference to the 
fruited plain. It is not attuned to what Anderson (after Walter Benjamin) calls “empty, 
synchronous time” but to the rhythm of the farm calendar, the nong li農曆, dictated in large part 
by the biological demands of crops. Even if the existence of the nation is what John Searle calls an 
“institutional fact,” or a fact by social convention, the nation-state in its agrarian conception is 
built out of what Searle calls the “brute facts” of human-plant interactions so that it exemplifies 
not so much the social construction of reality as what Searle terms “the construction of social 
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9 Anderson (2006), pp. 9-38. 
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reality” out of those brute facts. 12 It is neither strictly affair nor object, neither shi nor wu, but 
rather a hybrid shiwu. 
What does it mean to think of the nation as a shiwu? For inspiration, we might consider 
Aldo Leopold’s inventive notion of the “land ethic.” Leopold, an early ecologist, was generally 
unconcerned with nationalism. He interests me here because of the way he subverted the notion 
of “community” so as to goad his readers and listeners out of their anthropocentric worldview. 
He contended that if the traditional picture of a community is that of a certain number of people 
who live together on the land, we ought to conceive of “the land” itself as a community of 
relationships between humans, plants, animals, and soil--a “biotic community”—and to extend 
our ethics to that community.13 
A site where Leopold’s notion of the “biotic community” might be said to intersect with 
Anderson’s (later) notion of the “imagined community” is in the concept of national land, or as it 
is more commonly called in English, national “territory.”14 Consider once more the statement: 
“the tu of Kham is a part of our national tu.” What does such a statement imply about the people 
who lived on that tu?  In what community did they participate? Peering through our different 
analytical lenses, we see that these were people who, as part of an imagined community, were 
supposedly linked through the nation by an imagined fraternal bond (which they themselves 
may not have acknowledged), and who, as part of a biotic community, were simultaneously 
connected through the land by the “fountain of energy flowing through a circuit of soils, plants, 
and animals.” In its own way, I think, agrarian nationalism grasped this complexity. It sought to 
reconfigure the “fountain of energy” in service of the nation, so as to align the biotic community 
with the imagined community. Agrarianism was both a means and an end—a total way of life. 
Material reality militated against imagining the nation in any other way, at least at this 
time, in this place. The impossibility of Sinicization without agricultural development was 
nowhere more evident than in the field of public education. Although the province experimented 
with “nomadic education” (youmu jiaoyu), we saw that sedentary schools were more conducive 
to acculturating children into the nation. But these schools flourished or perished on their access 
 
12 Searle (1995). 
13 See Leopold (1989), pp. 201-226, especially p. 204. 
14 As I explain in chapter two, the Chinese phrase guo tu (“national land/territory”), commonly used in 
the Republican era, makes no lexical distinction between “land” and “territory.” However, the term guojia 




to grain farms—sometimes they were built on farms. The cultural arena was inseparable from the 
agricultural arena. 
Arguably, that is true just about everywhere. That we live in a world where many who do 
cultural work can afford to disregard the agricultural conditions of their existence is, I suspect, 
itself an outcome of the enormous food surpluses that emerged under various agrarian 
nationalisms during the 20th century. If much of the earth was divided among fascists, 
communists and liberals, it was oddly synchronized in a madcap pursuit of higher yields. 
Mussolini waged his Battle for Grain, Mao embarked on his Great Leap Forward, and Norman 
Borlaug spearheaded the American agricultural initiatives we now call the Green Revolution. 
Surely, the nation-state is the best thing that has ever happened to the wheat plant. 
By all indications, agrarian nationalism was such a pervasive and potent phenomenon 
that it is deserving of comparative study, perhaps on a global scale. Still, as I hope this study has 
shown, there are insights to be gleaned from deeply interrogating the archive of a particular time 
and place. What I found (and described in this study) forced me to rethink my prior notions about 
the nation. Like many historians I had come to see the nation-state, after Benedict Anderson, as a 
political form rooted in human culture, and nothing more substantial. In writing this study, I 
found it more productive to think of the nation-state as a semi-organic entity: imagined, yet 
rooted in the earth, not propagated by sheer force of language, but growing under the right 







The arrival of the People’s Liberation Army in 1950 tipped the delicate balance of power that long 
defined Kham as a political region. On the eve of the Communist takeover, Kham remained a 
borderland, in that the contested border between two colonial powers, Tibet and the Republic of 
China, had left the Khampas “room to maneuver and preserve some element of autonomy.”1 The 
respective Guomindang and Tibetan strongholds at Kangding and Chamdo watched each other 
from a distance. Now, Chamdo and Kangding both looked toward Sichuan in anticipation of an 
unfamiliar foe. 
A Tibetan monk named Ratuk Ngawang happened to be visiting Kangding in March to 
collect on a debt that some “Guomindang Chinese people” owed his monastery in Litang when 
he stumbled upon the aftermath of the battle for Xikang’s provincial capital.2 He watched from a 
distance as the PLA lined up Guomindang prisoners by a river near the airstrip and fired on them 
with automatic weapons. Some of the prisoners’ wives leapt into the river to kill themselves; some 
clung to a rock and wept until PLA soldiers carried them away. Ratuk Ngawang recalls that each 
day for about two weeks, the Communists drove four or five truckloads of bound POWs out to 
the airstrip and gunned them down. They also seized and redistributed government property in 
the urban district.3 The province’s Chinese administration was forced to pick sides: some, like 
Zhang Weijiong, survived and even thrived by defecting to the Communist Party, while others 
fought or fled.4 
Khampas, meanwhile, wondered what to expect from the approaching Communist army: 
how would these new Chinese measure up to the old? There was reason to feel conflicted. As we 
saw, the Guomindang had advocated a policy of tonghua or “assimilation” that, if taken to its 
logical conclusion, might have eradicated the customs, language and religion of non-Han peoples 
including the Khampas. By contrast, the Chinese Communist Party advocated equality of all 
“nationalities” (minzu) within a multi-ethnic state, a position clearly stated in the “Common 
 
1 In an oft-cited essay on North American borderlands, Jeremy Adelman and Stephen Aron argue that 
indigenous peoples (or “Indians” in their essay) enjoyed “room to maneuver and preserve some element 
of autonomy” in the fuzzy, contested borderlands between empires until borderlands gave way to 
bordered lands, or territories with fixed borders. I would argue that the same can be said of the Sino-
Tibetan borderlands. See Adelman and Aron (1999), p. 816. 
2 Specifically, this was the aftermath of Guomindang commander Tian Zhongtian’s failed attempt to 
expel the 18th Army of the PLA’s Southwest Military Corps (see the conclusion to chapter six). 
3 Sangjiejia and Tang Danhong (2015), pp. 34-35. 




Program” that the National People’s Consultative Congress promulgated in late 1949.5 But if the 
Guomindang had posed a greater ideological menace than the Communists, that menace was 
mitigated by the Guomindang’s general impotence in the borderlands so long as war raged in the 
interior. In practice, Xikang’s Republican-era administrators had for the most part coexisted with 
indigenous rulers and abbots, if only because they lacked the resources to do otherwise. By 
contrast, victory in the civil war freed the Communists to devote manpower and resources to the 
borderlands, and thus, to stage more dramatic interventions in the political landscape. One could 
only hope they were as benign as they claimed to be. 
1950 in fact saw few reports of PLA violence against Khampas. 6  Rather, it was 
Communists’ decimation of the Guomindang that frightened some into submission. “At the time 
we were extraordinarily astonished,” Ratuk Ngawang recalls of the Kangding massacre; “we 
thought the Communist Party Chinese people were truly devils, they killed so many people!”7 
Juchen Thupten Namgyal, the son of a Degé nobleman, recalls that the king of Degé ordered his 
subjects to stand down: “The Chinese now are different from the Chinese before,” the king 
reportedly warned them. “Resistance is of no use. You must not take reckless action.”8 
Below I narrate the Communist advance largely from the perspective of Degé, drawing 
on two fortuitous sources from that area: the first is an oral history that Juchen Thupten Namgyal 
(Chin: Juqin Tudeng Langjie 居欽圖登朗傑) delivered to two Chinese exiles in 2010, and the other 
is an unpublished PLA survey of Dege county from early 1950. I received almost no access to 
PRC-era archives on Xikang, but these two documents offer a window on processes that were 
likely occurring throughout the Kham dependency. 
First, the PLA mounted a vigorous propaganda campaign in Kham in hope of preventing 
an alliance between Khampas and the Lhasa government, which was represented in Chamdo by 
governor-general Lhalu Tsewang Dorje.9 A pamphlet arrived in Degé ahead of the 18th Army that 
listed four principles of the entering forces: to “deeply love our country” (reai guojia 熱愛國家), to 
eliminate local bandits and traitors, to respect local customs and traditions (fengsu xiguan 風俗習
 
5 Article nine of the Common Program stated that “All nationalities in the People’s Republic of China 
shall have equal rights and duties.” See “The Common Program,” p. 4. 
6 Shakya (2000), p. 40. 
7 Sangjiejia and Tang Danhong (2015), p. 35. 
8 Sangjiejia and Tang Danhong (2015), p. 122. 




慣), and to preserve freedom of religion.10 On arriving in Dege county, PLA forces privately 
recorded intentions to “smash Han chauvinism and narrow ethnic nationalism.”11 This mention 
of “Han chauvinism” (da Han zhuyi 大漢主義) was a tacit condemnation of Guomindang ethnic 
policy, while the reference to “narrow ethnic nationalism” (xia’ai minzu zhuyi 狹隘民族主義) was 
a thinly-veiled promise to quash Khampa and Tibetan separatism. 
The Communists’ success at minimizing inter-ethnic friction in Kham was key to 
overcoming the friction of terrain that, as we have seen, hemmed in so many other Chinese 
armies. Without significant Khampa resistance, the PLA was able to spend about seven months 
building a motorable road from Kangding to the Dri river. Most of the PLA’s transportation 
horsepower, however, was probably in the form of horse and yak power. One PRC history of the 
region recalls that Khampas in Drenthang (Chinese: Dengke), Sershül (Shiqu), Degé (Dege), 
Pelyül (Baiyu), and Kandzé (Ganzi) provided hay for PLA horses, and that many donated pack 
yaks to carry army provisions, such that, according to this history, “the peaceful liberation of 
Tibet was carried on the backs of [Khampa] Tibetan people’s yaks.”12 By the middle of 1950, a 
convoy of soldiers, vehicles, horses, and yaks sped toward Chamdo. 
Meanwhile, Tibetan delegates in Delhi persistently refused the terms that Chinese 
delegates presented for Tibetan unification with the PRC. Abandoning peaceful diplomacy, a 
large contingent of the PLA’s Southwest Army Corps forded the Dri River on October 5. Over the 
next two weeks it overwhelmed the smaller and less disciplined Tibetan forces west of the river 
with thousands of casualties, mostly on the Tibetan side.13 When the incensed Tibetan emissary 
in Delhi accused the Chinese of seizing Chamdo while negotiations were ongoing, the Chinese 
ambassador retorted that “it is better now that you accept Tibet as part of China.”14 
In April 1951, under threat of further violence, a Tibetan delegation led by Ngapö 
Ngawang Jigmei signed a treaty formally titled the “17-point Agreement of the Central People's 
Government and the Local government of Tibet on Measures for Peaceful Liberation of Tibet,” 
concluding a saga that the government of the PRC has since referred to as “the peaceful liberation 
of Tibet.” The terms included Tibet’s allegiance to the PRC “motherland” and acceptance of PLA 
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forces with a vague promise of regional autonomy. In 1965, Ngapö Ngawang Jigmei became the 
first chairman of the new Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), its borders stretching as far east as 
Chamdo, and its autonomy quite limited in practice. 
For their part, Khampas quickly found that Communist promises to respect local 
“customs and traditions” included neither local power structures nor subsistence practices. 
Juchen Thupten Namgyal recalls that when the PLA’s propaganda bulletin first arrived in Degé, 
people there “thought it referred to deeply loving the kingdom of Degé.”15 Instead, the new 
Xikang Province People’s Government sustained the Republican-era division of Degé into five 
different counties (only one of which was named Dege in Chinese) but eliminated the dual 
Chinese-Khampa political structure by disinvesting the king of all titles and assigning his nobles 
to posts in the various counties.16 
The Communists, like their predecessors, were quick to survey arable land with an eye to 
agricultural development. The PLA survey of Dege county, for example, identified 424 mu of 
cultivable wasteland, mostly on the banks of the river.17 Soon a new set of Chinese agricultural 
specialists showed up. Much like their Republican-era predecessors, Juchen Thupten Namgyal 
remembers that they “demanded that when [Khampa] Tibetans plant farms, we exchange our 
traditional plowing for the Chinese fashion; open some small square plots as a model farm, 
fertilize, plant vegetables all according to the Chinese methods.” The Communists also launched 
campaign after campaign to persuade pastoral nomads to adopt more modern production 
methods.18 Plus ça change. 
Interestingly, the government of the PRC excluded the lands of Xikang’s former Kham 
dependency from the region designated Tibet (Xizang), while it simultaneously designated the 
Khampas therein as ethnic “Tibetans” (Zangzuren 藏族人). The result, replicated in parts of 
Yunnan, Gansu, and Qinghai, was the existence of “Tibetan areas” (Zangqu 藏区) outside of Tibet 
as represented on maps of the PRC. This phenomenon invited experimental approaches toward 
administration. In the last month of 1950 the former Kham dependency was labeled the Xikang 
Province Tibetan Autonomous Region (Xikang Sheng Zangzu Zizhi Qu 西康省藏族自治区 ); 
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technically, this was the first “Tibetan autonomous region” in the PRC, predating the TAR by 
some 15 years.  
But Xikang was an awkward province, cobbled together from the portion of Kham that 
Liu Wenhui shielded from the Tibetan army and the slices of Sichuan that he finagled away from 
that province by pleading with the Republican government. With Liu reassigned to a national 
post as Minister of Forestry in Beijing, the First National People’s Congress moved in 1955 moved 
to dissolve Xikang into neighboring provinces. Sichuan absorbed everything east of the Dri river, 
including the former Xikang Province Tibetan Autonomous Region, which now became a 
prefecture of Sichuan: the Garzê Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (Tib: Garzê Börig ranggyong khü; 
Chin: Ganzi Zangzu Zizhi Zhou), with its seat at Kangding. And so, while it is true that Xikang 
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Appendix A: Units of Measurement 
The conversion table below includes only Republic of China units of measurement that are 
referenced within this dissertation. Listed are the national standards; this chart does not account 
for the minor local variations that are known to have existed across China, including Sichuan 
and Xikang, before the founding of the PRC. All figures are rounded to two decimals points. 
Type Chinese unit Dates effective Metric value US value 
Area 
1 mu 畝 1915-1930 614.4 square meters 0.15 acre 
 
1 shimu市畝 
(or mu 畝) 1930-1949 666.67 square meters 0.16 acre 
Volume 
1 dan 石 1915-1930 103.55 litres 27.35 gallons 
 
1 dou 斗 1915-1930 10.35 litres 2.28 gallons 
 
1 sheng 升 1915-1930 1.035 litres 2.19 pints 
 
1 shidan 市石 
(or dan石) 1930-1949 100 litres 26.41 gallons 
 
1 shidou市斗 (or 
dou 斗) 1930-1949 10 litres 2.64 gallons 
 
1 shisheng 市升 
(or sheng 升) 1930-1949 1 litre 2.11 pints 
Mass 
1 shijin市斤 
(or jin 斤)  1930-1949 500 grams 1.10 pounds 
 





Appendix B: 1939 County names in Chinese and Tibetan 
Below are the names of the counties in the Kham dependency of Xikang Province as of January 
1, 1939, along with their common Tibetan names and their current names in Chinese (as of 
2020). Not included in the table is the predominantly Han Chinese county of Luding. Chinese 
names are given in pinyin Romanization and traditional characters, and Tibetan names are 
given in simplified Tibetan transcription. 
Chinese pinyin Tibetan Chinese name today (if different) 
Ba’an 巴安 Batang Batang 巴塘 
Baiyu 白玉 Pelyül  
Danba丹巴 Rongtrak  
Daoba 稻壩 Dappa Daocheng稻城 
Daofu 道孚 Tau  
Dege 德格 Degé  
Dengke 鄧科 Drenthang  
Derong 德榮 Derong  
Dingxiang 定鄉 Chatreng Xiangcheng 鄉城 
Ganzi 甘孜 Kandzé  
Jiulong九龍 Gyezil  
Kangding 康定 Dartsedo  
Lihua理化 Litang Litang理塘 
Luding 瀘定 Chakzam  
Luhuo 爐霍 Drango  
Shiqu石渠 Sershül  
Yajiang 雅江 Nyakchukha  
Yanjing鹽井 Tsakhalo  
Zhanhua 瞻化 Nyakrong Xinlong 新龍 
 
